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Introduction*
This book explores two sets of issues in contemporary epistemology. 
The first part explores issues surrounding the category of basic 
knowledge (or justification) — that is, at a first pass, knowledge (or 
justification) which is immediate, in the sense that one’s justification 
for the known proposition doesn’t rest on any justification for believing 
other propositions.1 The second part investigates issues surrounding 
knowledge-closure and various conditions, namely conclusive reasons, 
sensitivity and safety, which some philosophers have claimed are 
necessary for knowledge. Each part of the book is substantial (there are 
five chapters in the first part and four in the second), and the two sets of 
issues — while evidently of independent interest — are interrelated in 
several ways (on which more below). The Conclusion, which includes 
a prospectus for further work, ties the safety condition on knowledge 
(Chapters Eight and Nine) back to the notion of failure of transmission 
of epistemic warrant (an absolutely central notion in Part One).
Before getting to the substance of the book, some terminological 
remarks are in order. Knowledge is taken to be a propositional 
attitude. Thus our focus is on so-called ‘knowledge-that’, as contrasted 
with other potential forms of knowledge — most saliently, perhaps, 
so-called ‘knowledge-how’.2 ‘Justification’ and ‘warrant’, unless 
*  All footnotes are the author’s own unless otherwise stated.
1  Our chief focus in this book is on empirical knowledge (and extensions of it through 
inference/deduction), though inevitably, at times, consideration of non-empirical 
knowledge becomes salient.
2  For a good overview of knowledge-how, and its contested relationship with 
knowledge-that, see Fantl (2012).
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otherwise stated, are used interchangeably in this book to refer to that 
which makes it epistemically appropriate to believe a proposition, and 
this is commonly referred to as propositional justification or warrant. 
Thus — using the ‘warrant’ nomenclature — if S has propositional 
warrant for a proposition, p, we can talk of S having warrant to believe 
p (or warrant for (believing) p). Also, S has doxastic warrant for p iff 
S has propositional warrant for p and S believes p on the basis of his 
propositional warrant for p. If this is the case, one can talk of S having a 
warranted belief in p (or, perhaps, being warranted in believing p). My 
choice of which term to use on any particular occasion is determined by 
the term most commonly used in the debate into which I’m entering. 
Relatedly, I assume, consistently with there being degrees of belief 
or credences, that there is a workable notion of binary belief. Unless 
otherwise stated, when I refer to ‘belief(s)’ in this book, I am making 
reference to this binary notion.
1. Starting Points
The starting points for our enquiry are G. E. Moore’s (1939) ‘Proof’ of 
an external world and Crispin Wright’s (1985) discussion of sceptical 
arguments and, especially, his introduction of the notion of transmission 
failure. The following argument can be extracted from Moore’s paper:3
(WARRANT FOR 1) I am having a visual experience as of having 
hands.
(MOORE)
(1)  I have hands.
(2)  If I have hands an external world exists.
(3)  An external world exists.
My interest is not primarily in this argument and its logical properties 
but in reasoning with the argument. This reasoning involves inference, 
a mental activity, in contrast with the argument itself, which is an 
3  In this book I do not enter into the exegetical question of how best to interpret 
Moore (1939).
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ordered set of propositions. On the distinctions between argument and 
inference, the logical and the psychological, and for strong views on the 
disconnect between the distinctions’ relata, see Harman (1986, 2010), who 
“reject[s] the idea that deductive rules like modus ponens are in any way 
rules of inference” (2010: 152).
As it is formulated here, (WARRANT FOR 1) is a proposition about 
Moore’s experience. According to one interpretation of the argument, 
this proposition is a premise and the transition from this premise to (1) 
involves inductive inference. According to another interpretation, the 
visual experience described in (WARRANT FOR 1) makes it epistemically 
appropriate to believe (1) — and the transition from experience to belief 
is not one of inference. Whichever way the epistemic support for (1) is 
understood, the critical question is whether this support is transmitted 
across the simple modus ponens inference to the anti-sceptical conclusion 
(3). Wright suggests that the (MOORE) argument does not provide a 
satisfying response to the sceptic (1985: 437):
Once the hypothesis is seriously entertained that it is as likely as not, 
for all I know, that there is no material world as ordinarily conceived, 
my experience will lose all tendency to corroborate the particular 
propositions about the material world which I normally take to be 
certain.
Thus, Wright continues (437): “Only if Moore already has grounds for 
[(3)] does [(WARRANT FOR 1)] tend to support [(1)].”4
Wright’s purpose is not, of course, to promote scepticism; he notes 
that scepticism could be avoided “if it could be reasonable to accept a 
group III proposition [e.g. (3)] without reason; that is, without evidence” 
(1985: 459). In later work (e.g. 2004) he refers to the envisaged unearned 
warrant as ‘entitlement’.5 If we have an unearned and non-evidential 
warrant for (3), then (WARRANT FOR 1) does support (1). But, Wright 
says, it would be a mistake to think that this evidential support is 
transmitted across the inference from (1) to (3) (1985: 436–37):
It simply is not true that whenever evidence supports a hypothesis, it 
will also support each proposition which follows from it. The important 
4  For more on this, see Davies (2004: 215, 217).
5  Such entitlement would seem to be a form of a priori default warrant. For Wright’s 
latest word on entitlement, see his (2014).
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class of exceptions illustrated are cases where the support offered to the 
hypothesis is conditional upon its being independently reasonable to 
accept one in particular of its consequences.
Thus, on Wright’s account, there is failure of transmission of epistemic 
warrant from premise to conclusion in cases with the structure of the 
(MOORE) argument. Warrant is not transmitted from the premise (1) 
to the conclusion (3) because the support for (1), provided by the visual 
experience as of having hands, is conditional or dependent on its being 
antecedently and independently reasonable to accept (3).6
Authors writing about warrant transmission and transmission failure 
often present principles concerning the (non-)transmission of warrant, 
and such principles will be mentioned at many points in this book. I do 
not definitively commit to any particular such principles. Throughout, I 
simply explore these principles, taking them — in particular, the results 
they mandate — to be answerable to a more general notion of epistemic 
circularity. Plausibly, it is because the (MOORE) argument exhibits 
a kind of epistemic circularity that it does not provide a satisfying 
response to the sceptic. There would be no evident circularity, and no 
correspondingly obvious explanation for the unsatisfying character of 
the (MOORE) argument, if our warrant to believe (1) (‘I have hands’) did 
not rest or depend on a warrant — whether earned or unearned — to 
believe or assume (3) (‘An external world exists’).
2. Immediate Justification and Basic Knowledge
We shall say that a subject has immediate or basic justification for 
believing p iff that subject is justified in believing p, and that justification 
doesn’t rest or depend on any justification for believing other supporting 
propositions. This account of immediate justification is related to the 
notion of epistemic antecedence.7 I prefer to leave the notion intuitive, 
and not to commit to a substantive analysis thereof. However, should 
I need to commit to a substantive analysis of epistemic antecedence, 
6  For more on this, see Davies (2004: 217–21) and McGlynn (2014). See Moretti and 
Piazza (2013) for a good survey of transmission issues.
7  The very idea that there could be genuine instances of this to-be-explained notion of 
epistemic antecedence is seemingly called into question by some philosophers (cf. 
Chapter Four).
 5Introduction
let me tentatively endorse James Pryor’s (2000: 525): “Your justification 
[i.e. warrant] for believing p1 is antecedent to your justification [i.e. 
warrant] for believing p2 just in case your reasons for believing p1 do 
not presuppose or rest on your reasons for believing p2. Your reasons for 
believing p1 can not beg the question whether p2.” It should be noted 
that the analysans contains several interrelating notions — presuppose; 
rest; reasons — which may themselves call for further analysis.8 I 
shall make use of a notion of epistemic dependence, related to Pryor’s 
notion of epistemic antecedence as follows: your warrant to believe p 
is antecedent to your warrant to believe q just in case your warrant to 
believe p does not depend on your warrant to believe q. A notion of 
epistemic antecedence more demanding than Pryor’s would require, in 
addition, that warrant to believe q does depend on warrant to believe p.
I explore a contrasting notion of temporal antecedence in Chapter 
Two — a notion which some philosophers (e.g. Zalabardo 2005) seem, 
upon analysis of their work, to take to be the important notion of 
antecedence in these debates. Here I offer several quick notes about the 
relationship between temporal antecedence and epistemic dependence 
(and the theses I come to put on display will be implicitly utilised in 
Chapter Two). First:
(TE1) If warrant for p is temporally antecedent to warrant for q, 
then it’s not the case that warrant for p is epistemically dependent 
on warrant for q.
If one can have warrant to believe p without (yet) having warrant to 
believe q, then the warrant to believe p cannot be epistemically dependent 
on warrant to believe q. One could, though — it would seem — have 
a warranted belief p without (yet) having a warranted belief q, even 
though warrant to believe p is epistemically dependent on warrant to 
8  A cautionary note about terminology: Pryor (2004) uses the term ‘liberal’ — to 
contrast with ‘conservative’ — to refer to stances endorsing immediate justification 
of this kind. (Such stances are liberal in the sense of not requiring — as a conservative 
stance would — justification for believing the other supporting propositions. And 
Pryor’s dogmatism is one such liberal stance.) Huemer (2001: ch.5), meanwhile, 
coined the term ‘phenomenal conservatism’ to refer to (and endorse: see, inter alia, 
2006, 2007) a stance of a kind which Pryor would refer to as ‘liberal’. (For a recent 
collection of essays on dogmatism and phenomenal conservativism, see Tucker 
(2013a).) I avoid these labels, and thus this potential confusion, in this book.
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believe q. Pryor (2012: 271) describes a position (not his own), according 
to which warrant to believe p could be epistemically dependent on 
warrant to believe q, even though warranted belief in p would not need 
to be based on warranted belief in q (nor even on warrant to believe q).
Second:
(TE2) It is not the case that: If warrant for p is temporally 
antecedent to warrant for q, then warrant for q is epistemically 
dependent on warrant for p.
One could have warrant to believe p without (yet) having warrant 
to believe q, even though warrant to believe q is not epistemically 
dependent on warrant to believe p. After all, warrant to believe q might 
be quite unrelated to warrant to believe p. Part of my aim in Chapter 
Two’s engagement with Jose Zalabardo — when I next return to consider 
notions of temporal antecedence — is to argue that epistemic antecedence 
and dependence are the important notion in these debates.
So, returning squarely to the epistemic domain, let us suppose — as 
an example of immediate or basic justification — that the mere having 
of a visual experience as of having hands gives one defeasible perceptual 
justification to believe that one has hands. Pryor introduces the notion 
of defeasible justification in the following way (2000: 517): “Our 
perceptual justification for beliefs about our surroundings is always 
defeasible — there are always possible improvements in our epistemic 
state which would no longer support those beliefs”. Similarly, defeasible 
justification is “justification that does not guarantee that our beliefs are 
correct” (2000: 518).9 If a subject has knowledge on account of having 
immediate or basic justification then we shall say that the subject has 
immediate or basic knowledge.
Importantly, focusing on the preceding sentence, it is ‘if’ and not ‘iff’: 
I want to leave open, and later in the book explore, a different form 
of knowledge, explored by Stewart Cohen (2002, 2005), aptly called 
‘immediate’ or ‘basic’, which, importantly, is not — better: need not 
be — arrived at on account of having immediate or basic justification. 
(It may be that the ‘basic’ terminology sits easier with this form of 
9  Cf. Williamson (2000: 265–66) on the putative both-ways independence of 
defeasibility and non-factiveness.
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knowledge than the ‘immediate’ terminology.) Cohen (2002: 310) calls 
knowledge delivered “prior to one’s knowing that the source is reliable” 
basic knowledge.
How best to understand this Cohenian basic knowledge? Consider 
(Cohen 2002: 309):
KR: a potential knowledge source K can yield knowledge for S only if S 
knows that K is reliable.
Allowing for basic knowledge involves rejection of KR. Here is my 
understanding of such a rejection: it allows for knowledge of a kind 
that can be yielded for S by a potential knowledge source K even if S 
does not know K is reliable. It is not saying that only knowledge that 
is actually yielded for S prior to S’s knowing that its source is reliable can 
be basic knowledge. Instead, even when S does know that K is reliable, S 
can still continue to acquire basic knowledge from source K. S can still 
acquire knowledge that could have been yielded for S by K even if S did 
not know K is reliable. (Of course, it is also the case that, if S does know 
that K is reliable, then S can acquire knowledge based on S’s knowledge 
that K is reliable.) In sum, I understand Cohen’s basic knowledge as a 
modal notion: a case in which K yields for S knowledge that p and S 
happens to know that K is reliable may still be a case of basic knowledge in 
Cohen’s sense if S’s knowledge that p is of a kind that could be yielded for 
S by K even if S did not know K is reliable.
Assuming I’m right on all this, the pressing question would 
become: what would it be in virtue of that we could have Cohen’s basic 
knowledge? A natural thought at this point would be, given Cohen’s 
focus on knowledge, to appeal to a notion of epistemic antecedence or 
dependence for knowledge: we could have Cohen’s basic knowledge 
in virtue of knowing p not being epistemically dependent on knowing 
K is reliable. Now Cohen doesn’t provide us with such a notion, but 
we might — at this point — draw on Pryor’s (2000: 525) “exten[sion of] 
th[e] notion of epistemic priority to knowledge”:
[Y]ou count as knowing p1 antecedently to knowing p2 just in case you 
know p1 and p2, and the justification on which you base your belief in 
p1 is antecedent to the justification on which you base your belief in p2.
Now Pryor (2000: 521) himself notes that “connections between 
justification and knowledge are complicated”, so we must be cautious 
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here. I suggest that a subject S who knows p and knows that the source 
of that knowledge is reliable (q) can have Cohenian basic knowledge if:
the justification on which S bases his belief in p does not 
epistemically depend on the justification on which he bases his 
belief in q.
I also suggest that a subject S who knows p and does not know that 
the source of that knowledge is reliable (q) can have Cohenian basic 
knowledge if:
the justification on which S bases his belief in p does not 
epistemically depend on any justification to believe q.
It seems implausible that a subject S who knows p and knows that 
the source of that knowledge is reliable (q) can have Cohenian basic 
knowledge if:
the justification on which S bases his belief in p epistemically 
depends on the justification on which he bases his belief in q.
And it seems at best unclear that a subject S who knows p and does not 
know that the source of that knowledge is reliable (q) can have Cohenian 
basic knowledge if:
the justification on which S bases his belief in p epistemically 
depends on a justification to believe q.
Now this is only a first pass, but I hope to have gone some way towards 
connecting epistemic antecedence and dependence for knowledge 
(Cohen’s focus) with epistemic antecedence and dependence for 
justification/warrant (my chief focus, and Pryor’s). Moreover, though 
I have not settled whether or not we can in fact have Cohenian basic 
knowledge in any particular case, I have given a view of what it is in 
virtue of which we might have it.
It remains to depict the relationship between this Cohenian basic 
knowledge and Pryorian basic knowledge. Suppose, then, that some 
knowledge is basic knowledge in Cohen’s sense. Does it follow that 
the corresponding justification is an immediate justification in a 
Pryorian sense? The answer is ‘no’. Cohen (2002: n. 4) asserts: “One 
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could consistently hold that basic knowledge in my sense must be 
based on other beliefs, provided it need not be based on the belief that 
the belief source is reliable.” (And we may take it if the knowledge 
is based on knowledge of, or justification to believe, other propositions, 
it would still be basic in Cohen’s sense.) Straightforwardly then, this 
knowledge wouldn’t be Pryorian basic knowledge, which involves 
justification which isn’t based on any other beliefs (or on knowledge of, 
or justification to believe, any other propositions). Thus, Cohenian basic 
knowledge need not be Pryorian basic knowledge.
What about the converse entailment? Is it the case that Pryorian basic 
knowledge must be Cohenian basic knowledge? This time, the answer is 
‘yes’. Cohen (2002: n. 4) asserts: “[A]ny basic knowledge in the traditional 
foundationalist sense will be basic in my sense as well.” Now while it’s 
not entirely clear what Cohen means by ‘traditional’,10 this assertion is 
an important clue as to Cohen’s intentions. Pryorian basic knowledge 
is arrived at on account of immediate justification — justification not 
based on any other beliefs. A fortiori, then, it isn’t based on “the belief 
that the belief source is reliable” (Cohen 2002: n. 4), which is the key to 
securing Cohenian basic knowledge. Thus, Pryorian basic knowledge 
must be Cohenian basic knowledge.
Thus, summing up, we have two forms of knowledge which can 
aptly be referred to as basic knowledge. As a conceptual matter, there 
is no bar to a piece of knowledge being both Pryorian and Cohenian 
basic knowledge. But Pryorian basic knowledge and Cohenian basic 
knowledge are independent of one another: Cohenian basic knowledge 
need not be Pryorian basic knowledge. They are not, however, both-
ways independent of one another: Pryorian basic knowledge must be 
Cohenian basic knowledge. Pryorian and Cohenian basic knowledge 
are, then, logically distinct — in the sense of not being extensionally 
equivalent. These two forms of basic knowledge are at stake as we move 
through Part One of the book, and are contrasted further in the Interim 
Review. (I hereinafter take care, where there is a potential for confusion, 
to explicitly distinguish between these two forms of basic knowledge.)
10  Indeed, his introduction of ‘evidentialist foundationalism’ — a Pryorian 
thesis — muddies the water somewhat.
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3. A Pattern of Objection
Having introduced immediate justification and basic knowledge, we 
can say that there would be no evident epistemic circularity in the 
(MOORE) argument if our perceptually based knowledge were to 
be Pryorian basic knowledge; that is, if the justification to believe (1) 
provided by the visual experience described in (WARRANT FOR 1) 
were to be immediate — not dependent on a justification to believe any 
other proposition, such as (3). According to the epistemological position 
known as dogmatism (Pryor, 2000, 2004), merely having a perceptual 
experience that represents the world as being a certain way provides 
immediate, though defeasible, justification to believe that the world is 
that way.11 So the epistemological dogmatist cannot appeal to epistemic 
circularity to explain why the (MOORE) argument does not provide a 
satisfying response to the sceptic.
On the face of it, this is a problem for dogmatism; and the problem 
generalises. Stewart Cohen (2002, 2005) considers arguments such as the 
following:
(WARRANT FOR 1) The table looks red.
(TABLE)
(1)  The table is red.
(2)  If the table is red, then it is not white with red lights shining 
on it.
(3)  The table is not white with red lights shining on it.
Here it might be said, by analogy with what Wright (1985) says about 
the (MOORE) argument, that it is only if one has antecedent warrant 
(perhaps unearned warrant) for (3) that the visual experience as of the 
table being red, described in (WARRANT FOR 1), supports (1). If this 
is, indeed, the structure of dependence of justification in the (TABLE) 
argument, then the argument involves a kind of epistemic circularity 
11  See Wedgwood (2011: n. 4) for a “claim that the process of taking one’s sensory 
experiences at face value is primitively rational [, which] is similar in spirit to the 
position that James Pryor (2000) has called ‘dogmatism’.”
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and provides another example of transmission failure. This seems to 
fit well with the intuitive view that simply looking at the table and 
following through the (TABLE) argument is not an adequate way 
of assuring oneself that one is not being misled by tricky red lights. 
(Wright, 2003: 60–63, discusses this same example — but with a red wall 
instead of a red table.)
However, according to dogmatism, merely having a perceptual 
experience that represents the table as being red provides immediate, 
though defeasible, justification to believe (1) (‘The table is red’). 
Specifically, this justification does not depend on an antecedent 
justification to believe (3) (‘The table is not white with red lights shining 
on it’). So there is no epistemic circularity and no failure of transmission 
of warrant.12 This is a problem for dogmatism — the problem of easy 
knowledge (Cohen, 2002: 313): “It seems very implausible to say that 
I could in this way come to know that I’m not seeing a white table 
illuminated by red lights.”13
Cohen (2002, 2005) raises a second problem for views that allow 
immediate justification and basic knowledge: what I shall, for contrast 
purposes, refer to as the problem of easy evidence, or bootstrapping. Here, 
the question is whether a reasoner is in a position to know, by racking 
up enough pairs of the form <I am having a visual experience as of 
P, P> (e.g. <I am having a visual experience as of the table being red, 
The table is red>), that my visual perception is reliable. In this book, I 
bracket consideration of the problem of easy evidence or bootstrapping. 
Principally this is because I am presently inclined to follow Wright’s 
(2007: 43–44) proposal:
A pool of evidence should be regarded as providing inductive 
confirmation of a hypothesis only if it is reasonable to consider it as 
drawing upon a representative sample. And that in turn requires that 
a significant prior probability for the thesis that counterexamples 
would have shown up in the sample if there are any [sic.]. But the body 
12  Pryor (2004, 2012) suggests instead a dialectical failing. (For more exploration 
of this dialectical route, see Burge (2003) and Markie (2005).) Davies (2009), 
meanwhile — on whom we focus in Chapter Three — explores both epistemic and 
dialectical realms in consideration of these arguments. (For discussion of Davies, 
see Coliva (2010) and Pérez Otero (2013).) For a useful survey article, see Carter 
(2012).
13  For more on this, see Davies (2004: 236–37).
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of ‘confirming’ data compiled by chalking up pairs of the form, <It 
appears visually to me that P, P>, in the way described has no chance 
of containing any counterexamples to the contention of the reliability 
of my visual appearances. So it provides no inductive support for that 
contention in any case, for purely general methodological reasons quite 
independent of Dogmatism.14
I would simply add: if, by contrast, the body of confirming data does 
have a chance of showing up counterexamples to the contention of the 
reliability of my visual appearances, it can provide inductive support 
for that contention. Now I do not, for one moment, pretend that this 
can be the end of the matter (for one thing, there has been a wealth 
of interesting, recent literature on this issue); it does, though, at least 
explain my motivation for not devoting extended treatment to the 
bootstrapping problem in the book.15
The problem of explaining why the (MOORE) argument does not 
provide a satisfying response to the sceptic about the external world, 
and the problem of explaining why the (TABLE) argument does not 
intuitively provide assurance that one is not the victim of a trick of 
the light, instantiate a pattern of objection to dogmatism, immediate 
justification, and basic knowledge. And, at a very general level, it is this 
pattern of objection which forms the core of Part One of the book.
4. The Backdrop of Foundationalism
Before turning to the second part of the book, a matter pertaining to the 
backdrop against which the book is written — in particular, the first part 
of the book — must be addressed. There are two reasons for delving into 
this. First, at a general level it is important to be clear about the scope 
of the issues addressed head-on in the book. Second, and relatedly, it is 
important to note a particular epistemological approach falling outside 
14  Wright (2011: 36) has since qualified this claim somewhat (in response to 
conversation with Cohen), and it is an interesting question whether the qualification 
is necessary.
15  I note that William Alston (1989) called bootstrapping ‘epistemically circular’ 
reasoning — and Alston’s usage has become popular. While I don’t dissent from 
this terminology, I use ‘epistemically circular’ in a different sense in this book. 
Finally, see Cohen (2010) and Wedgwood (2013) for interesting recent remarks on 
bootstrapping.
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the scope of the book, as the adoption of this approach would lend a 
very different view of issues central to the first part of the book.
In a nutshell, Part One of the book takes place against the backdrop 
of a form of foundationalism.16 And it should be noted that on a (much 
more) coherentist epistemology, many of the issues opened up in this 
book — e.g. the problem of easy knowledge — may well take on a very 
different form, or even disappear. (Relatedly, on such an epistemology, 
it is not clear how there could be instances of epistemic antecedence 
or dependence between two propositions, of the kind which might 
underwrite instances of transmission failure.) This is all a little gnomic. 
To make it less gnomic I need to do three things: first, say a little more 
about foundationalism and coherentism; second, explain what I mean 
by ‘backdrop’; and finally, explicate why it is an upshot of a (particular) 
coherentist approach that issues such as the problem of easy knowledge 
alter form, or even dissolve. Pursuing these issues — in particular, 
addressing the upshots of coherentism for issues in this book — will 
involve analysis of Ernest Sosa’s (2009) position on the problem of easy 
knowledge.
First, then, what are foundationalism and coherentism? 
Foundationalism first. Pryor (2001: 100–01) succinctly states the matter 
thus:
According to the foundationalist, the justification for all our beliefs 
ultimately traces back to a set of ‘basic beliefs’, which we have immediate 
justification for using.
(It is worth emphasising that Pryor is using ‘immediate justification’ in 
the sense delineated earlier in this introductory chapter.) We can take 
this to be core foundationalism — a thesis to which all foundationalists 
must be committed. Within the genus foundationalism we can follow 
Pryor in prising apart two species — traditional (or robust) and modest.
There appear to be two characteristics or hallmarks of traditional 
foundationalism; one is a claim pertaining to the nature of the basic 
beliefs, and one is a claim pertaining to the security with which such 
16  See Pryor (2001: sec.2) for a good overview of, and extensive list of references for, 
foundationalism’s development in recent epistemology. I shall be drawing on 
material from Pryor (2001) in what follows in the main text. See also Fumerton 
(2000/2010) for a good survey of foundationalism.
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beliefs are held by the believer. The traditional foundationalist approach 
to the nature and security of basic beliefs can be summarised thus:
Traditionally, foundationalism thought that these basic beliefs could 
only concern the nature of one’s current thoughts and experiences. 
(And perhaps some a priori matters as well.) All our other empirical 
beliefs, including beliefs about our perceptual environment, had to 
rest inferentially on this austere foundation of beliefs about our current 
mental states. These basic beliefs were thought to be exceptionally secure. 
They were often claimed to be infallible and indubitable. According to 
many foundationalists, the reason why these beliefs were so secure was 
that we had a non-propositional ‘direct apprehension’ of the mental 
states the beliefs were about. (Pryor 2001: 101)
Traditional foundationalism came in for persuasive criticism on all 
counts; and philosophers of a foundationalist bent have, typically, 
responded not by rejecting core foundationalism, but by adopting 
a more modest version of foundationalism than that found in its 
traditional precursor. This modesty is evident in a weakening of the 
foregoing ‘security claim’:
Newer forms of foundationalism are quite ‘modest’, in that they allow 
basic beliefs to be fallible, revisable, less than maximally justified, and 
so on. They only require that these basic beliefs be immediately justified 
[…] (Pryor 2001: 101)
Additionally, there has been a sea-change in the ‘nature claim’ as held 
by modest foundationalists: “Some of these new foundationalists allow 
beliefs about our perceptual environment to qualify as basic” (Pryor 2001: 
101). Finally — crucial for our coming contrast with coherentism — to 
be a modest foundationalist is not to rule out “important epistemic roles 
for facts about coherence, e.g. they may allow facts about coherence to 
defeat or to strengthen one’s justification of a belief, even a basic belief.” 
(Pryor 2001: 101) What, then, makes modest foundationalism a genuine 
form of foundationalism? It is its commitment to the above-mentioned 
core foundationalism — its commitment to a set of basic beliefs for 
which we have immediate justification. It is this modest foundationalism 
which serves — in a sense to be explained — as the backdrop for Part 
One of the book (and hereinafter I use the term ‘foundationalism’ to 
refer to this modest form thereof).
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Now to coherentism. It should be evident from the foregoing 
that our resulting taxonomy is going to be more complex than a 
simple foundationalism/coherentism divide according to which 
foundationalism allows no epistemic role for coherence: foundationalism, 
we have seen, can allow some epistemic role for coherence. Before getting 
to our ultimate taxonomy, let us, in broad-brush form, set out a working 
thesis of coherentism:
According to the coherence theory of justification, also known as 
coherentism, a belief or set of beliefs is justified, or justifiably held, just 
in case the belief coheres with a set of beliefs, the set forms a coherent 
system or some variation on these themes […] By a traditional account of 
coherence we will mean one which construes coherence as a relation of 
mutual support, consistency or agreement among given data (propositions, 
beliefs, memories, testimonies etc.) (My emphasis) (Olsson 2003/2012)17
Let us refer to an account of justification of this form as pure or robust 
coherentism. Its purity or robustness is arrived at by dint of the italicised 
‘just in case’ in the above quotation. Finally, let us refer to an account 
of justification allowing a significant role for coherence — in the sense 
outlined in the above quotation — but not adopting the ‘just in case’ claim 
distinctive of pure/robust coherentism as impure or modest coherentism.18 
(It is regrettably not, I think, as simple a matter as replacing ‘just in case’ 
with ‘if’/‘only if’ in the above quotation to arrive at impure or modest 
coherentism.) And just as modest foundationalism can be supplemented 
by a role for coherentism, let us, plausibly, assume that impure/modest 
coherentism can be supplemented by a role for foundationalism.
We are now in a position to state our tripartite taxonomy: (modest) 
foundationalism; impure/modest coherentism; and pure/robust 
coherentism. One thing should be readily apparent. Foundationalists 
can allow and impure/modest coherentists do allow a role for coherence 
in the epistemic justification of a belief or set of beliefs. The natural next 
question then becomes: what determines whether an account of epistemic 
17  Olsson (2003/2012) goes on to provide an illuminating analysis of coherentism in 
much more detail.
18  Wright (2011) also adopts the ‘pure’/‘impure’ coherentism distinction, though he 
puts a somewhat different gloss on it. (The gloss is not so different as to render 
impermissible, in this Introduction, quoting Wright when using the distinction.) 
We will shortly come to see an instance of impure or modest coherentism which 
Wright (2011) labels ‘frictional coherentism’.
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justification that allows a role for coherence in epistemic justification 
gets to be foundationalist or coherentist? As one might anticipate, there 
is no clean answer to this question. My working assumption is that the 
significance of the role ascribed to coherence determines this: the less 
significant, the more likely we are to have a foundationalist theory; the 
more significant, the more likely we are to have a coherentist theory.19
Now, with this taxonomy in hand, I can explain more fully what 
I mean by the ‘backdrop’ against which this book operates. I’ve said 
the book takes place against the backdrop of a form of foundationalism. 
We’re now in a position to see two related things. First, given the form 
of foundationalism in question is modest (and not traditional/robust), 
this backdrop is not stipulating away any possible role for coherence in a 
theory of epistemic justification. Second, and relatedly, this backdrop is 
not stipulating away impure/modest coherentism. As regards ‘backdrop’ 
itself, what precisely do I mean in this context? I absolutely do not mean 
that (modest) foundationalism’s truth is presupposed: on the contrary, 
much of the first part of the book is an exploration — a testing — of its 
viability. (Indeed, one of the chief interlocutors in Part One of the book 
is Wright — a philosopher who would not ascribe to foundationalism 
in the sense delineated here.) Instead I mean something a little more 
nebulous: the first part of the book takes seriously the viability of 
(modest) foundationalism (compatibly with which, it also, we have 
seen, takes seriously a role for coherence in epistemic justification). 
Limitations of space regrettably mean that something has to give, and 
a corollary of erecting this foundationalist backdrop to the book is that 
extended treatment is not given to pure/robust coherentism.20
Beyond the independent importance of making this backdrop clear, 
why spend so much time on this ostensibly merely terminological 
matter? Because, as I want to show now, this backdrop has important 
upshots for the broad shape of problems considered in the first part 
19  Three points: (1) Regarding significance: it is notable that the two examples, 
reproduced in the main text, which Pryor gives of a role that a modest foundationalist 
can ascribe to coherence are defeating or strengthening (presumably pre-existent) 
justification. (2) I assume that the impure/modest coherentist can allow a role for 
factors which are neither coherentist nor foundationalist (that is, I assume that it 
is not the case that factors that are not coherentist are ipso facto foundationalist). 
Nothing crucial hangs on this, however. (3) With all this in hand, we can plausibly 
describe our taxonomy as exclusive; it will almost certainly not be exhaustive.
20  And so the antonym of ‘takes seriously’ is not ‘takes unseriously’.
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of the book. In particular, I want to show that if — and, importantly, 
only if — pure/robust coherentism is adopted, problems such as that 
of easy knowledge alter their form entirely.21 Put differently: problems 
such as that of easy knowledge — and putative solutions thereto — take 
the form as presented in this book against the backdrop of (modest) 
foundationalism, a backdrop which takes seriously both modest 
foundationalism and impure/modest coherentism (plausible forms of 
which assign a role for foundationalism).
One good way into this is by introducing Sosa’s (2009) recently 
articulated views. More specifically, I will do this by focusing on Sosa’s 
stance on the problem of easy knowledge — a problem which receives 
extended scrutiny in Chapters Two and Three of the book. Cohen (2002: 
309) introduces this problem by presenting the following proposition, 
with which we are already familiar:
KR: a potential knowledge source K can yield knowledge for S only if S 
knows that K is reliable.
Sosa (2009: 211) nicely charts consideration of proposition KR as 
presenting us with a dilemma: to affirm KR is to “face the problem of 
vicious circularity”; to deny KR is to face the problem of easy evidence, 
or bootstrapping (and also the problem of easy knowledge as delineated 
above). Here, then, is the beginning of Sosa’s (2009: 239–40) response to 
this dilemma:
The right model for understanding reflective22 justification is not the 
linear model whereby justification is a sort of liquid that flows through 
some pipe or channel of reasoning, from premises to conclusion. 
(Such flow is linear, unidirectional; the pipe or channel “transmits” 
the justification — or warrant, or epistemic status.) A better model is 
rather that of the web of belief, whereby the web is properly attached to 
the environment, whilst its nodes can also gain status through mutual 
support. Any given node is thus in place through its connections with 
other nodes, but each of them is itself in place through its connections 
with the other nodes, including the original given node.
21  It is worth pointing out that, just as traditional/robust foundationalism has fallen 
out of fashion on account of the extremeness of its stance, so too has pure/robust 
coherentism fallen out of fashion.
22  I assume broad familiarity with Sosa’s (2007, 2009) difficult animal/reflective 
distinction, though I delve further into this distinction later.
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Now there is much to be said about this suggestive passage. First, 
though — and most importantly for present purposes — by looking 
at the passage in context we can be fairly sure that, though Sosa is 
acknowledging an epistemic role for coherence, he is not elaborating 
a pure coherentist picture here. As Wright (2011: 38) puts it: “So Sosa’s 
view, although his recourse to the metaphor of the web emphatically 
commits him to coherence as a source of justification, cannot be such 
a pure coherentism.”23 It will, at most, be impure/modest coherentism. 
We can drive this point home by noting Sosa’s remark that the web be 
“properly attached to the environment”.24 Now, while there is nothing, 
so far, to commit Sosa’s impure/modest coherentism to supplementation 
by foundationalism, when we come to piece together Sosa’s position on 
KR such supplementation is hinted at by Sosa.
Before moving on to Sosa and KR — a topic with which we shall 
conclude our introduction of Part One of the book — let’s pause to 
consider a pure coherentist picture with respect to the easy knowledge 
case and the above-noted dilemma arising from consideration of KR. 
Wright (2011: 38) eloquently, but suggestively, puts things thus:
Notably, there is no easy knowledge problem for pure coherentism 
[…] The Dilemma is precisely a problem about how to understand 
the justificational architecture of […] rational beliefs independently 
of considerations of their systematic integration into a larger system. 
The ground is cut from under the Dilemma by the pure coherentist’s 
willingness to disavow that there is any such well-conceived species of 
[…] rationality.25
Now this is all just to vindicate my claim that if we adopt pure coherentism, 
then problems such as the problem of easy knowledge — and answers 
thereto — are not going to take the form they take in this book.
It remains for me to vindicate — or, better, take a first step towards 
vindicating — the corresponding only if claim. Inevitably, I must be 
23  Wright (2011) adds, here, in a footnote (n. 14): “And is much the better for that, 
many would hold. It is pure coherentism that is open to the McDowellian complaint 
about ‘frictionless spinning in the void’.”
24  This indicates some impurity in the coherentism only on the plausible 
assumption — which I hereby make — that a pure coherentist is bound to deny 
that the web of belief (as a whole) needs to be properly attached to the environment 
(as a whole).
25  I have omitted here Wright’s distinction between access- and management-rationality.
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more cautious — less confident — about this claim. My strategy will 
be to show that Sosa’s impure/modest coherentism addresses the 
problem of easy knowledge in much the form in which it is presented 
in this book. I will then perform an inference to the best explanation: all 
(plausible) impure/modest coherentist positions address the problem of 
easy knowledge in much the form it is presented in in this book.26
Wright (2011: 39) notes that:
Sosa’s tendency seems to be to try to address the Dilemma by, as it 
were, distributing the distinction in the two kinds of knowledge [animal 
and reflective] across the horns. So: there has to be some knowledge 
(the animal) for which KR fails if knowledge is to be possible at all; but 
there also has to be some knowledge for which KR holds if knowledge 
is to allow rational scrutiny and organisation under a fully responsible 
epistemic perspective.27
Yet Wright (39) is correct to point out that, at this stage, we can simply 
“present the Dilemma as one for reflective knowledge”.28 Thus, so far, 
we have nothing like the radically different form — dissolution — of 
the problem of easy knowledge as mandated by adoption of pure 
coherentism. How, then, does Sosa explain the accomplishment of a 
transition from mere animal knowledge that, say, the table is red, to 
reflective knowledge of the same proposition?29
26  Two points: (1) This inference is made more plausible by the sophisticated nature 
of Sosa’s account of epistemic justification. (2) At n. 19, I acknowledged that our 
tripartite taxonomy will likely not be exhaustive. In particular, neither Wright 
nor the sceptic would seem to fall neatly into any of our three categories, but the 
claims just made about Sosa hold for the sceptic and Wright too. Thus to establish 
my ‘only if’ claim, I likewise perform a second inference to the best explanation: 
all (plausible) approaches to epistemic justification falling outside our tripartite 
taxonomy address the problem of easy knowledge in much the form it is presented 
in in this book.
27  This is similar to Cohen’s (2002) approach to KR (detailed in Chapter Three) — an 
approach Cohen acknowledges to be drawing on Sosa’s work.
28  In a rhetorical vein, Wright (2011: 39) continues: “How are we to advance from 
the animal knowledge that the wall is red to reflective knowledge that it is so? If 
reflective knowledge requires reflective knowledge of the presuppositions of its 
acquisition, how is the latter to be accomplished?”
29  Wright (39) pauses to consider an impure coherentist answer, which he labels 
frictional coherentism, which is — perhaps surprisingly — not pursued by Sosa. 
In broad outline it is a “pure coherentism restricted to reflective knowledge and 
warrant”. In essence, on this answer, we would have no epistemic role for coherence 
at the level of animal knowledge, and then an exclusive epistemic role for coherence 
in transforming animal knowledge into reflective knowledge. The key point for 
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Sosa suggests (2009: 239):
Consider […] one’s justification for a given commitment (or its status 
as epistemically appropriate): say a commitment that lies behind one’s 
belief that one sees a red wall [e.g. that in the present instance the 
appearance of the wall displays the actual colour of the wall] — might 
one’s reflective rational justification for that commitment gain a boost 
through one’s now basing it in part (perhaps in some very small part) on 
the belief that one does see a red wall? How are we to understand such 
boost in reflective rational justification?
Now this is all somewhat suggestive in nature. Here is one way —
pursued by Wright (2011) — of connecting these suggestive comments 
with Sosa’s impure coherentist account of epistemic justification. It is 
noteworthy that the foregoing suggestive comments of Sosa’s occur 
immediately before the above-quoted ‘web-as-contrasted-with-pipeline’ 
analogy is drawn by Sosa. It is thus natural to take Sosa’s answer to the 
question of how to understand such ‘boosting’ to be provided (in part) 
by the ‘web model’. As Wright (39–40) puts it:
[T]he idea seems to be that once a suitable web of beliefs is in place, 
able to receive and integrate new animal knowledge and take it up 
into reflective awareness, a modest degree of transmission of warrant—
not enough, presumably, to invite the charge of “easy warrant”—
from immediately believed (animally known) premises to those of 
their deductive consequences that articulate presuppositions for the 
acquisition of that knowledge, becomes possible.
Let us assume this is an adequate interpretation of Sosa. The important 
point for present purposes is that this impure coherentist account 
addresses the problem of easy knowledge much as it is presented in this 
book.30 More specifically, even though this impure coherentist account, 
on this view, assigns the foregoing ‘boosting’ role to coherence, the KR 
problem of understanding the ‘justificational architecture’ of beliefs 
independently of their coherence is still a live one. The impurity of this 
present purposes is that, insofar as frictional coherentism is not unrestricted pure 
coherentism, the KR problem of understanding the ‘justificational architecture’ of 
beliefs independently of their coherence is still a live one.
30  It should be emphasised that Sosa is interested, in the chapter under consideration, 
in both what we have called the problem of easy knowledge and the problem of 
easy evidence, or bootstrapping.
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coherentist account ensures that this is a live question; in contrast with 
the previously considered pure coherentist account on which it is not 
live. It remains for me to perform an inference to the best explanation, 
namely: this is so for all impure coherentist approaches.
I take myself to have done the three things I set out to do in this 
section, namely: to explicate further foundationalism and coherentism; 
to clarify what I mean by ‘backdrop’; and finally, to explain why it is 
an upshot of a (particular) coherentist approach that issues such as the 
problem of easy knowledge alter form, or even dissolve. (In this final 
task I have also sketched a view of a sophisticated impure coherentist 
response to the problem of easy knowledge: Sosa’s).
5. Conditions on Knowledge31
Part Two of the book proceeds to examine three putative conditions on 
knowledge which have received much scrutiny from epistemologists 
since their proposals: conclusive reasons (Dretske, 1971: 1):
R is a conclusive reason for P if and only if, given R, ~◊~P (or, alternatively, 
~◊ (R.~P));
sensitivity (Nozick, 1981: 172):
[S knows that p only if] if p weren’t true, S wouldn’t believe that p;32
and safety (Sosa, 1999: 378):
Call a belief by S that p “safe” if: S would not believe that p without it 
being so that p.33
31  For a good survey article of recent debate over these conditions, see Comesaña 
(2007).
32  Recent discussion of the (conclusive reasons and) sensitivity condition as a live 
option as a necessary condition on knowledge is not vast, but cf. DeRose (1995, 
2011), Adams and Clarke (2005), Black and Murphy (2007), Cross (2010). For 
signs of change, see Becker and Black (2012), though it is to be noted that only a 
small number of the essays therein end up defending sensitivity. Roush’s recent 
work (2005, 2010, 2012) on the sensitivity condition bears a special mention here. 
However, as her account (2012: 244) is one which “uses probability rather than 
counterfactuals, and in which the sensitivity condition is neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition”, it does not receive extended treatment in this book.
33  Safety, meanwhile, has proven more popular than sensitivity as a necessary 
condition on knowledge. Indeed, it is its very popularity which demands the 
inclusion of a chapter in this book focusing on it: Juan Comesaña’s (2005) putative 
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Exploration of these conditions on knowledge is evidently of 
independent interest (and I say more about this in the Overview of Part 
Two of the book). For now, I want to introduce two issues of particular 
interest when considering links between the two parts of the book.
The first issue concerns the conclusive reasons and sensitivity 
conditions on knowledge — conditions I attempt to render in as 
plausible a form as possible in Chapters Six and Seven, respectively. 
These two closely related conditions, while not identical, each license a 
rejection of knowledge-closure. (The matter is slightly more complicated 
than this: Essentially, to show a necessary condition on knowledge 
is not closed, isn’t quite yet to show knowledge itself is not closed.34 But 
this complication can be bracketed for present purposes.) For example, 
while one has a conclusive reason for/sensitively believes the table is 
red, one does not have a conclusive reason for/sensitively believe what is 
known to be entailed by this proposition, viz. the table is not: white and 
cleverly lit by red lights. This (controversial) rejection of knowledge-
closure — licensed by adoption of conclusive reasons/sensitivity as a 
necessary condition on knowledge — leads to a straightforward solution 
to the problem of easy knowledge (assuming rejection of KR):35 we can 
have basic knowledge that the table is red, without it following that we 
can have (easy) knowledge that sceptical hypotheses don’t obtain (by 
simple deduction or inference from said basic knowledge).
The problem of easy knowledge is one problem for dogmatism; a 
second is presented in Chapter Five. Rejection of knowledge-closure 
seems to promise a possible solution to that second problem as well — at 
least, for dogmatism about knowledge. But the second problem also arises 
counterexample to safety is the chief focus of Chapter Eight. For some other recent 
putative counterexamples to safety as a necessary condition on knowledge, see 
Vogel (1987: 212, 1999: 165), Hawthorne (2004: 4–5), and Hudson (2007). And for an 
interesting recent discussion of “a safety theoretic conception of knowledge”, see 
Hawthorne (2007). Finally, Comesaña (2007: n. 21) interestingly notes that “under 
the assumption that p is truly believed, if p is sensitive then it is safe (under the 
revised semantics of subjunctive conditionals [gestured at in Chapter Eight, n. 2 
of this book]). Therefore, counterexamples to safety as a necessary condition on 
knowledge are also (further) counterexamples to sensitivity.” But caution is in 
order: Sosa, on whose account of safety we focus in Chapter Eight, does not always 
formulate safety in terms of subjunctive conditionals.
34  See Chapter Seven, n. 6
35  The problem of easy knowledge only arises for theorists (like the dogmatist) who 
reject KR.
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for dogmatism about justification, and here it is instead rejection of a 
corresponding justification-closure principle which promises a possible 
solution.36
Do, then, my tentative arguments against knowledge-closure in 
Chapters Six and Seven carry over to constitute arguments against 
justification-closure? (Interestingly, Wright (2011: 31–32), for example, 
reads Dretske to be rejecting knowledge- and justification-closure.) 
To establish that they do carry over I would need to claim that these 
conditions (conclusive reasons and sensitivity) characterise justification. 
(‘Characterise’ is a hedging term.) Suppose one claimed that conclusive 
reasons or sensitivity are necessary conditions on justification. But to 
show that a necessary condition on justification is not closed, isn’t quite 
yet to show justification itself is not closed — for the premise may fail 
to meet other necessary conditions for justification. Still, in any actual 
case, there might be no reason to suppose that the premise, which 
meets conclusive reasons or sensitivity, fails to meet any other necessary 
condition for justification. (And in the Interim Review I consider 
whether the dialectical context of a defense of dogmatism is one such 
case.) Absent any such failure, one can reasonably suppose that the 
premise is justified and that one has an exception to justification-closure. 
The exception to justification-closure would be explained by the failure 
of closure for the necessary condition (conclusive reasons or sensitivity), 
even though failure of closure for the necessary condition does not (for 
the reason given) logically guarantee failure of justification-closure. (Such 
is typically the way with explanation.)
Now even amongst defenders of these conditions, it is difficult 
to discern unqualified endorsement of these ‘carry over’ claims. 
(Interpretation of Dretske and Nozick on this issue is difficult.) But, 
while it would be inadvisable for me to push any such claim too far,37 I 
do believe it is worthy of serious consideration.38
36  And I take it that if dogmatism about justification is false, then dogmatism 
about knowledge is also false. Importantly, the Interim Review makes clear that 
knowledge-/justification-closure rejection is not the only possible solution for the 
dogmatist.
37  One reason is that I do not have a particularly substantive account of justification. 
This book simply takes justification to be that which makes it epistemically 
appropriate to believe a proposition.
38  Cf. Chapter Six, section 2.6, where I am prepared to talk of “conclusive reasons in 
some sense justify[ing] belief in propositions for subjects”.
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I pick up on, and discuss, these issues further in the Interim Review 
(and beyond). And this linkage between the two parts of the book should 
be kept in mind as the conclusive reasons and sensitivity conditions on 
knowledge are scrutinised in detail in Chapters Six and Seven.39
The second linkage issue connects the safety condition on 
knowledge — scrutinised in detail in Chapters Eight and Nine — with 
an absolutely central issue in the first part of the book: failure of 
transmission of (epistemic) warrant. Martin Smith (2009) has proposed 
an intriguing account of failure of transmission of knowledge40 in terms 
of the safety condition. (In particular, Smith (2009: 172) claims “that a 
failure to transmit safety is a sufficient [but not necessary] condition 
for a failure to transmit knowledge.”)41 I take it if there is failure of 
transmission of warrant, there is failure of transmission of knowledge 
(insofar as warrant is a necessary condition on knowledge);42 but the 
converse entailment does not hold (insofar as warrant may transmit, 
but some other necessary condition on knowledge may fail to do 
so). Thus, there can be failure of transmission of knowledge without 
failure of transmission of warrant. (If such a possibility obtains, that 
would mean that warrant would transmit, but not knowledge.) One 
might then ask: if Smith explains failure of knowledge transmission in 
terms of safety, how will that help us understand failure of warrant 
transmission, if the two — failure of knowledge and failure of warrant 
transmission — can come apart? The answer is that, while there is no 
entailment from the former to the latter, the former may well be playing 
an important explanatory role in many instances of the latter. I discuss 
39  For a good survey article on closure principles, including an extensive list of 
references, see Kvanvig (2006). It is worth noting also that many ‘closure’ principles 
which we encounter in the book, insofar as they involve deduction or inference, 
are closely related to ‘transmission’ principles. For subtle distinctions between 
different versions of closure, and their relationships to problems in this area, see 
Blome-Tillmann (2006). And for a closure-based proposed solution to the problem 
of easy knowledge, see Black (2008).
40  Smith takes it to be something of an historical accident that ‘transmission questions’ 
are formulated in terms of warrant or justification, and not knowledge.
41  It is again possible — though not common amongst participants in these debates — to 
conceive of the safety condition as characterising warrant or justification. (Smith, for 
example, does not do so, but cf. section 2.3 of Chapter Eight, where I am prepared 
to talk of safety playing some form of justificatory role.)
42  And so, if there is not failure of transmission of knowledge, there is not failure of 
transmission of warrant.
 25Introduction
Smith’s proposal further in the Conclusion. For now it suffices to note 
that this second linkage between the two parts of the book should be 
kept in mind while the safety condition on knowledge is scrutinised in 
detail in Chapters Eight and Nine.
I have aimed to produce a straightforward and uncluttered text, and 
to present the main lines of argument with maximum clarity. As a 
consequence, a not insubstantial portion of the words in this book are to 
be found in footnotes. I hope that an initial reading of the main text of each 
individual chapter will provide a clear view of its claims and strategy. 
The footnotes are not, however, dispensable; they provide background 
and connections, elucidation, caveats, and concessions. Ultimately, my 
investigation of the viability of allowing for basic knowledge, and into 
various putative conditions on knowledge, is to be judged on the basis 
of the full text, and not just the main text, of this book.

PART ONE  
EXPLORING BASIC KNOWLEDGE

Overview of Part One
In Part One of this book, immediate justification and basic knowledge 
(particularly as these are conceived by the dogmatist) are exposed to 
a pattern of objection. One instance of the pattern is along the lines 
that, if perception delivers basic knowledge of a proposition such as 
the proposition that I have hands, then it would seem to follow that 
Moore’s ‘Proof’ provides an adequate response to the sceptic about the 
external world. At the very least, there would be no evident epistemic 
circularity in Moore’s ‘Proof’. This poses a problem for immediate 
justification and basic knowledge to the extent that Moore’s ‘Proof’ does 
not seem to provide an adequate response to scepticism. Other instances 
of the pattern of objection are presented by arguments that raise Stewart 
Cohen’s (2002, 2005) problem of easy knowledge.
In the first chapter, I consider two prominent responses to the 
question of what (if anything) is wrong with reasoning in accordance 
with the (MOORE) argument — (MOORE)-reasoning. Crispin Wright 
(1985, 2003) says that (MOORE)-reasoning involves epistemic circularity, 
that epistemic warrant is not transmitted from the premise (1) to the 
conclusion (3), and that by engaging in (MOORE)-reasoning one could 
not come to have, for the first time, a warranted belief that an external 
world exists. A dogmatist (Pryor, 2000, 2004) maintains, in contrast, 
that (MOORE)-reasoning does not involve epistemic circularity, that 
warrant is transmitted, and that (MOORE)-reasoning can provide a 
first-time warrant for (3). On the face of it, Wright has a ready answer 
to the question what is wrong with (MOORE)-reasoning, while the 
dogmatist faces the problem of explaining why something seems to be 
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wrong with (MOORE)-reasoning, even though it is not epistemically 
circular and does transmit warrant — the (MOORE)-transmit problem. 
The advantage would therefore seem to lie with Wright’s view rather 
than with that of the dogmatist; but I contest that assessment.
First, Martin Davies (2004) has proposed a solution to the (MOORE)-
transmit problem. Even the dogmatist can agree that, within the context 
of the epistemic project of settling the question whether or not an external 
world exists (a project governed by suppositional doubt about whether 
an external world exists), one cannot rationally deploy one’s perceptual 
justification to believe that one has hands (see Davies, 2009: 364–68).
Second, I argue that, on Wright’s view, there is still a kind of 
transmission of epistemic warrant in (MOORE)-reasoning. According 
to Wright (1985, 2004), by engaging in (MOORE)-reasoning, one cannot 
come, for the first time, to have some justification or other to assume or 
believe the conclusion (3). But one can come, for the first time, to have at 
least partly perceptual and evidential justification to believe (3). Thus, 
(MOORE)-reasoning transmits evidential warrant and Wright faces the 
(MOORE)-transmit problem.
Third, I argue — though in a provisional spirit — that the (MOORE)-
transmit problem is particularly challenging for Wright because it is not 
clear that he can adopt Davies’s (2004) proposal. The proposition that an 
external world exists has, for Wright (2004; see also 1985), ‘cornerstone’ 
status, which may not be consistent with its being called into question or 
doubted, even suppositionally. The upshot is that this first exposure to 
the pattern of objection leaves dogmatism no worse off — and perhaps 
better off — than Wright’s view.
In the second and third chapters, I turn to the problem of easy 
knowledge. Reasoning in accordance with the (TABLE) argument 
(referred to as the (EK) argument in these chapters) seems to allow us 
to proceed too easily from basic knowledge of a quotidian proposition 
(the proposition that a viewed table is red) to knowledge of a conclusion 
that rules out a disobliging hypothesis less general than a global 
sceptical hypothesis (the hypothesis that one is being misled by tricky 
red lighting). My focus in the second chapter is (one strand of) José 
Zalabardo’s (2005) response to the problem of easy knowledge and, 
specifically, an argument to the conclusion that there is no such problem.
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Zalabardo’s argument concerns the relationship between 
transmission of epistemic warrant and closure of warrant under known 
entailment. It is a familiar point that failure of transmission of warrant 
from the premises to the conclusion of a valid argument — as in the 
(MOORE) argument, according to Wright — is consistent with closure 
of warrant. On Wright’s view, we do have a warrant for the proposition 
that an external world exists, but it is an unearned, antecedent warrant, 
and not a warrant transmitted from the premises of the argument. On 
Zalabardo’s view, in contrast, warrant transmission itself presupposes a 
failure of closure. Consequently, unless the (EK) argument constitutes 
an exception to the closure of warrant under known entailment, (EK)-
reasoning does not transmit warrant and so there is no problem of 
acquiring too easy knowledge by inference from basic knowledge. I 
reject Zalabardo’s radical solution to the problem of easy knowledge 
and, along the way, subject key notions — especially warrant and 
transmission — to close examination.
In the third chapter, I develop my own solution to the problem of 
easy knowledge — a solution that is available to the dogmatist. First, 
Davies’s (2004) proposed solution to the (MOORE)-transmit problem 
extends to the problem of easy knowledge. Within the context of the 
epistemic project of settling the question whether or not the viewed 
table is white with red lights shining on it, one cannot rationally 
deploy one’s perceptual justification to believe that the table is red. But 
second, Davies’s proposal is incomplete. There are pairs of arguments 
that Davies has to classify together despite the fact that, intuitively, 
reasoning with one of the arguments is less epistemically unsatisfactory 
than reasoning with the other. Third, I make a proposal about the 
epistemic property that explains the intuitive difference. Thus, it seems, 
epistemic dogmatism, immediate justification, and basic knowledge can 
be defended despite exposure to the pattern of objection.
I turn to a general theoretical issue in the fourth chapter. An important 
notion in the literature that we have been considering (beginning from 
Wright, 1985) is that of warrant transmission failure — conceived, in 
this book, as related to epistemic circularity. (Somewhat confusingly, 
Davies (2004, 2009) sometimes says that the limitation of (MOORE)-
reasoning and (EK)-reasoning in the context of the epistemic project 
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of settling the question — a limitation that can be acknowledged by 
the dogmatist — provides a second account of transmission failure.) 
However, there are philosophers who can be taken to claim that there 
are no genuine instances of transmission failure and also that the 
impression that there are such instances is the product of a flawed 
conception of evidence. There are large and difficult issues here, and 
scepticism about transmission failure may flow naturally from lack 
of enthusiasm for notions of epistemic antecedence or dependence. 
Nonetheless I aim at least to begin the task of showing that transmission 
failure is a possibility on most plausible accounts of evidence.
The availability of the notion of transmission failure (related 
to epistemic circularity) does not, of course, advance the cause of 
dogmatism. The dogmatist needs to respond to the pattern of objection 
without appeal to epistemic circularity and, on the basis of the first three 
chapters, the prospects for such a response seem quite good. In the fifth 
chapter, however, I describe what seems to be a more serious puzzle 
confronting dogmatism. Possible responses are discussed in the Interim 
Review at the end of Part One.
1. Reflections on Moore’s ‘Proof’
Dogmatism, immediate justification, and basic knowledge are to be exposed to a 
pattern of objection. I begin from Wright’s (1985) discussion of Moore’s (1939) 
‘Proof’, and his introduction of the notion of failure of warrant transmission 
(related to epistemic circularity). I argue, against the standard view, that 
Wright’s position does not enjoy an advantage over dogmatism.
0.1 Suppose one has a visual experience as of having hands, and then 
reasons as follows:
(MOORE)
(1)  I have hands.
(2)  If I have hands an external world exists.
(3)  An external world exists.
Suppose one’s visual experience gives one defeasible perceptual 
warrant, or justification, to believe (1) — that is, one’s experience makes 
it epistemically appropriate to believe (1).1 And suppose one comes to 
believe (1) on the basis of this visual experience. The conditional premise 
1  This experience can be — indeed often for Wright it is (e.g. 2004: 170) — taken to 
feature as a premise. If it is so taken we will construe the transition from having 
this experience to coming to believe one has hands as (inductively) inferential. This 
is relevant to Wright’s — but not the dogmatists’ — focus on the claimability of 
warrant. I think this potential disconnect can be safely bracketed here.
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(2) is knowable a priori.2 And (3) can be established by modus ponens 
inference. If one reasons thus, say one is engaged in (MOORE)-reasoning.
What, if anything, is wrong with (MOORE)-reasoning? I consider 
two prominent responses to this question — the dogmatists’ and Crispin 
Wright’s. Each finds fault in (MOORE)-reasoning, but on different 
grounds.
0.2 Let’s start with the following accounts of (non-)transmission of 
warrant:
(α) Non-transmission of warrant
Epistemic warrant is not transmitted from the premises of a valid 
argument to its conclusion if the putative support offered for one of the 
premises is conditional on its being antecedently and independently 
reasonable to accept the conclusion. (Davies 2004: 221)3
(β) Transmission of warrant
A valid argument [transmits warrant] if […] to have warrant for its 
premises and then to recognise its validity is to acquire — perhaps for 
the first time — a warrant to accept the conclusion. (Wright 2003: 57)
Wright’s principle (β) can be contrasted with a closure principle for (an 
inclusive notion of) warrant:
(WC) If one has warrant for p, and knows or justifiably believes 
that p entails q, then one has warrant for q.
On the face of it, the key difference between (β) and (WC) is that the 
latter says nothing about “for the first time”. Acceptance of (WC) for 
an inclusive notion of warrant does not require acceptance of a closure 
principle for each more specific kind of warrant.4
2  This conditional need not — indeed for Wright it does not — feature as a premise.
3  Wright (2003: 57) has a similar sufficient condition for non-transmission. My 
ensuing claims go through, mutatis mutandis, operating with Wright’s condition for 
non-transmission.
4  Further understanding of why, for Wright, (WC) is exceptionless while (β) has 
exceptions must await the introduction of Wright’s notion of entitlement (see 1.2 
infra). Endorsement of (WC), coupled with rejection of a closure principle specifically 
for evidential justification, is relevant to Wright’s response to the leaching problem 
(see 2.2 infra) — the problem providing the stimulus for my claims to come.
 351. Reflections on Moore’s ‘Proof’
0.3 Dogmatists, like James Pryor (2000),5 can be taken to employ a 
notion of negative entitlement: in order for one’s visual experience to 
generate warrant for (1), there is no need to have antecedent warrant 
for (3); in the absence of defeaters one has an entitlement — negative 
in nature — not to adopt the attitude of doubt towards (3).6 For the 
dogmatist, then, there is (or can be) warrant transmission in (MOORE)-
reasoning: by recognising the entailment from (1) to (3) the dogmatist is 
in a position to ground a belief in (3) on the very warrant that grounds 
his belief in (1). If there is (or need be) no transmission failure in a piece 
of (1)-(3) reasoning, the dogmatist must explore other avenues for 
finding error in (MOORE)-reasoning.
Wright, meanwhile, employs a notion of positive entitlement: in order 
for one’s visual experience to generate warrant for (1), there is need to 
have antecedent warrant for (3); and we do in fact have antecedent 
warrant — an entitlement — for (3).7, 8 So warrant is — in the absence 
of defeaters — generated for (1); it is just not transmissible to (3). For 
Wright, then, there is transmission failure in (MOORE)-reasoning and, 
resultantly, no alternative avenues need be explored for finding error in 
(MOORE)-reasoning.
In sum, philosophers locating the defectiveness of (MOORE)-
reasoning in transmission failure, as Wright does, typically take 
(MOORE)-reasoning to suffer from a form of epistemic circularity: it is 
only if one already has warrant for (3) that one can have a warrant for 
5  Other candidate dogmatists are Burge (1993, 2003), Davies (2004, 2009), Peacocke 
(2003), and Pollock (1986). As a positive matter, dogmatists take the warrant one 
gets for (1) on the basis of one’s visual experience to be immediate — that is, it does 
not rest on antecedent warrant for any other propositions.
6  The thesis preceding the semi-colon and the thesis following it are both-ways 
independent. Indeed, Pryor himself only explicitly commits to what precedes the 
semi-colon — the notion of negative entitlement is Davies’s (2004) (cf. Dretske 
(2000)). At this point in the chapter no particular substantive notion of entitlement 
itself is yet operative (cf. 1.2 infra where Wright’s notion is introduced). I characterise 
negative entitlement as the conjunction of these two theses, but this is merely 
stipulative. Moreover, one might endorse the thesis preceding the semi-colon while 
maintaining one in fact has antecedent warrant for (3) — see Silins (2007).
7  Again, the thesis preceding the semi-colon and the thesis following it are both-ways 
independent. I characterise positive entitlement as the conjunction of these two 
theses, but this is merely stipulative.
8  Cf. Cohen (1999: 76) and White (2006: 552–53) for such views. Cohen’s notion of 
non-evidential rationality, in particular, bears clear similarities to Wright’s notion 
of non-evidential warrant (see 1.2 infra).
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(1). If (MOORE)-reasoning suffers from transmission failure in this way, 
we can say that propounding (MOORE) cannot offer a new route to its 
conclusion. As dogmatists deny that it’s only if one already has warrant 
for (3) that one can have a warrant for (1), for them warrant for (1) can 
cross over the conditional to provide a first-time warrant for (3).
1. The Standard View
1.1 Nevertheless, the dogmatist thinks (MOORE)-reasoning can 
be problematic: is it really this easy to get warrant for the falsity of 
a global sceptical hypothesis? Assume, then — with the dogmatist 
and Wright — that something (at least) seems wrong with (MOORE)-
reasoning. Consequently, it’s a strength of any account of the structure 
of perceptual warrant(s) that it can give a plausible account of why 
something seems wrong with (MOORE)-reasoning. Call the particular 
problem of giving a plausible account of why something seems wrong 
with (MOORE) reasoning given it can transmit warrant, the (MOORE)-
transmit problem.
I want to focus on the (MOORE)-transmit problem. It’s seemingly 
faced by the dogmatist, but not by Wright: in (MOORE)-reasoning 
warrant is (or can be) transmitted according to the dogmatist, but cannot 
be transmitted according to Wright. Call this view of the (MOORE)-
transmit problem the standard view. My claim is that the standard view 
is wrong. The (MOORE)-transmit problem is not just the dogmatist’s 
problem, it’s Wright’s too: there’s a sense in which there’s transmission 
of warrant in (MOORE)-reasoning for Wright. And I make a stronger 
claim: not only is the (MOORE)-transmit problem Wright’s problem 
(contra the standard view), it’s furthermore more troubling for Wright 
than for the dogmatist. So, at least, I shall argue.
Why is opposing the standard view important? Assume answering 
the (MOORE)-transmit problem is not straightforward. Then, if the 
standard view is correct, a strength of Wright’s account of the structure 
of perceptual warrant(s) is that it doesn’t face the (MOORE)-transmit 
problem. If the standard view is correct, then to that extent we would 
have some motivation to adopt Wright’s account over the dogmatist’s. 
If it’s wrong, however, this motivation disappears.
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1.2 To fully understand the standard view note that, for Wright, (3) lies 
outside the domain of cognitive achievement: it’s “outside the domain 
of what may be known, reasonably believed, or doubted” (1985: 470–
71). Wright so concludes upon consideration of the following pattern of 
sceptical argument (437–38):9
(a)  All our evidence for particular propositions about the material world 
[…] depends for its supportive status on the prior reasonableness of 
accepting [(3)].
(b)  For this reason [(3)] cannot be justified by appeal to such evidence.
(c)  [(3)] cannot be justified any other way.
(d)  [(3)] may be false.
In responding to this argument, Wright accepts (a) and (b), but questions 
(c) — which calls (d) into question. Wright notes that (c) would be 
falsified if “it could be reasonable to accept [(3)] without reason; that is 
without evidence” (450). And if(f) such acceptance is reasonable one has 
non-evidential warrant for, or epistemic entitlement to, (3). For Wright, 
in (1985), it can be reasonable to accept (3) without evidence because 
(3) (and similar ‘cornerstones’ — see Wittgenstein (1969: 341–43)) lies 
outside the domain of truth-evaluability: (3) is, for Wright, not up for 
grabs as either true or false — it is beyond doubt.10
Wright now (2004: 167, n. 2) remarks, however:
The major strategic contrast with the present proposal is in how such 
warrant is conceived. In [1985] I proposed that [(3)] might be regarded as 
defective in factual content and that accepting [it] might accordingly be 
freed from the requirements of evidence that I took to be characteristic of 
the factual. In the present discussion non-factuality is not assigned a role 
in making a case that rational acceptance need not be evidence-based.
It’s one thing to say that non-factuality isn’t assigned a role in making 
a case that rational acceptance of (3) needn’t be evidence-based, and 
9  I thus highlight Wright’s Humean, rather than Cartesian, pattern of sceptical 
argument.
10  Wright, following Wittgenstein, also refers to cornerstones as ‘hinge propositions’, 
but I bracket this since talk of propositions is not easy to square with non-truth-
evaluability. Finally, for an interesting view that Wright’s and Wittgenstein’s 
conceptions of hinge propositions come apart, see Pritchard (2005a: 204–05).
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another to say that (3) is no longer to be regarded as non-factual. 
Wright here commits to the former (justificatory) claim, but makes 
no commitment to the latter (semantic) claim. The claims are distinct, 
and we can forbear from ascribing the latter claim to Wright, while 
respecting his shift with regard to the former.
Entitlement to accept a proposition P, for Wright (2004: 175), 
is unearned: I may have it “even though I can point to no cognitive 
accomplishment in my life, whether empirical or a priori, inferential or 
non-inferential, whose upshot could reasonably be contended to be that I 
had come to know P, or had succeeded in getting evidence justifying P”. 
It’s in this context that Wright introduces the notion of ‘mere acceptance’ 
of (3), as distinct from a more full-blooded acceptance, involving belief:11
We may propose the notion of acceptance of [(3)] as a more general 
attitude than belief, including belief as a sub-case, which comes apart 
from belief in cases where one is warranted in acting on the assumption 
that P or taking it for granted that P or trusting that P for reasons that 
do not bear on the likely truth of P. Of course one may — sometimes 
irrationally — also believe P on such occasions, in the sense implicit 
in a conviction that one knows that P. Successful sceptical arguments 
may then embarrass such convictions […] Such scepticism may prove 
to carry no challenge, nevertheless, to the corresponding acceptances and 
[…] warrant to accept — rather than to believe — cornerstone[s] may be 
enough to block the sceptical paradoxes that attend arguments to the 
effect that there is no such thing as getting evidence to believe them. 
(2004: 177)
Wright recognises a burden to delimit the scope of what we have non-
evidential warrant to accept: “This is a good result […] only if it is 
selective — only if the entitlements generated turn out to be cornerstones 
of our actual ways of thinking about and investigating the world and 
do not extend to (what we would regard as) all manner of bizarre and 
irrational prejudices.” (2004: 195)
1.3 We’ve now considered the standard view of the (MOORE)-
transmit problem. We can go further and consider how to answer it. A 
dogmatist answer has been proposed by Davies (2004: 238–43). Davies 
11  Pryor (2004: 355–56) ignores this aspect of Wright’s epistemology “to keep our 
discussion manageable”. Unfortunately, without more, manageability is here 
achieved at the cost of distortion.
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(now) claims that there is (or can be) warrant transmission in (MOORE)-
reasoning, while conceding that something (still) seems wrong with 
(MOORE)-reasoning. But, if warrant transmission in abstracto isn’t the 
problem, what is?
Davies suggests (2004: 240–41):
[T]here is a kind of epistemic project whose conduct is conditioned by 
suppositional doubt, namely, the project of settling the question whether 
a particular proposition is true […] Imagine that I undertake the project 
of settling the question whether or not there is an external world as 
ordinarily conceived […] by deploying the warrants I have for believing 
the premises of Moore’s argument. I begin the project by regarding the 
question of the truth of the conclusion of Moore’s argument as open pro 
tem. So my conduct of the question-settling project is conditioned by the 
initial supposition that Moore’s conclusion is, or may very well be, false12 
[…] [T]hen I could not rationally regard my experience as constituting a 
warrant for believing [(1)]. In short, I cannot settle the question whether 
or not [3] is true […] by deploying the epistemic warrant I have for 
believing [(1) and (2)].13
This answer to the (MOORE)-transmit problem delimits the epistemic 
situations in which (MOORE)-reasoning transmits warrant. If Wright 
faces the (MOORE)-transmit problem, it seems he can’t avail himself 
of this answer. Davies’s answer to the (MOORE)-transmit problem 
rests on suppositionally doubting (3). But (3)’s status as a cornerstone, 
for Wright, precludes its truth being doubted — suppositionally or 
otherwise. (3) isn’t — on pain of irrationality — eligible for doubt; 
it’s to be unquestioningly accepted. Put differently: according to the 
‘cornerstones’ conception of (3) in (MOORE)-reasoning, there’s no 
question-settling project that can even be attempted. So, for Wright, 
the problem with (MOORE)-reasoning cannot, it seems, be that the 
12  Davies adds elsewhere (2009: 369): “[A] fuller treatment of the project of settling 
the question would have to allow for the case where I begin by supposing that it is 
as likely as not that Q is false”. So principled or mandated agnosticism (see Wright 2007) 
about Q — in which one assigns a credence of 0.5 to both Q and its negation — might 
seem to be a form of suppositional doubt about Q (cf. Chapter Three, n. 9).
13  Pryor (2004, 2012) suggests the problem with (MOORE)-reasoning is not epistemic, 
but rather dialectical.
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argument cannot be deployed in settling the question whether or not (3) 
is true — for there’s no such project.14
This is my (tentative and separable) stronger claim: not only does 
Wright face the (MOORE)-transmit problem; he faces it in a particularly 
debilitating way. I consider this stronger claim in section 3. First I need 
to demonstrate — contra the standard view — that Wright indeed faces 
the (MOORE)-transmit problem.
2. The Standard View Contested
2.1 Wright’s analysis of (MOORE)-reasoning15 seems internally 
consistent. But there’s a wrinkle. Stephen Schiffer (Wright 2004: 177, 
n. 8) has argued that Wright faces what Wright himself terms the 
leaching problem:
How exactly does [my analysis] promise to shore up the possibility of 
justified belief in [(1)]? We are proposing to concede, after all, that we 
may indeed have no (evidentially) justified belief in [(3)] — that maybe we 
can point to no cognitive accomplishment of which the effect is a reason 
to take it that [(3) is] more likely to be true than not — but countering that 
we may nevertheless be rationally entitled to accept [(3)]. But if standard 
closure principles govern justified belief, then the counter comes too late 
to do any good. Standard closure principles will have it that justified 
belief in [(3)] will be a necessary condition for justified belief in anything 
one knows to entail it. To surrender the former will therefore be to 
surrender justified belief in [(1)] […] Maybe an entitlement to accept 
them nonetheless can be salvaged. But the idea was to use entitlement to 
save justification, not to replace it. (Wright 2004: 177–78)
14  Wright and Wittgenstein differ here, in that for the latter, but not the former, doubt 
about cornerstones is not meaningful (and hence is not rationally possible). For Wright, 
doubts about cornerstones are meaningful (and can be responded to by showing 
that they rest on a mistaken conception of warrant for cornerstones). But for such 
doubts to be meaningful is not yet for them to be rationally possible. More on this 
later, in Section 3.
15  Wright’s (2007: secs. II and IV) is a general strategy to deal with “justificational 
triads” resembling (MOORE) whose subject-matter include “other minds, the laws 
of nature, the future, and the substantial past” (all of which can be “called into 
(Humean) sceptical doubt”).
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In short: if justified belief is closed under known entailment, and if 
in addition, as on Wright’s view, we cannot justifiably believe (3), 
then — problematically — we cannot justifiably believe (1).
2.2 The leaching problem is a nice one. And Wright has a nice answer 
thereto:
[I]t cannot be that evidentially justified belief is closed under (known/
justifiably believed) entailment […] But if we let ‘warrant’ disjunctively 
cover both evidential justification and entitlement, it can still be that 
warrant, inclusively so understood, obeys closure principles suitable to 
do justice to our strong conviction that ‘justification’ — pre-theoretically 
understood — should do so. (2004: 178)
In sum: we can preserve justified belief in (1) without it following 
that we justifiably believe (3). This involves abandoning the closure of 
evidentially justified belief under known/justifiably believed entailment. 
But, according to Wright, “[t]hat is not so remarkable once one notices 
that evidential relations themselves are not so closed” (178) — indeed 
Wright takes this to be the “minimal lesson” of Dretske’s (1970) ‘zebra’ 
example. Closure is maintained, however, for Wright’s inclusive 
‘disjunctive’ notion of warrant (cf. principle (WC) introduced at 0.2): 
evidential warrant for (1), given (2) is known/justifiably believed, entails 
some kind of warrant — evidential or otherwise — for (3). And, for 
Wright, there’s merely non-evidential warrant for, or entitlement to, (3).
The leaching problem originated as a closure-based problem for 
Wright. I want to use Wright’s response thereto to generate the 
transmission-based (MOORE)-transmit problem for Wright. In brief, 
Wright’s response to the leaching problem introduces a disjunctive 
notion of warrant; and reflection on that disjunctive notion of warrant 
prompts consideration of (non-)transmission principles specific to the 
evidential disjunct (see 2.6–2.9 infra). Consider (abstracting, for now, from 
these specific (non-)transmission principles): in virtue of an entitlement 
to (3) I can justifiably believe (1). The conditional premise in (MOORE) is 
knowable a priori. So I can believe that. And there is a simple inferential 
route to (3). So it seems I’d do well, epistemically speaking, to believe 
(3). This prompts the question: if we start out with an entitlement to (3), 
and then engage in (MOORE)-reasoning, should we, resultantly, come 
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to justifiably believe (3)?16 I think the answer is ‘yes’. I’ll argue (contra 
Wright) that evidential warrant does transmit in (MOORE)-reasoning 
for Wright. The resultant justified belief in (3) means Wright faces the 
(MOORE)-transmit problem. In essence, the point here is that there is 
transmission failure when there is epistemic circularity; but, I’ll argue, 
there is no circularity in (MOORE)-reasoning involving specifically 
evidential warrant.
2.3 Let’s fix rules of engagement with Wright. What am I granting 
Wright? First, his (non-)transmission of warrant theses (see 0.2); 
second, his notion of positive entitlement (see 0.3); third, his (putatively 
epistemic) notion of non-evidential warrant (see 1.2); and, finally, his 
(stipulated) disjunctive notion of warrant and its associated closure 
principle (see 2.2).17
2.4 What am I not granting Wright? First, I leave the question whether 
evidentially justified belief is closed under known/justifiably believed 
entailment open pro tem (see 2.2).18 Here this is cashed out in terms 
of whether there is an entailment from evidentially justified belief in 
(1) — assuming knowledge/justified belief in (2) — to evidentially 
justified belief in (3).
Second, recall Wright takes (3) to be non-factual (see 1.2). So, for 
Wright, the question: if we start out with an entitlement to (3), and then 
engage in (MOORE)-reasoning, should we come to justifiably believe 
(3)?, is a closed one. Even if — pace Wright — (MOORE)-reasoning 
transmits (evidential) warrant, there’s a sense in which, for Wright, one 
still shouldn’t — indeed couldn’t — come to justifiably believe (3). But 
to grant Wright this at the outset would be to foreclose the possibility 
of warrant transmission in (MOORE)-reasoning for Wright. We must, 
rather — in order not to foreclose this possibility — find a way to make 
16  Cf. Davies (2004: 222–23) who describes such reasoning as epistemic alchemy.
17  See also my third response to Wright at 2.5 infra for a further concession to Wright.
18  I also leave open pro tem whether “evidential relations themselves are […] so 
closed” (Wright 2004: 178). There is a complication here. In Wright’s presentation 
of the leaching problem, he talks of closure under ‘known’ entailment. Then, in his 
response to the leaching problem, he puts ‘known/justifiably believed’ in brackets 
when considering the entailment. Finally, in a footnote (178: n. 9), he appears 
to be focusing on a closure principle where the entailment needn’t be known or 
justifiably believed. Throughout, I focus on the most plausible such principles in 
which the entailment is known/justifiably believed (cf. n. 28 infra).
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it possible to come to justifiably believe (3) by (MOORE)-reasoning 
while respecting as much of Wright’s analysis of (MOORE)-reasoning 
as possible. Here are three non-conditional routes to achieving this:
(A)  Leave it an open question whether (3) is non-factual.
(B)  Grant that (3) is non-factual, but allow that one can come to 
justifiably believe (3) by (MOORE)-reasoning.
(C)  Deny that (3) is non-factual, and allow that one has an 
entitlement to (but not justified belief in) (3) prior to 
(MOORE)-reasoning.
2.5 Each of these three strategies is worthy of extensive discussion and 
each faces possible objections. In brief, however: (A) has the merit of not 
denying that (3) is non-factual, but is vulnerable to the objection of not 
properly engaging with Wright, for whom (3)’s status as non-factual is 
seemingly not an open question. (B) respects Wright’s claim about (3)’s 
non-factuality, but, by allowing a justified belief in (3) to be generated 
by (MOORE)-reasoning, it threatens inconsistency. (C), meanwhile, 
promises to generate more questions than it answers: if (3) is — pace 
Wright — factual, on what epistemic basis could we have an entitlement 
to (3)?19 I thus assume merely the following conditional, which I take to 
be the barest commitment we must make:
(D)  Even if (3) is non-factual this doesn’t automatically rule 
out the possibility of coming to justifiably believe (3) by 
(MOORE)-reasoning.
That is, (3) may (or may not) be non-factual, but, if it is, this doesn’t 
preclude coming to justifiably believe (3) by (MOORE)-reasoning. 
By endorsing (D) we can postpone the question of which of (A)-(C) 
is to be endorsed and proceed to engage with Wright. A corollary of 
the minimal nature of (D) is that it allows engagement with positive 
entitlement theorists other than Wright, who may share Wright’s notion 
19  See Wright (2004: 205, 2008: 506, n. 3) for inchoate answers not committed to (3)’s 
non-factuality.
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of entitlement yet not hold that (3) is non-factual (cf. n. 8 supra). Our 
focus, though, remains on Wright.20
Suppose, however, perhaps predictably, Wright refuses to accept 
(D). Four (related) responses are in order. First, consider the following 
remarks of Kent Bach (online manuscript):
There are many everyday *beliefs* and *statements*21 that are not true or 
false, or at least not straightforwardly true or false (to borrow a phrase from 
Field [1994]). There are many common one-place predicates, such as 
‘large’, ‘poisonous’, ‘tasty’, ‘interesting’, ‘disgusting’, and ‘illegal’, which 
do not express one-place properties but which we often use as if they 
do. We use them in ordinary subject-predicate sentences to make statements 
and thereby express beliefs. Although we say ‘Fido is large’ to mean that 
Fido is large for a dog, ‘That mushroom is poisonous’ to mean that it is 
poisonous to humans (we certainly do not mean that it is poisonous to 
all creatures), and ‘Anchovies are tasty’ to mean that they are tasty to 
oneself, these utterances, taken strictly and literally, are neither true or false. 
They are true or false only relative to something, something that these 
utterances do not make explicit (there are many sorts of relativity, e.g., 
category-, argument place-, location-, time-, reference frame-, and norm-
relativity). They would be straightforwardly true only if that something 
were made explicit. (My emphases added)
Bach’s remarks detail a substantive position in the philosophy of 
language, and I concede that there is no clear analogy between the 
statements Bach considers and statements involving cornerstones.22 
20  It must be conceded that, if Wright holds to various (Wittgensteinian) aspects of 
his (1985) view, then he is not open to the (MOORE)-transmit problem. But it is far 
from clear that Wright does now hold to all those aspects. (D), then, can be viewed 
as a minimal claim offered as a starting point for engagement with a Wright-
like character who does not hold to all those aspects of his (1985) view (cf. also 
(MOORE-EW) and (EW), introduced later at 2.9, for further minimal claims with a 
similar function).
21  Bach uses the asterisks “to leave it open whether *statements* and *beliefs* in a 
given area really are true or false and qualify as genuine statements and beliefs”. 
So it is noteworthy that the asterisks are removed when Bach next uses ‘statements’ 
and ‘beliefs’, in the second italicised portion of this passage.
22  On a natural reading, Bach’s point is that utterances of these sentences are not 
literally true or false, yet these utterances express thoughts or beliefs that are true 
or false. The sentences, even as uttered on a particular occasion, are not literally true 
or false because they do not specify something that is crucial for truth evaluation. 
Yet we use the sentences to express propositions that are true or false, propositions 
to which we adopt attitudes such as belief or doubt — and to which we adopt 
these attitudes sometimes with, but sometimes without, justification or warrant. So 
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Nonetheless, Bach’s remarks reveal there is conceptual space (at least) 
for justified beliefs in the realm of the non-factual; and such conceptual 
space is all that is required for a defense of (D). Second, we noted at 1.2 
that, for Wright, non-factuality is no longer assigned a justificatory role in 
making a case that rational acceptance of (3) need not be evidence-based. 
Given this downplaying of the justificatory role of (3)’s non-factuality it 
might seem dubious for Wright to then give it the devastating role of 
automatically ruling out the possibility of coming to justifiably believe 
(3) by (MOORE)-reasoning. Third, we can grant Wright, consistently 
with endorsing (D), that one cannot come to justifiably believe (3) simply 
by redeploying one’s non-evidential warrant for (3):23 (D)’s consequent only 
speaks of not automatically ruling out coming to justifiably believe 
(3) by (MOORE)-reasoning. Finally, a different component of (D)’s 
minimal nature can be emphasised: its consequent only speaks of not 
automatically ruling out the possibility of coming to justifiably believe (3) 
by (MOORE)-reasoning. Endorsing (D) leaves open not ultimately coming 
to justifiably believe (3) by (MOORE)-reasoning. In sum, rejection of (D) 
does not seem dialectically advisable for Wright (recall, also, how much 
of Wright’s analysis of (MOORE)-reasoning we granted him at 2.3). 
Nonetheless, should Wright resolutely refuse to accept (D) our focus 
would shift to an engagement with positive entitlement theorists other 
than Wright, who may share Wright’s notion of entitlement yet not hold 
that (3) is non-factual (again: cf. n. 8 supra).
2.6 Recall, by (α) and (β) (see 0.2), and operating with Wright’s 
disjunctive notion of warrant, warrant fails to transmit, for Wright, in 
(MOORE)-reasoning: one needs antecedent (non-evidential) warrant 
for (3) in order for one’s visual experience to provide warrant for (1).
While Wright operates with a disjunctive notion of warrant, we 
need to separate the disjuncts again for our analysis of (MOORE)-
reasoning. To see why (MOORE)-reasoning does transmit warrant for 
Bach’s point depends on the distinction between sentences (or utterances thereof), 
on the one hand, and propositions (or attitudes towards propositions), on the 
other hand. It seems clear, however — our concession — that neither Wright’s nor 
Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘non-factual’ relates to sentences that are neither true nor 
false being used to express propositions or thoughts that are true or false.
23  Cf. Wright (2004: 176). To allow for non-evidential warrant to believe (3) would 
complicate things considerably.
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Wright, we need to set out two more specific, plausible accounts of 
(non-)transmission of warrant, catering for (non-)transmission of 
evidential warrant. Consider, initially:
(γ) Non-transmission of evidential warrant
Evidential epistemic warrant is not transmitted from the premises 
of a valid argument to its conclusion if the putative evidential 
support offered for one of the premises is conditional on its being 
antecedently and independently reasonable to evidentially accept 
the conclusion.
Theses (α) and (γ) are independent theses: (MOORE)-reasoning fails 
to transmit warrant by (α), yet doesn’t fail to transmit warrant by (γ). So 
there is non-transmission of (disjunctive) warrant, but there isn’t non-
transmission of evidential warrant, in (MOORE)-reasoning. In other 
words, thesis (α) is met, while thesis (γ) is not.24
2.7 So the names of the theses can mislead, for satisfaction of (α) 
doesn’t, as the names might suggest, entail satisfaction of (γ). How 
counterintuitive a result is it that (MOORE)-reasoning fails to transmit 
(disjunctive) warrant but doesn’t fail to transmit evidential warrant? 
Warrant is a positive epistemic relation a subject can have to a 
proposition. Is it not therefore contradictory to say — as it might seem I 
want to — that (MOORE)-reasoning fails to provide one with a positive 
epistemic relation (disjunctively construed) to (3), but doesn’t fail to 
provide one with a proper subset of that positive epistemic relation to 
(3)?25
We should recognise that, while (MOORE)-reasoning doesn’t fail 
to transmit evidential warrant by (γ), nor does it transmit evidential 
warrant by (β). If the matter were left there, this would be an unhappy 
24  It cannot be that thesis (γ) is met while thesis (α) is not: (simplifying) if it must be 
antecedently and independently reasonable to evidentially accept the conclusion, it 
must be antecedently and independently reasonable to accept the conclusion. And 
so theses (α) and (γ) are not both-ways independent.
25  Recall, transmission failure is the result of circularity. There is circularity of inclusive 
(disjunctive) warrant, but there is no circularity of evidential warrant. There is, I 
shall show, not first-time inclusive warrant for (3); but there is first-time evidential 
warrant for (3).
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result. But we can construct a more specific, plausible condition for the 
transmission of evidential warrant (similar in form to (β)):
(δ) Transmission of evidential warrant
A valid argument transmits evidential warrant if to have 
warrant for its premises (including evidential warrant for at 
least one of its premises) and then to recognise its validity is to 
acquire — perhaps for the first time — an evidential warrant to 
accept the conclusion.
Now we have the result that (MOORE)-reasoning both doesn’t suffer 
from non-transmission of evidential warrant by (γ), and does transmit 
evidential warrant by (δ). This is perfectly compatible with (MOORE)-
reasoning suffering from non-transmission of (disjunctive) warrant by 
(α) and failing to transmit (disjunctive) warrant by (β).
2.8 Here’s the dialectical position. We’ve four prima facie plausible 
theses of (non)transmission of warrant: (α), (β), (γ), and (δ). By (α) 
and (β) (jointly) there’s non-transmission of (disjunctive) warrant; by 
(γ) and (δ) (jointly) there’s transmission of evidential warrant. (Wright 
can’t just elect to use (α) and (β), rather than (γ) and (δ). I’m putting all 
four forward as plausible theses. It’s up to Wright to show those theses 
disfavourable to him to be implausible.) But what is counterintuitive 
about this? Sure, it is counterintuitive if reasoning with an argument 
can provide evidential warrant for its conclusion but no (disjunctive) 
warrant for its conclusion. To allow this is to allow a contradiction, akin 
to: x is a married man but not a man. But this isn’t the result these four 
theses deliver. If a subject has evidential warrant for an argument’s 
conclusion it follows he has (disjunctive) warrant for that self-same 
conclusion. No work to which these four theses can be put places 
this result in jeopardy. The only thing the four theses mandate is that 
evidential warrant will, while (disjunctive) warrant will not, transmit in 
(MOORE)-reasoning. Specifically, one’s warrant for having hands — a 
visual experience as of having hands — will transmit insofar as it’s (quite 
naturally) treated as evidential warrant, but will fail to transmit insofar 
as it’s treated as (disjunctive) warrant. Maybe that’s a little puzzling; but 
it’s not contradictory.
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2.9 To emphasise: evidential warrant doesn’t fail to transmit by (γ) 
as the putative support offered for one of (MOORE)’s premises is only 
conditional on its being antecedently and independently reasonable 
to non-evidentially accept (MOORE)’s conclusion. This seems right. 
Why should having an antecedent non-evidential warrant to accept (3) 
preclude evidential warrant for (1) transmitting across the conditional 
to generate — crucially, for the first time — evidential warrant for, 
and justified belief in, (3)? A principle on which one might base an 
objection is:
(γ*) Non-transmission of evidential warrant
Evidential epistemic warrant is not transmitted from the premises 
of a valid argument to its conclusion if the putative support offered 
for one of the premises is conditional on its being antecedently 
and independently reasonable to accept — evidentially or non-
evidentially — the conclusion.26
But (γ*) is implausible. Consider Wright operating with (γ*) when 
analysing (MOORE)-reasoning. He’d point out that having non-
evidential warrant to accept (3) is a precondition for one’s visual 
experience evidentially warranting (1). Fine. But (MOORE)-reasoning 
generates for the first time (Wright’s phrase) a justified belief in (3). The 
only thing presupposed is the reasonableness of a mere acceptance 
of — that is, a non-belief in — (3). So it’s unclear why the putative 
generation of a justified belief in (3) for the first time should suffer from 
non-transmission of evidential warrant.
My opposition to (γ*) is anchored by:
(MOORE-EW) One’s having non-evidential warrant for (3) 
is no bar to one’s acquiring evidential warrant for (3) in virtue 
of competent inference from (1), for which one has evidential 
warrant.
26  (γ*)’s twin transmission principle reads:
(δ*) Transmission of evidential warrant
A valid argument transmits evidential warrant if to have warrant for its 
premises (including evidential warrant for at least one of its premises) and then 
to recognise its validity is to acquire — perhaps for the first time — a warrant 
(disjunctively-construed) to accept the conclusion.
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Note the confined scope of (MOORE-EW). Perhaps its moral is extendable, 
mutatis mutandis, to reasoning by means of a more general class of 
arguments. One might, then, attempt to anchor (MOORE-EW) by:
(EW) One’s having non-evidential warrant for the conclusion of a 
valid argument is no bar to one’s acquiring evidential warrant for 
that conclusion in virtue of competent inference from premises,27 
for (some of) which one has evidential warrant.
But, given our focus is on (MOORE)-reasoning, I commit only to 
(MOORE-EW).
2.10 As a final dialectical point, suppose I’m taken to have failed to 
make out my case for the implausibility of (γ*). As we’re now separating 
the disjuncts of disjunctive warrant, we’d have two prima facie plausible 
(sufficient) theses for non-transmission of evidential warrant, (γ) and 
(γ*), the former mandating (in conjunction with (δ)) transmission of 
evidential warrant, the latter mandating non-transmission of evidential 
warrant. This would be a puzzling state of play; but such a state of play 
is more troubling for Wright than for me. The onus is on Wright to show 
(γ) to be implausible. And so long as (γ) (and its positive cousin, (δ)) 
is plausible — notwithstanding (γ*), arguendo, is prima facie plausible 
too — Wright faces the (MOORE)-transmit problem.
2.11 In sum: (γ) is not satisfied. There’s no non-transmission of 
evidential warrant: by starting off with non-evidential warrant for (3), 
and then engaging in (MOORE)-reasoning, one generates — for the first 
time — an evidential warrant to accept the conclusion, (3). In other words, 
(δ) is satisfied.
This is what Wright must say (cf. n. 20 supra). He’ll recoil from saying 
this: (3) is non-factual, and we shouldn’t be in the business of generating 
justified beliefs in (3). Nevertheless, evidential warrant transmits for 
Wright, and justified belief in the existence of an external world has 
been delivered via a visual experience and a simple a priori inference.28 
27  Of course, the number of ‘premises’ may be one: the relevant argument may be 
single-premise (cf. n. 2 supra).
28  So we finally oppose Wright’s view that: (MOORE) is a locus for a counterexample to 
evidentially justified belief being closed under known/justifiably believed entailment 
(in part) for the reason that we cannot justifiably believe (3). Consistently with this, we 
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The standard view has it that the (MOORE)-transmit problem targets 
only the dogmatist, but, with a more refined view of (non-)transmission 
of warrant, we can see it targets Wright too.
3. The Potentially Devastating Nature of the 
(MOORE)-Transmit Problem
3.1 Let’s take stock of the dialectical situation: the dogmatist says that 
(MOORE)-reasoning transmits warrant — it can provide a first-time 
warrant to justifiably believe (3). So the dogmatist faces the (MOORE)-
transmit problem. On the standard view, Wright doesn’t face that 
problem because he says that (MOORE)-reasoning doesn’t transmit 
warrant; rather it’s an example of transmission failure. But I’ve shown 
Wright can, and should, allow that, beginning from an unearned 
warrant to trust in (3), (MOORE)-reasoning provides a route to a first-
time earned warrant (based on perception plus inference) to believe 
(3) — provided, that is, we operate with assumption (D) (see 2.5). So 
Wright (too) faces a version of the (MOORE)-transmit problem.
3.2 One response — Pryor’s — to the (MOORE)-transmit problem 
on behalf of the dogmatist is to say that (MOORE)-reasoning seems 
wrong because it’s dialectically unconvincing. As Wright is committed 
to the idea that (MOORE)-reasoning suffers from a genuinely 
epistemic defect — viz. transmission failure — Wright cannot locate its 
defectiveness merely in its dialectical unconvincingness.
On Davies’s (2004) view, (MOORE)-reasoning suffers not merely 
from dialectical unconvincingness; it also suffers from a kind of 
epistemic limitation. (MOORE)-reasoning cannot be deployed in the 
service of a particular kind of epistemic project that he calls settling 
the question. Can Wright say something along the same lines? Earlier 
I suggested not. Recall, Davies accepts there need be no transmission 
failure in (MOORE)-reasoning, but argues that, in circumstances in 
which one suppositionally doubts (3), warrant no longer transmits: 
one’s visual experience won’t provide a rationally deployable warrant 
may ultimately wish to join Wright in rejecting this (doxastic) closure principle. We 
also finally oppose Wright’s view that (MOORE) is a locus for a counterexample to 
“evidential relations themselves [being] so closed” (cf. n. 18 supra).
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for (1) or (3). But, given Wright’s ‘cornerstones’ conception of (3) in 
(MOORE)-reasoning, Wright isn’t in a position, on pain of irrationality, 
to doubt (3)’s truth — suppositionally or otherwise. The question-settling 
project is conditioned by suppositional doubt, but Wright cannot allow 
that (3) is subject to doubt — not even to suppositional doubt. Wright 
(1985: 470) does say: “[Cornerstones] may, in a different context, take on 
a more purely hypothetical role; and […] our confidence in them, in such 
a context, may be defeasible by empirical or theoretical considerations”. 
I am not sure which contexts Wright has in mind, but while the inputs 
to the question-settling project can be “purely hypothetical” — in 
(MOORE)-reasoning I suppose, just for the purposes of the project, that (3) 
is false — its outputs — settling questions — are clearly not.29
For Wright, then, there’s seemingly unfettered transmission of 
evidential warrant in (MOORE)-reasoning — a curious result. Let’s 
briefly consider three responses to this peculiar outcome. The first two 
are possible responses from Wright; the third is a possible response 
from a hypothetical positive entitlement epistemologist.30
3.3 Response 1. To summarise the dialectic: (i) we outlined Wright’s 
view that (3) is non-factual and so isn’t eligible to be justifiably believed; 
(ii) we saw that (MOORE)-reasoning does, for Wright, transmit evidential 
warrant, and that, despite Wright’s views about (3)’s non-factuality, 
Wright ends up with a justified belief in (3); and finally (iii) we observed 
that, because of Wright’s ‘cornerstones’ conception of (3) in (MOORE)-
reasoning (which, for Wright, entails (3)’s non-factuality), he’s not able 
to doubt (3) — suppositionally or otherwise. Wright might seize on 
steps (ii) and (iii). He might contend that, in step (ii), I compromised one 
of his key semantic claims about cornerstones like (3) — viz. that they’re 
non-factual — by pinning a justified belief in (3) on him. But then in step 
(iii), he might contend, I inconsistently relied on that self-same semantic 
claim by denying him the possibility of doubting (3).
29  If Wright were to adopt the view that cornerstones are no longer to be regarded 
as non-factual, room for (suppositional) doubt might open up. But insofar as 
cornerstones are still presuppositional in our various cognitive projects, it’s not clear 
how such doubt could be explained.
30  These responses are, concededly, only given summary treatment here, and merit 
more detailed consideration. The claim of this final section is, though, as we’ve 
already noted, tentative and separable.
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To answer this (and the third) response we need to have recourse 
to theses (A), (B), and (C) (see 2.4). In light of this response, (B) seems 
optimal. To adopt either (A) or (C) would disable us from taking step 
(iii) — doubt about (3) would then be possible. Only with (B) in hand 
can we consistently take both steps (ii) and (iii).
3.4 Response 2 (to step (iii)). Wittgenstein remarks: “Doubting and 
non-doubting behaviour. There is a first only if there is a second.” (1969: 
354) Drawing on this, Wright might claim: In step (ii) you lumbered me 
with a justified belief in (3); (only) once you’ve done that, I’m now in a 
position to doubt (3).31 Having anticipated this possible reply I leave it 
to Wright to speak for himself.
3.5 Response 3. The claim that Wright cannot avail himself of Davies’s 
answer to the (MOORE)-transmit problem relies on Wright’s view 
about (3)’s non-factuality. So we might, to concretise things, consider a 
positive entitlement theorist employing Wright’s notion of entitlement 
yet adopting (C) (cf. n. 8 supra). Such an epistemologist would be able 
to adopt Davies’s answer to the (MOORE)-transmit problem — he 
would not be precluded from doubting (3). But adoption of (C) seems 
unmotivated, given entitlement is a putatively epistemic notion: when 
(3) is ex hypothesi factual, don’t epistemic bases for accepting (3) require 
evidence, whether empirical or a priori (cf. n. 19 supra)?
3.6 There may be other ways for Wright to answer the (MOORE)-
transmit problem.32 But in the absence of any developed suggestions, 
there’s a potentially devastating problem here. This is what I described 
earlier (1.3) as ‘my (tentative and separable) stronger claim’. We might 
view the problem in the form of a dilemma. Limb 1: maintain both the 
non-factuality of (3) and (3)’s ineligibility for justified belief. However, 
we’ve seen (MOORE)-reasoning generates a justified belief in (3) while 
respecting as much of Wright’s analysis of (MOORE)-reasoning as 
possible. Limb 2: allow (3)’s eligibility for justified belief (whether by 
31  Strictly, to make this claim, the final sentence of Wittgenstein’s must be: there is a 
second only if there is a first.
32  A (undeveloped) candidate: for the dogmatist, (MOORE)-reasoning provides a 
route to a wholly new warrant to believe (3). But for Wright it only provides an 
earned warrant to believe something that one already had an unearned warrant to 
trust.
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denying the non-factuality of (3) or not), but maintain one can only assess 
(MOORE)-reasoning by means of theses (like) (α) and (β) (and (γ*) and 
(δ*)), and not-possibly-additionally (γ) and (δ). But there’s no argument 
for such a strong modal claim.
4. Conclusion
4.1 We began with the question: what, if anything, is wrong with 
(MOORE)-reasoning? We’ve seen that one reason, according to the 
standard view, for favouring Wright’s answer over the dogmatist’s 
doesn’t stand up to scrutiny: the (MOORE)-transmit problem is Wright’s 
problem as much as the dogmatist’s. In fact we can go further, though in 
a provisional spirit: the problem is, seemingly, Wright’s in a peculiarly 
devastating fashion. So much for the standard view.

2. First Reflections on the 
Problem of Easy Knowledge
Continuing with the pattern of objection to dogmatism, immediate justification, 
and basic knowledge, I examine, and ultimately reject, Zalabardo’s (2005) 
radical response to Cohen’s (2002, 2005) problem of easy knowledge. Along the 
way, I discuss warrant, inference, and transmission in some detail.
0.1 Stewart Cohen (2002, 2005) considers a case in which his son 
wants a red table for his room. Cohen and his son go to the furniture 
store. Cohen’s son is concerned that the table his father is considering 
purchasing, which appears red, may in fact be white with red lights 
shining on it. Cohen (2005: 418) responds with the following reasoning:
(WARRANT FOR 1) The table looks red.
(EK)
(1)  The table is red.
(2)  If the table is red, then it is not white with red lights shining 
on it.
(3)  The table is not white with red lights shining on it.
(The (EK) argument is what was earlier — in the Introduction — called 
the (TABLE) argument.) If one reasons thus, say one’s engaged in 
(EK)-reasoning. Cohen finds such a response to his son’s concern 
unsatisfactory. Intuitively, believing (1) on the basis of the experience 
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described in (WARRANT FOR 1), and then reasoning one’s way to (3), 
is not a way of coming to know — finding out, confirming — that (3) is 
true. It is too easy.
0.2 Structurally similar reasoning delivers (knowledge of)1 the falsity 
of sceptical hypotheses concerning the external world, testimony, other 
minds etc. Consider the testimony case:
(WARRANT FOR 1) Danny tells me he has a red table in his office.
(1)  Danny has a red table in his office.
(2)  If Danny has a red table in his office, then it is not the case that 
Danny has no red table but told me that he does have.
(3)  It is not the case that Danny has no red table but told me that 
he does have.
Here, the intuition is that believing (1) on the basis of Danny’s testimony, 
and then reasoning one’s way to (3), is not a way of coming to know that 
(3) is true — it is not a way of confirming that Danny told the truth, and 
not a way of ruling out the possibility that he spoke falsely. It is too easy. 
The unsatisfactoriness, therefore, threatens to generalise.
0.3 (EK)-reasoning in outline: In each of our two examples (and in other 
examples with the same structure), the immediate transition from the 
experience or evidence described in (WARRANT FOR 1) to knowledge 
of (1) involves reliance on a potential source of knowledge — visual 
perception or being told by Danny. The transition would apparently be 
blocked by acceptance of:
KR A potential knowledge source K can yield knowledge for S, only if 
S knows K is reliable.2 (Cohen 2002: 309)
1  I use this parenthetical device again in Chapter Three: it signals that the key issue 
up for debate is whether such knowledge is indeed delivered.
2  Assume that the fact that a knowledge source is reliable does not guarantee that 
the knowledge source always delivers truths. So, to accept KR, know K is reliable, 
and then to engage in (EK)-reasoning is to learn something new, viz.: K is not 
misleading on this particular occasion. How counterintuitive this is (if at all), I leave 
to the reader. I also bracket problems concerning the individuation of knowledge 
sources. Finally, I read Cohen to take KR to make knowledge of the reliability of 
a source merely a corequisite, and not — more strongly — a prerequisite, for having 
knowledge by means of that source. For further exploration of this distinction, cf. 
Sosa (2009) and Van Cleve (2011).
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But rejection of KR is not, by itself, sufficient to underwrite the 
transition, because the mere possibility of cases in which some source 
delivers knowledge prior to my knowing that the source is reliable does 
not entail that the present case is one such. Moreover, rejection of KR 
leaves open that there are other necessary conditions on a knowledge 
source yielding knowledge — conditions which may not be met. Cohen 
(2002: 310) calls knowledge delivered “prior to one’s knowing that the 
source is reliable” basic knowledge. Many epistemologists — including 
Alston, Dretske, Ginet, Goldman, Klein, Nozick, Pollock, Pryor, and 
Sosa — reject KR, for various reasons, and with various qualifications. 
(For Cohen and KR, see n. 4.) Such epistemologists allow for the 
possibility of basic knowledge. The problem is that basic knowledge of 
(1) seems to lead to too-easy knowledge of (3). The conditional premise 
(2) is knowable a priori. If I know (1) and (2) then, given a plausible 
knowledge-closure principle,3I can seemingly come to know (3) by 
(EK)-reasoning. Thus (EK)-reasoning transforms basic knowledge of an 
everyday proposition about the colour of a table into easy knowledge of 
the falsity of a sceptical hypothesis. The generation of easy knowledge 
“suggests that we were wrong to think we had the basic knowledge in 
the first place” (Cohen 2002: 311). Thus the problem of easy knowledge.4
0.4 Cohen is convinced that (EK)-reasoning is an unsatisfactory 
response to his son:
[I]t seems very implausible to say I could in this way come to know that 
I’m not seeing a white table illuminated by red lights. Note that on this 
view, my inductive evidence against the possibility that there are red 
lights shining on the table turns out to be irrelevant to my knowing that 
3  Say: If S knows p and S knows p entails q, then S knows (or at least is in a position 
to know) q. Knowledge-closure principles have been denied by Dretske (1970, 
1971, 2005) and Nozick (1981). This denial hasn’t proven popular, however (see 
Hawthorne 2005). (Knowledge-closure is discussed in detail in Chapters Six and 
Seven.)
4  Cohen’s response to the problem (2002, 2005) involves distinguishing between animal 
and reflective knowledge (cf. Sosa 2007, 2009). KR is rejected when considering 
animal knowledge, but so is deductive closure (cf. 1.7 infra). When considering 
reflective knowledge, meanwhile, KR is accepted. Either way: no problem of easy 
knowledge. Cohen (2002: sec. VI, 322), more positively, appeals to a holism on which 
“[g]radually, as we acquire more and more sensory evidence, thereby accumulating 
a relatively large and coherent set of beliefs, those beliefs, including the belief 
that our cognitive faculties (perception, memory, reasoning) are reliable become 
knowledge”.
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the table is not white with red lights shining on it. This is surely a strange 
result. (Cohen 2002: 313)
We’ll follow Cohen by talking of the unsatisfactoriness of (EK)-
reasoning, but such talk involves no suggestion that the reasoning is 
somehow invalid. Nor are we committed to denying many plausible 
knowledge-closure principles (cf. n. 3 supra). It is a further — so-called 
bootstrapping — question whether S is in a position to know, in some way, 
that K is reliable. Instead, all we mean is that a subject is epistemically 
criticisable in attempting to acquire knowledge of (3) — to find out or to 
confirm that (3) is true — by means of (EK)-reasoning.
1. Zalabardo’s Response
1.1 I want to sketch (one strand of)5 José Zalabardo’s (2005) original and 
heterodox response to the problem of easy knowledge. By consideration 
of Zalabardo’s response we can gain insight into the nature of warrant, 
inference, and transmission (of warrant).
1.2 Before reconstructing Zalabardo’s argument, let’s take note 
of two key principles (or: schemata) operative therein (where ‘S’ is a 
placeholder for a subject, and ‘p’ and ‘q’ for propositions):
Closure: If p has warrant for S,6 and S knows that p entails q, then q has 
warrant for S. (36)
Transmission: If p entails q and S knows that p,7 then inferring q from p8 
would enable S to obtain warrant for q. (39)
5  Another strand — Zalabardo’s starting point — focuses on bootstrapping.
6  My note: ‘p has warrant for S’ is equivalent to ‘S has warrant for p’.
7  My note: (1) Could we, without loss, weaken the antecedent of Transmission by 
replacing ‘S knows that p’ with ‘p has warrant for S’? Or indeed, weaker still, saying 
nothing about S’s epistemic position vis-a-vis p? (Suppose S has no warrant for p, 
but has warrant for a proposition in the neighbourhood of p, p´. Could S infer q 
from p and thereby obtain p´-warrant for q?) Perhaps. I suspect Zalabardo wants 
to sidestep issues over inferring from unknown premises. (2) As hinted at already, 
Transmission is somewhat strange on account of the antecedent not explicitly 
mentioning warrant (yet that is what is supposed to be transmitted).
8  The inference of q from p must, I take it, be deductive — though the deduction 
need not consist of a formally valid argument — and performed competently (cf. 
Hawthorne 2004: 34–35).
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When I talk generically I’ll use lower-case ‘closure’ and ‘transmission’. 
Closure and Transmission are valid schemata just in case — iff — they 
have no false instances; invalid otherwise.9 Thus we can talk of the 
truth or falsity of an instance of the schema Closure. The schema will be 
instantiated to a particular subject and a particular set of propositions. 
For brevity, and somewhat loosely, we can talk of an instance of Closure 
in an argument. And we can talk of the truth or falsity of an instance 
of Transmission in a particular piece of reasoning with an argument.10 
Say there is Transmission (of warrant) — warrant Transmits — just in 
case, the instance of the schema Transmission, in a particular piece of 
reasoning, has a true antecedent and a true consequent. (So this is 
equivalent to an instance of Transmission’s non-vacuous truth.) And say 
there is not Transmission (of warrant) just in case, in a particular piece of 
reasoning, Transmission has either a false antecedent or a true antecedent 
and a false consequent. (So this is equivalent, respectively, to either an 
instance of Transmission’s vacuous truth or its falsity.) And say finally 
there is Transmission failure — or non-Transmission — just in case, in a 
particular piece of reasoning, Transmission has a true antecedent and a 
false consequent. (So this is equivalent to an instance of Transmission’s 
falsity.) So, that there is not Transmission does not entail Transmission 
failure; the converse entailment, however, holds.
1.3 We might reconstruct Zalabardo’s response to the problem of easy 
knowledge as follows:
9  Note that Zalabardo is not endorsing Transmission’s — cf. Closure’s — validity, given 
he allows for instances of transmission failure. Thus, to give a complete account of 
transmission, it would seem that Zalabardo must either reformulate Transmission 
to render it valid (e.g. for him, as we’ll see, making ‘S has no warrant for q prior to 
inference’ a condition of the antecedent), or supplement Transmission with a trouser-
wearing, putatively valid (sufficient) condition for transmission failure.
10  Transmission is an indicative conditional whose consequent is a subjunctive 
conditional. In evaluating Transmission in a particular piece of reasoning 
with an argument we assume the truth of the antecedent of that subjunctive 
conditional — we assume, that is, the performance of an inference. In what follows 
we are investigating the (temporal) preconditions on inference.
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(ZALABARDO)
(A)  The problem of easy knowledge presupposes Transmission 
of warrant in (EK)-reasoning.
(B)  Transmission of warrant in (EK)-reasoning presupposes the 
falsity of an instance of Closure in (EK).
(C)  But Closure is valid, and thus has no false instances.
(D)  So, from (B) and (C): There is no Transmission of warrant in 
(EK)-reasoning.
(E)  So, from (A) and (D): There is no problem of easy knowledge.
The argument is clearly valid. If it is to be resisted, one or other of its 
premises must be shown to be false.
1.4 Argument (A)-(E) needs unpacking. We need to cash out Zalabardo’s 
closure and transmission principles. Zalabardo remarks (39):
[T]ransmission is different from, and independent of, Closure. 
Transmission postulates a sufficient condition for an inference to have 
the power to furnish the subject with warrant for its conclusion. Closure, 
by contrast, imposes a constraint on an admissible combination of 
warrant attributions to a subject: that for all propositions p, q and every 
subject S, if we ascribe to S knowledge that p entails q, we should not 
ascribe to her warrant for p without also ascribing to her warrant for q. 
(footnote omitted)
Note that Transmission is posed as a sufficient (and not necessary) 
condition. Thus it is left open that other transmission principles are 
operative.11 A result of this is that the fact that there is not Transmission in 
a piece of reasoning does not entail that that piece of reasoning does not 
transmit warrant. And nor does the fact that there is Transmission failure 
in reasoning entail that that reasoning suffers transmission failure.
1.5 For Zalabardo, “when p is true and S believes that p, S will know 
that p just in case p has warrant for S” (33). In other words, ‘warrant’ 
operates as a placeholder for whatever is required, in addition to 
11  Often, though, proponents of sufficient transmission conditions (tacitly) take them 
to be lone sufficient conditions.
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a true belief, to constitute knowledge (see Plantinga 1993).12 Let’s 
locate this usage of ‘warrant’ with respect to two prominent types of 
warrant — propositional and doxastic. A subject, S, has propositional 
warrant for a proposition, p, iff it is epistemically appropriate for S to 
believe p (notwithstanding S may not in fact believe p) (see Goldman 
1979). (I leave open whether a thinker could have propositional warrant 
to believe a proposition p even though the thinker had never even 
conceptualised the proposition, p.) And if this is the case, one can talk of 
S having warrant to believe p (or warrant for (believing) p).13 Meanwhile, 
S has doxastic warrant for p iff S has propositional warrant for p and S 
believes p on the basis of14 his propositional warrant for p. If this is the 
case, one can talk of S having a warranted belief in p.
How does Zalabardo’s (Plantingan) notion of warrant fit into this 
taxonomy? First, it’s not-merely-propositional, as there is nothing in the 
definition of propositional warrant which guarantees — as Zalabardo’s 
warrant does — that adding it to a true belief gets one knowledge. 
For one thing, one’s having propositional warrant leaves open that 
one’s true belief is not based on the propositional warrant: the mere 
availability of a warrant, even availability to the thinker in question, is 
not sufficient, when added to a true belief, for knowledge. Additionally, 
it’s not doxastic, as it’s left open that Zalabardo’s warrant is in place for 
a proposition absent that proposition being believed. So Zalabardo’s 
(Plantingan) warrant occupies a middle ground of being not-merely-
propositional but not doxastic either.15
1.6 Insofar as Zalabardo’s notion of warrant is not the notion of 
warranted belief — doxastic warrant — consider Nicholas Silins’s (2005: 
75–77) claim that debates over transmission of warrant oughtn’t to be 
12  So the possibility of Gettierisation is stipulated away. I don’t question Closure’s 
validity in this chapter, though it is psychologically questionable on account of this 
usage of ‘warrant’. Principles like Closure, operating with this Plantingan, Gettier-
proof notion of warrant, have not received much scrutiny.
13  The propositional reading of the ‘warrant for believing’ locution is not, it seems, in 
line with Silins (2005: 74), but is in line with Pryor (2001: 104) and others.
14  The basing relation is left undeveloped here (see Korcz 2006).
15  The basing relation presents a bit of a problem for Zalabardo’s (Plantingan) 
approach. If true belief plus warrant equals knowledge, then warrant needs to 
include basing. But it is not easy to see how warrant that includes basing could be 
present in the absence of belief.
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conducted in terms of the notion of warrant to believe — propositional 
warrant (cf. also Tucker (2010)):
[I]t is too demanding to define transmission of warrant in terms of 
acquisition of [propositional] warrant […] To see this, note that many 
cases of transmission of [propositional] warrant […] would be automatic. 
For example, if you believe on the basis of some warrant that Moby Dick 
is a whale (and you know that all whales are mammals), then you have 
[propositional] warrant […] that Moby Dick is a mammal regardless of 
whether you have inferred the conclusion or not. Moreover, you cannot 
acquire [propositional] warrant […] that Moby Dick is a mammal by 
reasoning from the proposition that Moby Dick is a whale. Rather than 
provide you with new evidence to believe that Moby Dick is a mammal, 
the inference would instead allow you to base a belief on evidence you 
already had to believe the conclusion. The upshot is that, if we define 
transmission of warrant so as to require the acquisition of [propositional] 
warrant […], many legitimate pieces of reasoning will then suffer from 
failure of transmission of warrant. For example your inference that 
Moby Dick is a mammal from the proposition that Moby Dick is a whale 
will fail to transmit warrant. But such a verdict is far too harsh. After all, 
you can acquire [doxastic] warrant […] [for] the conclusion through the 
inference, that is, you can come to believe the conclusion on the basis of a 
warrant through the inference.
Closure of propositional warrant under known entailment (CPW) 
requires that, if a thinker has some warrant or other to believe p and 
knows that p entails q, then that thinker has some warrant or other to 
believe q. As a conceptual point, CPW does not impose any constraints 
on the nature of the warrant to believe q. It does not say, for example, 
that the warrant to believe q should be partly constituted out of the 
warrant to believe p. For example, suppose that (contrary to fact) it 
were a metaphysical necessity that, for each thinker x, if x is situated 
in such a way that a warrant to believe p (Moby Dick is a whale) 
becomes available to x and x knows that p entails q, then x is visited by 
the oracle and is told on the highest epistemic authority that q, thereby 
being provided with a warrant to believe q (Moby Dick is a mammal). 
That would be sufficient for the metaphysically necessary satisfaction 
of CPW in this case. But the foregoing is not what Silins describes as 
automatic transmission of propositional warrant. The warrant to believe 
q that Silins says one has automatically, if one has a warrant to believe 
p and knows that p entails q, has the following property: if a thinker 
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were to base his belief on the propositional warrant that is automatically 
‘transmitted’ then that thinker would be basing his belief q in part on 
the propositional warrant to believe p (and in part on the warrant to 
take the step of inference from p to q). In contrast, if the thinker in our 
strange story were to base his belief on the propositional warrant to 
believe q that makes CPW come out true (that is, were to base his belief 
on the word of the oracle),16 then that thinker would not be basing his 
belief q in part on the propositional warrant to believe p. In our strange 
story, a thinker who bases his belief that Moby Dick is a mammal on the 
word of the oracle is basing his belief on a warrant that is epistemically 
independent from, and not epistemically posterior to, the warrant to believe 
that Moby Dick is a whale. In contrast, the warrant to believe that Moby 
Dick is a mammal, which is (according to Silins) automatically available 
to a thinker who has a warrant to believe that Moby Dick is a whale and 
who knows that all whales are mammals, is epistemically dependent on, 
and epistemically posterior to, the warrant to believe that Moby Dick is 
a whale.
If Silins were right that having a warrant to believe p and knowing 
that p entails q (and being a competent thinker, perhaps) adds up to 
having a warrant to believe q,17 then this fact would guarantee CPW 
(for competent thinkers). But, conversely, CPW does not guarantee that 
Silins is right. Again, if Silins were right, he might call the principle that 
he would be right about: transmission of propositional warrant under 
known entailment (for competent thinkers) — TPW. TPW might even be 
exceptionless: that is, there might be no failures of TPW. If there were no 
failures of this kind of transmission of warrant, then we might infer that 
this kind of transmission of warrant was not exactly what was under 
discussion in debates over failures of warrant transmission.18
16  Perhaps it can be shown that an epistemically ideal thinker would never base his 
belief q on the warrant made available by the oracle; but neither Transmission nor 
Closure says anything about epistemically ideal thinkers.
17  Admittedly, Silins just talks of “many cases” of automatic transmission, but I take it 
that our stipulation here that our thinker knows that p entails q (and is competent, 
perhaps) is sufficient to commit Silins to this claim.
18  Suppose the exceptionless principle of transmission of propositional warrant does 
require that the thinker should actually take the step of inference (competently). We 
would still say that, in that case, this was not what people had in mind in discussion 
of transmission failure.
64 Basic Knowledge and Conditions on Knowledge
In sum, and returning to the excerpted passage, Silins imagines 
that friends of transmission failure might say that transmission of 
propositional warrant across known entailment (TPW) is too easy. It 
does not really require anything of the thinker (other than perhaps that 
the thinker should be competent). Silins then imagines that friends of 
transmission failure might try to make transmission more demanding 
on the thinker. Perhaps — new proposal — warrant transmission 
should be a matter of the thinker acquiring a new warrant (that is, a new 
propositional warrant) by carrying out a particular bit of reasoning. 
Silins’s point in response to this suggestion is that, if a warrant to believe 
q is automatically available to a thinker who has a warrant to believe p 
and knows that p entails q, then nothing that the thinker can do (whether 
carrying out some reasoning or anything else) can make that very same 
warrant to believe q newly available to the thinker. Before the thinker did 
anything, the warrant to believe q was already automatically available. 
So, following the new proposal, there would be too much transmission 
failure. Of course, the thinker could do something to make a different 
warrant to believe q newly available. The thinker could, for example, go 
and visit the oracle. But making a different warrant newly available — a 
warrant that is epistemically independent from the warrant to believe 
p — would not be warrant transmission. Overall, Silin’s point seems 
to be that, if warrant transmission is defined wholly in terms of 
propositional warrant — warrant to believe — then there will either be 
no transmission failure or else too much. I leave explicit discussion of 
Silins here, but the points raised will be relevant in what follows.
1.7 So, returning to (ZALABARDO) itself: whence premise (A)?
(A)  The problem of easy knowledge presupposes Transmission 
of warrant in (EK)-reasoning.
The problem of easy knowledge is the problem of (EK)-reasoning 
providing knowledge that the table is not white with red lights shining 
on it. It’s not the problem of possessing knowledge that the table is not 
white with red lights shining on it. Most philosophers can agree that 
one could obtain and use inductive evidence against the possibility that 
there are red lights shining on the table to come to know this proposition. 
Indeed closer visual scrutiny of the table and its environs could rule 
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out this local sceptical hypothesis. So, as only Transmission — and 
not, crucially, Closure — poses a requirement on how knowledge that 
the table is not white with red lights shining on it is acquired, it is the 
principle directly germane to the problem of easy knowledge.
Note premise (A) is not in conflict with the following remark from 
Cohen (2005: 418): “Since I know [(2)] a priori, then given [deductive 
closure], I can come to know [(3)], on the basis of [(1)] and [(2)].” Cohen 
here locates the problem of easy knowledge as a problem centred 
on closure, rather than transmission (cf. Klein 2004: 165). But this is an 
apparent — rather than a genuine — conflict with Zalabardo because 
Cohen operates with a closure principle that is distinct from Zalabardo’s. 
Cohen’s closure principle is “DC: If S knows P and S competently 
deduces Q from P, then S knows Q”19 — a principle, crucially, requiring 
an act of inference. Thus, the difference in location of the problem of easy 
knowledge does not reflect a deep disagreement between Zalabardo 
and Cohen.
1.8 Whence premise (B) (cf. (38–39)) — the main load-bearing 
component in Zalabardo’s argument?
(B)  Transmission of warrant in (EK)-reasoning presupposes the 
falsity of an instance of Closure in (EK).
Closure, assuming I have warrant for (1) and know (2), mandates I have 
some warrant or other to believe (3)20 — the warrant to believe (3) might 
be epistemically antecedent to, epistemically posterior to (dependent 
on), or epistemically independent from the thinker’s warrant to 
believe (1). (More on this later.) Closure does not commit on the origins 
of that warrant. Suppose it is a warrant to believe (3) that does not 
depend on my actually carrying out the inference from (1) and (2) to 
(3). It might be a propositional warrant automatically transmitted from 
(1), warrant from the oracle, or an a priori default warrant. Now suppose 
I engage in (EK)-reasoning and perform an (EK)-inference. Zalabardo 
maintains (as would Silins) that, assuming Closure — which guarantees 
19  It is a good exercise to probe the difference between closure principles, such as 
Cohen’s, which require an act of inference, and transmission principles.
20  I here gloss Zalabardo’s warrant as ‘warrant to believe’ (though we’ve seen it has 
properties additional to those had by propositional warrant — see 1.5 supra).
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that I have warrant to believe (3) regardless of whether I engage in (EK)-
reasoning — there’s no sense in which I can — as warrant Transmission 
requires — obtain warrant to believe (3) by engaging in (EK)-reasoning. 
I cannot newly enter the condition of having a warrant to believe (3) 
because, ex hypothesi, I am already in that condition; I already have such 
a propositional warrant.21
Premise (B) has, seemingly, been vindicated: Transmission of warrant 
in (EK)-reasoning presupposes the falsity of an instance of Closure in 
(EK).22 But, before proceeding further with (ZALABARDO), we must 
pause to reflect on precisely how Zalabardo vindicates premise (B) — in 
particular, drawing on our work in the Introduction, we must spell out 
the implicitly temporal nature of Zalabardo’s operative transmission 
principle.
1.9 It’s clear that ‘obtain’ is bearing great weight in Transmission, and 
thus in vindicating premise (B): to obtain warrant for (3) it’s necessary 
that one not already have warrant for (3). As a purely conceptual matter, 
this is questionable: consider cases in which S already has warrant for 
(3) but this is epistemically independent from S’s warrant for (1), say from 
an alternative knowledge source (cf. Silins 2005: 83–84). Why should 
that conceptually preclude S from obtaining additional warrant for (3)?
So, if we were being uncharitable to Zalabardo we might straightaway 
conclude that premise (B) is false. To avoid such uncharitability, it’s plain 
we need to draw out the implicitly temporal nature of Transmission. It 
must be taken to read instead: ‘obtain warrant for q for the first time’ or ‘for 
the first time, enter the state of having warrant for q’. (Hereinafter read 
this into Transmission.) We now straightforwardly have a vindication of 
21  There is one sense in which, for Zalabardo, you could obtain warrant to believe a 
proposition for which you already have warrant: when you come into a new relation 
to the proposition that would make you have warrant to believe the proposition if 
your original source of warrant wasn’t there. (EK)-reasoning (and like reasoning), 
though, doesn’t satisfy this condition, since, if the original source of warrant to 
believe (3) wasn’t there, by Closure you wouldn’t have warrant to believe (1).
22  Thus the unorthodoxy of Zalabardo’s response: the received wisdom seems to 
be that, put crudely, transmission entails closure but that closure does not entail 
transmission. Wright (1985, 1991, 2003, 2004), for example, always makes the point 
that transmission failure is consistent with closure. But, for Zalabardo, put crudely, 
Transmission entails Closure’s falsity in (EK)-reasoning (and so Closure entails 
Transmission’s falsity in (EK)-reasoning). More on this, and on Zalabardo on the 
relationship between Transmission and Closure in general, in section 2.
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premise (B): Closure would ensure that S would already have warrant to 
believe (3), even before engaging in the inference.
Now inferences take place in time. That much is clear. What’s less 
clear is how relevant temporal — as opposed to epistemic — antecedence 
is to any plausible transmission principle. I want to claim epistemic 
antecedence (and dependence) is the key to transmission questions. 
Here is my strategy: I want to draw out the different analysis of (EK) 
which arises when we switch from Zalabardo’s Transmission to a 
plausible transmission principle, framed instead in terms of epistemic 
dependence, which I’ll call Epistemic Transmission.23 Then in section 2 
I’ll vindicate my preference for a focus on epistemic antecedence by 
demonstrating a principle to which Transmission, but not Epistemic 
Transmission, is committed.24 This principle is 2.4’s (~K-ENT). And I 
come to show that endorsement of (~K-ENT) is associated with serious 
costs.
Consider, then (modelled on Zalabardo’s Transmission):
Epistemic Transmission: if p entails q, S knows that p, S infers q 
from p, and S’s warrant for p isn’t epistemically dependent on S’s 
warrant for q, then S thereby obtains warrant for q.25
In Epistemic Transmission, there is warrant transmission — not epistemic 
circularity and not transmission failure — even if S has some warrant 
or other for q before inferring q from p. Epistemic Transmission 
mandates warrant transmission in (EK)-reasoning unless warrant for (1) 
epistemically depends on warrant for (3).26 And this is all just to say 
that Epistemic Transmission doesn’t endorse premise (B) (with Epistemic 
Transmission replacing Transmission therein).
23  The points will generalise: from (EK) to other arguments, and from Epistemic 
Transmission to other plausible such transmission principles. Of course, Zalabardo’s 
Transmission is an epistemic principle — framed in terms of warrant and knowledge. 
So the contrast here is with Zalabardo’s focus on temporal antecedence.
24  This commitment arises on the assumption of Closure — an assumption Zalabardo, 
my interlocutor, makes.
25  I don’t suggest this is an optimal such principle; rather the aim — served by 
modelling it on Zalabardo’s principle — is merely for contrast.
26  Modulo the other conditions in its antecedent being met. Thus, unlike Zalabardo’s 
principle, this principle has a shot at being valid (cf. n. 9 supra).
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1.10 Returning to (ZALABARDO) itself, (D) and (E) are straightforward 
deductive consequences of (B) and (C) ((C) is an unargued assumption 
which I grant for the purposes of the present discussion), and (A) and 
(D), respectively. Nevertheless, there is more to be said about premise (B).
2. Exploring Premise (B) Further: Upshots of 
Zalabardo’s Response
2.1  Recall premise (B):
(B)  Transmission of warrant in (EK)-reasoning presupposes the 
falsity of an instance of Closure in (EK).
Why is Zalabardo committed to premise (B) rather than only to some 
weaker principle? Why, for example, does Transmission of warrant 
in (EK)-reasoning presuppose the falsity — and not just the false-false 
vacuous truth (i.e. false antecedent-false consequent) — of an instance 
of Closure in (EK)? Put differently: isn’t there Transmission of warrant 
in (EK)-reasoning when an instance of Closure is false-false vacuously 
true — and not false — in (EK)?
For the reader’s ease, let me, at this juncture, repeat Zalabardo’s 
operative principles:
Closure: If p has warrant for S, and S knows that p entails q, then q has 
warrant for S. (36)
Transmission: If p entails q and S knows that p, then inferring q from p 
would enable S to obtain warrant for q. (39)
If Closure’s antecedent is stipulated to be false then either (i) p fails to 
have warrant for S or (ii) S fails to know that p entails q (or both). If (i), 
then Transmission’s antecedent is, by stipulation, false (as if p fails to 
have warrant for S, it follows that S fails to know that p). We’ve thereby 
stipulated that there is not Transmission in (EK)-reasoning when an 
instance of Closure is false-false vacuously true in (EK). So option (i) gets 
us nowhere. What if — option (ii) — one doesn’t, prior to performing a 
competent inference, antecedently know the entailment which licenses 
that inference. We might, moreover, suppose that one can come to know 
that p entails q as a result of competent inference (more on this later). 
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At base, however: suppose one’s antecedently failing to know that p 
entails q is no bar to competently inferring q from p. If this is so, then 
it’s not that Transmission in (EK)-reasoning presupposes the falsity of an 
instance of Closure in (EK); it just presupposes its falsity or false-false 
vacuous truth.
But it should be clear that this challenge to premise (B) — viz. pointing 
to the possibility of Closure being false-false vacuously true — simply 
isn’t open in dealing with the problem of easy knowledge. As the problem 
of easy knowledge is set up, one, by stipulation, knows the premises 
of (EK) — viz. (1), and (2) (the relevant entailment) — prior to an act of 
inference.27 When facing the problem of easy knowledge, the antecedent 
of Closure is true in (EK): Closure, in (EK), can’t be false-false vacuously 
true. So Zalabardo is indeed committed to premise (B) (and not to some 
weakened variant thereof).
2.2 We made Zalabardo’s argument as strong as possible by making 
premise (B) as weak as possible: it only makes claims about (EK), and 
reasoning therewith. But Closure and Transmission are general principles. 
Consider, then:
27  Two related points. First, what do I mean by ‘knowing (or having warrant for) the 
relevant entailment’ — a locution which features prominently in the remainder of 
this chapter? (2) is a conditional expressing an entailment relation. Thus, to know 
(2) is to know the relevant entailment relation expressed by (2). And we can refer to 
the proposition expressed by (2) as the relevant entailment proposition. Importantly, 
such knowledge does not entail that one knows that: [(1) and (2)] entail (3) (and so 
on). Second, and relatedly, the set-up for (EK) does not, however, require that: one 
knows that premise (1) and premise (2) together entail conclusion (3). It follows 
from this (I leave the proof to the reader) that a revised premise (B), operating 
instead with the following plausible two-premise versions of Transmission and 
Closure, would, without more, be false:
Two-premise Transmission: If p1 and p2 together entail q, and if S knows that p1 
and S knows that p2, then (competently) inferring q from p1 and p2 would enable 
S to obtain a warrant to believe q.
Two-premise Closure: If S has a warrant to believe p1, and S has a warrant to 
believe p2, and S knows that p1 and p2 together entail q, then S has a warrant to 
believe q.
The moral for Zalabardo is: don’t construct the argument with these two-premise 
principles.
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(GENERALISED B) Transmission of warrant presupposes the 
invalidity of Closure.
Glossing (GENERALISED B): in order for any competent inference 
to enable one to obtain warrant for the inferred proposition, Closure 
must have at least one false instance — in particular, it must have a 
false instance in the particular argument in which one is performing the 
inference. Is Zalabardo committed to (GENERALISED B)?
2.3 The answer is ‘no’. But seeing why he isn’t so committed leads us 
to a further principle to which Zalabardo is committed. Commitment to 
that further principle reveals some interesting upshots of his response. 
Let’s back up a little. Note that we can reformulate (EK) — indeed some, 
although not Cohen, have done so — thus:
(WARRANT FOR 1*) The table looks red.
(EK*) (1*)  The table is red.
So:
(2*)  The table is not white with red lights shining on it.
That is, we can suppress the conditional in (EK). (EK*)-reasoning is 
analogous to the commonly discussed a priori deduction of ‘Something 
is coloured’ from ‘Something is red’. And there are many more such 
deductions. Consider, then, the following two (single-inference) 
argument schemata (and assume p entails q):
(MP) (1) p (MP*) (1*) p
(2)  If p then q So:
(3) So: q (2*) q
We want to allow that competent (deductive) inferences need not consist 
of formally valid arguments: the a priori consequences of a claim can be 
drawn out without one’s reasoning being formally valid. And it would 
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be mistaken to insist that ostensible (MP*)-reasoning is enthymematic.28 
In sum, abstracting from the problem of easy knowledge, we want to 
allow for a subject competently inferring q from p while failing to know 
that p entails q.
Standardly, however, in order for a proposition to function as a 
premise for a subject, it must be warrantedly believed or known by 
that subject.29 Thus (MP) — but not (MP*) — has a requirement that a 
propounder of an instance of schema (MP) have, at least, a warranted 
belief in the relevant conditional and, ex hypothesi, the relevant entailment. 
It follows, modulo our assumptions concerning warrant (see 1.5 supra), 
and p entailing q, that (MP) — but not (MP*) — has a requirement that a 
propounder of an instance of schema (MP) know the relevant entailment 
(though (MP*) is, of course, compatible with such knowledge).30
2.4 So it turns out Zalabardo isn’t committed to (GENERALISED 
B):31 Transmission of warrant is compatible with the false-false vacuous 
truth of Closure just in case the relevant entailment is not known by the 
reasoner prior to an act of inference. In other words, Zalabardo’s Closure 
and Transmission principles — which interact in premise (B) — commit 
him to the following principle:
28  Wright (2007: sections II and IV) presents a series of “justificational triads” concluding 
with the falsity of sceptical hypotheses concerning the external world, testimony, 
other minds etc., which share (MP*)’s property of not being formally valid.
29  Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) argue a premise must be known by a subject engaging 
in practical reasoning, and note that such a requirement also seems plausible in the 
domain of theoretical reasoning. If Hawthorne and Stanley are right on this latter 
claim, my conclusion that a propounder of an instance of schema (MP) must know 
the relevant entailment can be reached directly.
30  Even in (MP) the three propositions — premises (1) and (2) and conclusion (3) — do 
not tell the whole story. There is also a rule of inference. In (MP*) there is also a 
rule of inference — not a logical rule of inference, but still a rule of (proper or non-
logical) inference that is a priori valid. There is no evident requirement, however, 
that the thinker should have formulated as a proposition, and should have a 
warrant to believe, the relevant rule of inference (in the case of (MP), the rule modus 
ponens). All we assume is that the thinker in question is a competent reasoner.
31  This is a good thing. Given Zalabardo assumes the validity of Closure, if premise (B) 
were to have generalised in this way, Zalabardo would have been in the unenviable 
position of ruling out Transmission of warrant tout court.
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(~K-ENT) Warrant Transmits in reasoning, only if32 the reasoner 
does not know the relevant entailment proposition prior to an act 
of inference.
Why so? Because, according to Closure, it’s only if our propounder 
fails to know the relevant entailment prior to an act of inference that 
the propounder can fail to have warrant already for the argument’s 
conclusion.33 By contrast, Epistemic Transmission isn’t committed to 
(~K-ENT) (with Epistemically Transmits replacing Transmits therein): 
even if our propounder knows the entailment, and thus has a warrant 
for the conclusion prior to inference, warrant Epistemically Transmits 
provided warrant for the premise(s) does not epistemically depend on 
warrant for the conclusion.
Now let us note two interesting upshots of (~K-ENT) — upshots of 
ascending importance. First, consider a rough continuum within the set 
of single-inference arguments (our focus), ranging from simple to complex 
inferences: the more complex an inference, the more readily foreseeable 
it is that a subject may fail to know the relevant entailment prior to an act 
of inference. By (~K-ENT), the more complex the relevant entailment, 
the more likely it is that reasoning employing that entailment Transmits 
warrant for the propounder. For some, this would seem, if anything, 
to get things the wrong way round. For Zalabardo, however, this is 
perfectly intuitive: the more complex the entailment, the more likely it 
is that inferential reasoning will provide you with something you don’t 
already have.
Second, and more importantly, let us focus on some interesting 
specific cases of what (~K-ENT) permits by way of warrant Transmission. 
(~K-ENT) permits Transmission of warrant in reasoning with 
arguments — of the form either (MP)34 or (MP*) — in which one comes 
32  Not ‘if’: there is not, for Zalabardo, Transmission in reasoning if the reasoner has an a 
priori default warrant for the conclusion (though any such cases are bracketed here).
33  And, of course, a propounder can fail to meet this necessary condition — can know 
the relevant entailment prior to an act of inference — whether the argument with 
which he reasons is constituted in the form (MP) or (MP*).
34  Thus, on this view, (EK)-reasoning as understood with respect to the problem of 
easy knowledge, in which one knows the relevant entailment prior to an act of 
inference, is but one form of (MP)-reasoning.
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to know the relevant entailment in the act of35 competent inference. 
(~K-ENT) permits Transmission of warrant in reasoning with arguments 
of the form (MP*) — but not (MP) — in which one comes to know 
the relevant entailment as a result of competent inference.36 Why this 
difference between (MP)-reasoning and (MP*)-reasoning when one 
comes to know the relevant entailment as a result of competent inference? 
Because we are positing the performance of a competent inference 
prior to knowledge of the relevant entailment — a posit forbidden by 
constituting an argument in the form (MP).
Thus we can conclude that the only circumstances in which (MP)-
reasoning Transmits warrant are those in which one comes to know 
the relevant entailment in the act of competent inference. For some, 
this would seem unduly restrictive. Be that as it may, given the 
fundamentality of (MP)-reasoning, and given the only circumstances 
in which it Transmits warrant are those in which the act of competent 
inference and the acquisition of knowledge of the relevant entailment 
are simultaneous, one would like to hear more about the nature of this 
form of inference. It is not merely — as with certain instances of (MP*)-
reasoning — that one comes to know the relevant entailment as a result of 
competent inference: this is an interesting feature of certain inferences, 
but we have a rough idea of how such a performance — or series of 
performances — can (causally) lead to such knowledge. The process 
of drawing an inference — or series of such inferences — can make 
it appropriate, after completion of the process, to ascribe knowledge 
of the relevant entailment to the reasoner. By contrast, instances of 
(MP)-reasoning which Transmit warrant have a quite exceptional, and 
underexplored, feature: one comes to know the relevant entailment in 
the act of — simultaneously with — competent inference. Put differently: 
coming to know the relevant entailment is, in some sense, constitutive 
of this type of inference. This putative feature of certain inferences 
35  A key issue here, relevant to our simple/complex inference distinction, will be 
individuating acts of inference. When do they start? When do they end? When is 
warrant obtained? A defender of (~K-ENT) owes us an answer to these questions 
(cf. 2.5 infra).
36  (~K-ENT) permits warrant Transmission in reasoning with arguments of the 
form (MP*) — but not (MP) — in which one does not come to know the relevant 
entailment at all.
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warrants further scrutiny.37 In sum, given (~K-ENT) is a presupposition 
of premise (B), should (~K-ENT) prove to be unsustainable, so too will 
be Zalabardo’s response to the problem of easy knowledge.
2.5 Is, then, (~K-ENT) unsustainable? I have no principled objection to 
the possibility of any of the foregoing types of inference permitted by 
(~K-ENT).38 Thus, I have no straightforward objection to (~K-ENT) to the 
effect that it permits inferences which ought not to be permitted. Let me, 
instead, gesture at a more cautious objection to (~K-ENT) to the effect 
that its defenders have an explanatory burden which they have yet to 
discharge. The explanatory burden arises given two assumptions. First, 
assume it is a desideratum on any theoretical account such as Zalabardo’s 
that it be able — given adequate information — to accurately classify 
or characterise the form of argument involved in as many successful 
inferences,39 of those to which it speaks, as possible — here, whether (MP) 
or (MP*). Second, assume that many successful inferences involve the 
form of argument (MP). I take each of these assumptions to be relatively 
uncontroversial.
Now, on the back of these assumptions, let us make two particular 
suppositions in advance of outlining the explanatory burden faced by 
a defender of (~K-ENT): first, suppose that a reasoner does not know 
the relevant entailment prior to an act of inference. Second, suppose 
that the inference in question is performed competently. Now, whether 
the form of argument involved in this inference is (MP) or (MP*) (in 
part) depends on whether our reasoner comes to know the relevant 
entailment in the act of — simultaneously with — competent inference. 
37  To switch emphasis: This putative feature of certain instances of coming to know an 
entailment warrants further scrutiny.
38  While, as far as I am aware, none of the foregoing types of inference permitted by 
(~K-ENT) has received detailed discussion in the literature, none is straightforwardly 
unintuitive. I do not attempt to go beyond the basic adumbration of the foregoing 
types of inference permitted by (~K-ENT) provided in 2.4 (an adumbration which, 
saliently, does not provide an account of what it is to know an entailment); indeed, 
given the shape of my coming objection to (~K-ENT) — which takes the form of an 
explanatory challenge for defenders of (~K-ENT) — it would be unwise of me to 
do so.
39  I will stipulate that a successful inference just is a competent inference plus whatever 
additional constraints, if any, are required in order for the inference in question to 
furnish the subject with warrant for that which is inferred. For Zalabardo, thus, 
(~K-ENT) would be such an additional constraint. Thus, what counts as a successful 
inference, in this sense, will vary depending on the theoretical account in question.
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If he so comes to know, we have a candidate case of (MP)-reasoning 
(though also a candidate case of (MP*)-reasoning).40 And if he fails to 
so come to know, we have a case of (MP*)-reasoning (and not also a 
candidate case of (MP)-reasoning).41
Now, here is our explanatory challenge: defenders of (~K-ENT) 
must offer clear, prospective individuation conditions for the type of 
inference in which one comes to know the relevant entailment in the 
act of — simultaneously with — competent inference. We can call these 
knowledge-constitutive inferences. And we can call those inferences 
in which one comes to know the relevant entailment as a result of 
competent inference, knowledge-resulting inferences. In particular, then, 
such individuation conditions must enable us to distinguish between 
knowledge-constitutive and knowledge-resulting inferences.
We can dramatise the urgency of this challenge by contrasting two 
inferences — one knowledge-constitutive and one knowledge-resulting 
(yet suppose the two inferences are otherwise identical, in advance of 
determining the form of argument involved therein). We can stipulate 
that the knowledge-resulting inference is one in which, as a matter 
of fact, the reasoner acquires knowledge of the relevant entailment a 
millisecond (or less) after completing the inference (cf. n. 35 supra). The 
point is that in the absence of clear, prospective individuation conditions 
for knowledge-constitutive inferences it is unclear how — even given 
adequate information about how, independently of whether known, the 
relevant entailment features in the reasoner’s reasoning process etc. (cf. 
n. 40) — we can distinguish between these two inferences.42 Without 
40  (MP*)-reasoning is, I take it, compatible with such knowledge. (At any rate, in 
advance of further information on the nature of such inferences we must assume 
this to be the case.) I take it that further information about how such knowledge 
features in the reasoner’s psychology — how, independently of whether known, 
the relevant entailment features in his reasoning process — will determine whether 
the argument involved in this inference is (MP) or (MP*). Note that such facts about 
a reasoner’s psychology alone cannot determine the form of argument involved; it is 
such facts in combination with whether, and when, the reasoner knows the relevant 
entailment.
41  To fail to make our supposition that the inference is performed competently, both 
the foregoing cases may be cases of non-successful — failed — reasoning (cf. n. 39 
supra).
42  Why not, instead, begin at the other end with a search for clear, prospective 
individuation conditions for knowledge-resulting inferences? To my mind this would 
not be a fruitful way to proceed (though defenders of (~K-ENT) are free to adopt 
this strategy if they so wish). First, I take it that knowledge-resulting inferences are 
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such conditions we can, in this and like cases, have no idea whether 
the form of argument involved in the inferences in question is (MP) or 
(MP*). And it follows, given (~K-ENT), that we can have no idea when a 
successful piece of (MP)-reasoning has taken place.43
In sum, in advance of defenders of (~K-ENT), like Zalabardo, 
discharging this explanatory burden, we can enter a provisional verdict: 
(~K-ENT) is, without more, unsustainable, and so too, without more, is 
Zalabardo’s response to the problem of easy knowledge.
a motley group of inferences, with potentially little conceptually to unite any two 
such inferences. Second, and relatedly, I do not see how, even assuming some such 
set of individuation conditions could be reached, such conditions could help us 
distinguish between the two inferences in our dramatisation.
43  Doesn’t this explanatory challenge arise regardless of (~K-ENT)’s truth-value? 
Yes — but with less urgency if (~K-ENT) is false. The challenge is less urgent because 
if (and only if) (~K-ENT) is false, it’s no longer the case that the only circumstances 
in which (MP)-reasoning furnishes the subject with warrant for its conclusion are 
knowledge-constitutive inferences. That is, if (and only if) (~K-ENT) is false, cases 
in which the relevant entailment is known prior to an act of inference can serve as 
quotidian cases in which the inference in question is successful — furnishes the 
subject with warrant for that which is inferred (cf. n. 40 supra). Given adequate 
information, we can accurately classify or characterise the form of argument 
involved in such cases on a case by case basis (cf. n. 38 supra). Clearly, in such 
circumstances the need to provide clear, prospective individuation conditions for 
knowledge-constitutive inferences is less urgent (cf. our two assumptions made two 
paragraphs ago in the main text).
3. The Problem of Easy 
Knowledge: Towards a Solution
I develop my own solution to the problem of easy knowledge, criticising and 
improving on a proposal by Davies (2004). My solution is available to the 
dogmatist. Thus, so far, the prospects look good for a defense of dogmatism, 
immediate justification, and basic knowledge against the pattern of objection.
0.1 In Chapter Two, I introduced Stewart Cohen’s (2002, 2005) problem 
of easy knowledge (in sections 0.1–0.4 of that chapter), and then offered 
an extended commentary on José Zalabardo’s response to the problem. 
In this chapter, I take some steps towards a solution to the problem of 
easy knowledge.
1. Responses to (EK)-reasoning
1.1 One could accept KR (and thereby face a version of the problem of 
the criterion):1
KR A potential knowledge source K can yield knowledge for S, only if 
S knows K is reliable. (Cohen 2002: 309)
This principle would block basic knowledge, and so the problem of 
generating easy knowledge from basic knowledge by (EK)-reasoning 
wouldn’t arise. But I want to consider responses to the problem of easy 
1  See Cohen (2002: 309–10) on the problem of the criterion.
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knowledge which don’t accept KR2 (and thereby avoid the problem of 
the criterion). My focus is on a response which can be attributed to 
Martin Davies (2004, 2009). Davies’s response is promising, but my 
claim is that it is incomplete. In section 2 I introduce Cohen’s important 
modification of his original case. And in section 3 I identify, and make 
a positive move to remedy, the incompleteness of Davies’s response. 
First, though, I need to delineate Davies’s response.
1.2 Some preliminaries: first, Davies (2004: 229–31) endorses — at least 
for the sake of the argument — James Pryor’s (2000: 519–20) dogmatist 
epistemology, which licenses an immediate, though defeasible, 
transition from the experience described in (WARRANT FOR 1) to 
basic knowledge of (1). To the extent that Davies is a dogmatist we can 
conclude he doesn’t accept KR.
Second, Davies distinguishes between two epistemic projects: the 
epistemic project of deciding what to believe, and the epistemic project of 
settling a question.3 Here is Davies (2009: 361) on the epistemic project of 
deciding what to believe (call it the D-project):
If you review some of your beliefs, P1,…, Pn, and notice a valid argument 
from those premisses to Q then you should4 adopt the belief Q or, if other 
considerations argue against Q, then you should reconsider your beliefs 
P1,…, Pn.
Note a feature of this project: it’s deciding what to believe, Q, on the 
basis of noticing a valid argument from a set of premises, P1,…,Pn, to Q. 
The type of D-project of particular interest here is reasoning with an 
argument to come to know its conclusion.5
And here is Davies (2009: 364–65) on the epistemic project of settling 
a question (call it the S-project):
2  And, indeed, don’t accept WR: A potential knowledge source K can yield knowledge 
for S, only if S has warrant to accept that K is reliable.
3  This epistemological distinction parallels, respectively, Frank Jackson’s (1987: ch.6) 
dialectical distinction between the teasing out and the convincing purposes of arguing.
4  ‘[M]ay’ is preferable to avoid the project mandating the adoption of countless time-
consuming and pointless beliefs.
5  Although Davies (2009: 363) does not speak explicitly about knowledge (in 
connection with either of his two epistemic projects), but only about “three 
progressively less demanding norms for the project of deciding what to believe”.
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The project of settling the question whether or not Q is true […] begin[s] 
by taking the question to be open pro tempore […] I suppose, for the 
purposes of the question-settling project, that I have reasons to think that 
Q is, or may very well be, false. This suppositional doubt then governs 
my conduct of the project.6
Suppose that I have a warranted belief P and that my project is to 
deploy my warrant to believe P, and my appreciation of the valid 
argument from P to Q, in order to settle the question whether or not 
Q is true in favour of the positive. My conduct of the question-settling 
project is governed by suppositional doubt about Q. In some cases, my 
suppositional doubt about Q may prevent me from rationally availing 
myself of my warrant to believe P within the project that is governed by that 
suppositional doubt. In such cases, although I do have a warrant to believe 
P and there is an obviously valid argument from P to Q, I cannot deploy 
that warrant to settle the question in favour of Q.7
Note, as before, that undertaking an S-project doesn’t threaten many 
plausible knowledge-closure principles: while an (EK)-reasoner has 
warrant for (1), it’s left open that he has warrant for (3) other than by 
means of (EK)-reasoning within the scope of suppositional doubt.8 The type 
of S-project of particular interest here is reasoning with an argument to 
come to know its conclusion.
1.3 So, by Davies’s lights, when one undertakes a D-project in (EK)-
reasoning a subject can put together antecedent warranted beliefs in 
6  Davies also adds elsewhere (2009: 369): “[A] fuller treatment of the project of settling 
the question would have to allow for the case where I begin by supposing that it is 
as likely as not that Q is false”. This suggests that principled or mandated agnosticism 
(see Wright 2007) about Q — in which one assigns a credence of 0.5 to both Q and its 
negation — is, for Davies, a form of suppositional doubt about Q, but caution is in 
order. It may be that a Bayesian will describe a state of open-mindedness as a state 
in which probability 0.5 is assigned to a proposition and its negation. Those may 
also be the probabilities that are suppositionally assigned in suppositional doubt, 
but the fact that the Bayesian assigns the same probabilities in these two conditions 
does not show that the two conditions are epistemically equivalent. (In any case, 
it’s clear that Davies would not want to say that mere open-mindedness makes it 
impossible to make rational use of one’s warrant for (1) in the project of deciding 
what to believe.)
7  The extension of the S-project to multi-premise arguments is straightforward.
8  It will usually be that the thinker has a warrant to believe (3). But the project of 
settling the question is more demanding than the project of deciding what to 
believe and the set-up of the more demanding project may prevent the thinker from 
rationally deploying his warrant to believe (1) within the scope of the demanding 
project.
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(1) and (2) to come to know (3). But when one undertakes an S-project 
in (EK)-reasoning one suppositionally doubts (3). Now (WARRANT 
FOR 1) cannot be rationally deployed to settle the question in favour 
of (3). Thus no warrant for, and so no knowledge of, (3) is acquired by 
(EK)-reasoning within the S-project.9 Davies offers a like diagnosis of 
reasoning with Moore’s ‘Proof’ of (knowledge of)10 the existence of an 
external world.11
2. Cohen’s Modified Case
2.1 Cohen (2005: 420) considers a modification of his original case — a 
case designed to “eliminate entirely any dialectical context” from 
(EK)-reasoning:
Suppose my son is not worried about the possibility that the table is 
deceptively illuminated. He accepts that I know that the table is red and 
not white with red lights shining on it. He is just curious about how I 
know it. I respond in just the same way. “Oh that’s easy. It looks red, so it 
is red, so it is not white with red lights shining on it.” By my lights there 
is something unsatisfactory about my response.
9  Though Davies does not explicitly say this in his 2009 paper (cf. n. 5 supra), his earlier 
discussion of the problem of armchair knowledge (2000, 2003) suggests this way of 
speaking. (In terms of warrant: the thinker does have a warrant to believe (3) and 
may well have a warranted belief in (3). But the warrant to believe (1) cannot be (re-)
deployed within the context of suppositional doubt in order to settle the question 
whether or not (3) is true.) Given the distinction between two epistemic projects, 
it seems he should say that, if the thinker undertakes the more demanding project 
then he cannot arrive at knowledge of (3), but that he can arrive at knowledge of the 
very same proposition ((3)) by undertaking the less demanding project (cf. epistemic 
contextualism — see Rysiew 2007). This sounds a bit paradoxical, however. It may 
be we tend to run together two standards for knowledge — the standard of doing 
well in deciding what to believe and the standard of doing well in settling the 
question. Perhaps we tend to impose the more demanding standard — unless there 
is no possibility of meeting that standard, in which case we might shift to the less 
demanding standard. More on this later.
10  I use this parenthetical device throughout to signal that the key issue up for debate 
is whether such knowledge is indeed delivered.
11  Davies (2009) uses notions of defeat and transmission failure to explain how 
suppositional doubt can limit the rational deployment of warrant (in (EK)-
reasoning, with respect to both (1) and (3)). Rather than explore this explanation 
further, I leave the explanandum intuitive, with (EK)-reasoning and Moore’s ‘Proof’ 
serving as putative exemplars thereof.
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Two responses are available. First, one might dispute Cohen’s intuition 
about this case. Maybe Cohen has been misled by considering a case 
in which, even though a dialectical context has been eliminated, 
there are still two parties involved — two parties, we can assume, 
sharing background assumptions. Perhaps the involvement of two 
parties — Cohen and his son — has misled Cohen into finding 
something unsatisfactory about a genuinely satisfactory response. That 
is, maybe Cohen has unconsciously imported differing background 
assumptions onto the parties in the case; such an importation rendering 
a satisfactory response ostensibly unsatisfactory. This first response 
would be hasty. I share Cohen’s intuition about the unsatisfactoriness of 
the father’s response in the modified case, but reliance on bare intuitions 
is philosophically unsatisfying. So I want — the second response — to 
give a philosophically satisfying account of this intuition.12 Doing this 
will reveal the incompleteness of Davies’s response to the problem of 
easy knowledge.
(Perhaps, though, we can, even at this stage, do slightly better than 
reliance on a bare intuition. It seems that the question, ‘How do you 
know?” is rather different from the question, ‘Why do you believe?’. 
One natural answer to the second question is: (a) I believe that the table 
is red; so, on that basis, (b) I believe that the table is not white; and so 
(c) I believe that the table is not both white and lit with red lights. If I 
do well in believing (a) then it seems that I also do well in believing 
(c). Dogmatism says that there is no epistemic circularity here. On 
one view, the intuitions about ‘know’ owe something to an intuition 
about sensitivity — a condition explored in Chapter Seven. However, 
I try to show that that latter intuition seems to be limited in some way. 
Sometimes sensitivity is unachievable in principle. In sum: the ‘How do 
you know?’ question seems more demanding, more challenging.)
2.2 By eliminating the dialectical context, Cohen removes any 
possibility of the dialectical phenomenon of begging the question entering 
the picture. Cohen’s son is prepared to grant Cohen that he does indeed 
know (3) and wants to be told how Cohen achieved the feat of coming 
12  This is the first of several points in this chapter where, concededly, I use a contestable 
intuition (here: Cohen’s) as a stimulus to providing a theoretical underpinning 
thereof.
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to know (3). What Cohen’s case illustrates is that we find the answer 
intuitively inadequate if all it does is to spell out how Cohen did well 
in the D-project. This suggests that the son’s request calls for, but does 
not receive, an account of how Cohen settled the question whether or 
not (3) is true. So it’s not that eliminating the dialectical context removes 
the S-project from consideration, leaving only the D-project. Rather, the 
son’s question, ‘How do you know?’ — cf. ‘How did you find out?’, 
‘How could you tell?’, ‘How did you rule out relevant alternatives to 
(3)?’ — asks for an account of Cohen’s conduct of the S-project. The son 
wants to know what evidence Cohen was able rationally to deploy in 
the context of a project that began by his suppositionally regarding the 
question whether or not (3) is true as a genuinely open one. And the son 
is unsatisfied by an account merely of Cohen’s conduct of the D-project.
3. Identifying and Remedying the Incompleteness 
of Davies’s Response
3.1 Consider the following variant on (EK), (EK*):
(WARRANT FOR 1) The table looks red.
(EK*)
(1)  The table is red.
(2)  If the table is red, then I’m not a BIV13 being deceived into 
falsely believing the table is red.
(3)  I’m not a BIV being deceived into falsely believing the table 
is red.
This is just (EK) but with a different consequent in (2) and, resultantly, 
a different conclusion. And (EK*), predictably, can be explained in 
much the same way as (EK): we have a piece of basic knowledge, a 
bridging conditional that is knowable a priori, and an anti-sceptical 
13  BIV = Brain-in-a-Vat, being fed pseudo-perceptual-experiences (by an evil scientist). 
One’s being a BIV is compatible with there being an external world — just not with 
one coming to know (any features) thereof. I leave open that a BIV can engage in 
competent intellectual functioning, cf. Wright (1991: 104).
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conclusion. What’s the purpose of setting out (EK*), and considering 
(EK) and (EK*) side-by-side? The problem of easy knowledge, recall, 
is that particular arguments (beginning from a premise of which we 
have basic knowledge) seem to offer a ‘too-easy’ route to knowledge 
of a conclusion. But (EK) and (EK*) elicit very different intuitions 
about the legitimacy of the argument as a route to knowledge: (EK*)-
reasoning seems much less unsatisfactory as a route to knowledge of 
its conclusion than (EK)-reasoning. However, both (EK)-reasoning and 
(EK*)-reasoning do well by the standards of the D-project and neither 
does well by the standards of the S-project.14 On these two projects, 
(EK)-reasoning and (EK*)-reasoning are matched. Given that the only 
theoretical considerations on which Davies can draw in determining 
whether a thinker knows a conclusion is whether that thinker does well 
in the D- and S-projects, if the question is whether to say that a thinker 
knows the conclusions of (EK) and (EK*), then Davies apparently has 
to (counterintuitively) give the same answer for this pair of examples 
matched on their performances in the D- and S-projects. Thus the 
incompleteness of Davies’s response.15
3.2 Now consider the following intuition of Cohen’s (2002: 313):
I think [(EK*)-reasoning] may look plausible only because it is obscure 
in general how we know global sceptical alternatives do not obtain, e.g., 
how we know we’re not brains-in-a-vat. And insofar as we are inclined to 
say we do know such things, this can seem like a reasonable hypothesis 
about how we know.
But the problem is that we cannot limit the knowledge we acquire 
in this way to denying global sceptical alternatives […] Presumably, I 
cannot know that it’s not the case that the table is white but illuminated 
by red lights, on the basis of the table’s looking red.
14  Davies (2009) has two notions of transmission failure — one for each of the D- and 
S-projects — which, if met, result in a failure of transmission of epistemic warrant 
from premises to conclusion. Reasoning fails to do well in the relevant epistemic 
project iff that project’s transmission failure condition is met.
15  I’ve raised an ‘incompleteness’ problem for Davies. But, additionally, it seems (at 
least some) epistemic contextualist and subject-sensitive invariantist responses will 
inherit such a problem. On these analyses, so long as — as, suppose (cf. Lewis 1996), 
in Cohen’s modified case — the possibility that the table is deceptively illuminated 
is not raised, there is no way of diagnosing anything unsatisfactory about responding 
with (EK)-reasoning. I leave open how other analyses of knowledge will handle 
Cohen’s modified case.
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As before, two responses are available: we might reject Cohen’s 
intuition or we might try to give a philosophical underpinning to it. 
As before, I prefer the second response. Cohen admits to an intuition 
that (EK*)-reasoning is less unsatisfactory than (EK)-reasoning, 
although the two examples have the same structure (“the knowledge 
we acquire in this way […]” (my emphasis)). He seems to conjecture 
that the difference is that the conclusion of (EK*) denies a global 
sceptical hypothesis, while the conclusion of (EK) denies a more 
local sceptical hypothesis. He also enters a conjecture about why this 
difference should make a difference; namely, that “it is obscure” how 
we know global sceptical hypotheses to be false. I take it that the 
reason that this “is obscure” is that, in general, it is not plausible 
that we know they are false on account of sensory or perceptual 
evidence that counts against them. So, if we want to say that we do 
know that they are false then maybe “[(EK*)-reasoning] can seem 
like a reasonable hypothesis about how we know”. So, is the global/
local distinction important here? Is the global/local distinction what’s 
driving Cohen’s intuition?
Where (EK*) and (EK) differ, then, is in (EK*) concluding with 
the falsity of a global sceptical hypothesis, whereas (EK) merely 
concludes with the falsity of a local sceptical hypothesis. The truth of a 
global sceptical hypothesis is incompatible with our knowing — but 
not necessarily with the truth of — any of the things we ordinarily 
take ourselves to be able to know by means of sense perception. 
The truth of a local sceptical hypothesis is incompatible with our 
knowing — but not necessarily with the truth of — a proper subset of 
the things we ordinarily take ourselves to be able to know by means 
of sense perception. Local sceptical hypotheses come in varying 
degrees of strength. The conclusion of (EK), for example, is the falsity 
of a fairly weak local sceptical hypothesis.16
16  For interesting remarks on conditions on being a sceptical hypothesis, see Beebe 
(2010).
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3.3 Let’s now stipulate the following argument template:
(EK)-style argument: A valid argument with a first premise 
establishing a piece of basic knowledge, a second conditional 
premise knowable a priori, and a conclusion — reachable by a 
modus ponens inference — delivering (knowledge of) the falsity of 
a sceptical hypothesis (global or local).17
Notably, Moore’s ‘Proof’ is an (EK)-style argument. Call reasoning with 
an (EK)-style argument (EK)-style reasoning. While such arguments and 
reasoning are my focus from here on, my final proposal purports to 
have application to knowledge and reasoning in general (within the 
scope of our two epistemic projects).
Moreover, let us stipulate that the three instances of (EK)-style 
arguments encountered thus far — viz. (EK), Moore’s ‘Proof’, and 
(EK*) — are central cases of (EK)-style arguments in the following sense: 
each has a first premise establishing a piece of basic knowledge of 
an everyday proposition which is not the negation of a sceptical hypothesis. 
‘Everyday proposition’ is not a perfectly precise term; moreover nor 
is ‘sceptical hypothesis’ — cf. n. 16. However, ‘I have hands’ and ‘The 
table is red’ serve as clear exemplars of everyday propositions which are 
not the negations of sceptical hypotheses. It is a characteristic of central 
cases of (EK)-style reasoning (but not only of such central cases) that 
they do badly in the S-project.
Finally, we can stipulate that (EK)-style arguments which are not 
central cases thereof — by virtue of not having a first premise establishing 
a piece of basic knowledge of an everyday proposition that is not the 
negation of a sceptical hypothesis — are peripheral cases. I think that 
this central/peripheral distinction is an important and natural one to 
draw. Indeed it captures the differing degrees of attention lavished by 
contemporary epistemologists on the two types of (EK)-style arguments, 
and on reasoning therewith. And, though we’ll encounter peripheral 
17  Wright (2007: sections II and IV) presents a series of “justificational triads” 
which — with a little modification — can be fitted into my (EK)-style argument 
template, concluding with the falsity of sceptical hypotheses concerning the 
external world, testimony, other minds etc. In Wright’s triads the conditional 
does not function as a premise. My final proposal can go through operating with 
Wright’s formulations.
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cases in what follows (see nn. 24–25 infra), our focus — following 
contemporary epistemologists — will be on central cases.
Now let’s ask the following two questions:
(Local Necessary?) Is the delivery of (knowledge of) the falsity 
of a (merely) local — and not global — sceptical hypothesis 
in (EK)-style-reasoning necessary to generate intuitions of 
unsatisfactoriness to (roughly) the level generated by (EK)-reasoning 
(even in a non-dialectical context)?
(Local Sufficient?) Is the delivery of (knowledge of) the falsity 
of a (merely) local — and not global — sceptical hypothesis 
in (EK)-style-reasoning sufficient to generate intuitions of 
unsatisfactoriness to (roughly) the level generated by (EK)-reasoning 
(even in a non-dialectical context)?18
(A key point is that, compatibly with a piece of reasoning not generating 
intuitions of unsatisfactoriness to (roughly) the level generated by 
(EK)-reasoning, something could still seem — and be — unsatisfactory 
about a piece of reasoning in question. Indeed my coming analysis 
of (EK*)-reasoning, and, by analogy, (MOORE)-reasoning, bears out 
this compatibility. (EK*)-reasoning is less unsatisfactory than (EK)-
reasoning, yet suffers from an epistemic limitation: it cannot be used 
in the epistemic project of settling the question. Albeit this limitation, 
I’ll claim, is not such as to preclude knowledge.) It turns out that the 
answer to both questions is: ‘no’. We’ll discover this by means of two 
thought experiments. This will support the proposal that the global/
local distinction isn’t driving Cohen’s intuition. In fact the two thought 
experiments lead us to the real distinction — a distinction cross-cutting 
the global/local distinction — that drives Cohen’s intuition.19
18  I omit the parenthetical ‘even in a non-dialectical context’ from here on in, simply 
to keep things less cumbersome. Our focus, though, is on both dialectical and non-
dialectical contexts.
19  Cohen (2002: 313) hints at the real distinction to which my thought experiments 
lead. I therefore take any disagreement with Cohen to be one of emphasis rather 
than substance.
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3.4 Thought experiment one — why the answer to (Local Necessary?) is ‘no’. 
We need a piece of (EK)-style-reasoning which seems as unsatisfactory 
as (EK)-reasoning, but which delivers (knowledge of) the falsity of a 
global — and not (merely) local — sceptical hypothesis. To get this we 
need to draw the following distinction:
Weak BIV: One is a Weak BIV iff one is a BIV with the availability 
of knowledge-conferring evidence that one is a BIV.
Strong BIV: One is a Strong BIV iff one is a BIV with no availability 
of knowledge-conferring evidence that one is a BIV.20
So Weak BIV and Strong BIV exhaustively and exclusively partition the 
set of BIVs. What might be some examples of evidence that one is a BIV? 
Pryor (2000: 537–38) suggests the following:
[A] ticker tape appears at the bottom of your visual field with the words: 
“You are a brain in a vat…”
[S]tatistical evidence, such as evidence that 7 out of 10 subjects are brains 
in vats, or evidence that you are a brain in a vat 7 mornings out of 10.
Pryor introduces these examples as cases of positive evidence that one is 
a BIV, which thus form evidence potentially undermining any warrant 
one might have that one is not a BIV. Pryor (537–38) categorises the ticker 
tape example as a case of “positive empirical evidence” that one is a 
BIV (and doesn’t explicitly categorise the statistical evidence example). 
I take the ticker tape — and the statistical evidence — example as a case 
of pseudo-perceptual evidence. Finally, why is one’s being a Weak BIV a 
global — and not merely local — sceptical hypothesis? Because a Weak BIV 
cannot — as local sceptical hypotheses permit — come to know anything 
by means of sense perception. That which it can come to know — that it is 
a BIV — is not, ex hypothesi, knowable by sense perception. BIVs have no 
such faculties; they’re limited to pseudo-perception.
With this distinction drawn, and examples explained, we can 
construct our argument:
20  Cf. Cohen’s (1999: 69) ‘Brain-in-a-vat*’.
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(WARRANT FOR 1) The table looks red.
(Local Necessary? No)
(1)  The table is red.
(2)  If the table is red, then I’m not a Weak BIV being deceived into 
falsely believing the table is red.
(3)  I’m not a Weak BIV being deceived into falsely believing the 
table is red.
Why does such (EK)-style reasoning dictate that the answer to (Local 
Necessary?) is ‘no’? As with — and to the level of — (EK), something is 
unsatisfactory with coming to know that one is not such a Weak BIV in such 
a manner. But (Local Necessary? No) has delivered a conclusion — unlike 
as with (EK) — falsifying a global sceptical hypothesis. Could the 
characteristic shared by (Local Necessary? No) and (EK) that explains 
our like dissatisfaction with reasoning therewith be the following: that 
there is (ex hypothesi) other reliable evidence available — other, that is, than 
evidence acquired by (EK)-style reasoning — for coming to know their 
conclusions?21
With respect to (Local Necessary? No) such evidence would be the 
absence of ticker-tapes, statistical evidence etc. informing you that you 
are a Weak BIV.22 What background knowledge a subject must have to 
exploit such evidence is something I don’t explore. Just assume that 
whatever background knowledge is required, our subject has it. I’m 
supposing our subject could, at a certain point, engage in the following 
non-(EK)-style modus tollens reasoning:
(Weak BIV)
(1)  If I am a Weak BIV, then I will have received evidence that I am 
a Weak BIV by now.
(2)  I haven’t received evidence that I’m a Weak BIV.
(3)  I’m not a Weak BIV.
21  It’s a presupposition of the availability of other reliable evidence that the relevant 
subject is able to recognise and exploit such evidence as evidence for the hypothesis in 
question (cf. n. 30 infra).
22  Cf. Cohen (1999: 69).
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Note that (3) leaves open that one is a Strong BIV. Now suppose, as a 
result of (Weak BIV)-reasoning, our subject acquires reliable evidence 
for (3). (This supposition is not uncontroversial: in general, it is not clear 
how much weight in favour of Not-Weak-BIV is provided by the absence 
of evidence for Weak BIV.) Our subject can then deploy such evidence 
to come to know, by non-(EK)-style reasoning, the conclusion of (Local 
Necessary? No).23 Such evidence can be evidence directly for the conclusion 
of (Local Necessary? No), and thus deployment of it needn’t proceed 
by way of (EK)-style reasoning.24 Before — as I shall — conclusively 
answering affirmatively to the question whether the availability of other 
reliable evidence is the key to explaining our intuitions, let’s press on to 
thought experiment two and our negative answer to (Local Sufficient?).
3.5 Thought experiment two — why the answer to (Local Sufficient?) is 
‘no’. We need a piece of (EK)-style reasoning which doesn’t seem as 
unsatisfactory as (EK)-reasoning, but which delivers (knowledge of) the 
falsity of a (merely) local sceptical hypothesis. We need (EK) again, but 
with an accompanying stipulation:
23  I concede, given that a global sceptical hypothesis undermines all perceptual 
warrants, that (Weak BIV)-reasoning (which presupposes some form of externalism 
about perceptual evidence) is not clear-cut. I think my final proposal may go 
through without reliance on (Weak BIV)-reasoning, however (i.e. with reliance 
instead on the coming thought experiment two).
24  Two related points. (1) Of course, there is inference involved in obtaining the 
evidence, viz. (Weak BIV)-reasoning. The ‘directness’ point (here and, mutatis 
mutandis, later in the chapter) is simply that once this evidence is obtained, no 
further inference — and certainly not (EK)-style reasoning — need be involved: 
a non-inferential transition can instead occur. (2) Needn’t so proceed; but can. 
Consider:
(WARRANT FOR 1) (Weak BIV)-reasoning, concluding with reliable evidence 
for its conclusion.
(1)  I’m not a Weak BIV
(2)  If I’m not a Weak BIV, then I’m not a Weak BIV being deceived into falsely 
believing the table is red.
(3)  I’m not a Weak BIV being deceived into falsely believing the table is red.
In principle this is a live candidate for being a case of (EK)-style reasoning. Indeed, 
let us grant that (1) is a piece of basic knowledge (bracketing the difficult question 
of identifying the operative knowledge source). We can note that, not only is (1) not 
an everyday proposition, but, moreover, it is the falsity of a sceptical hypothesis. 
It is thus a peripheral case of (EK)-style reasoning. Notably, reasoning with this 
argument — unlike central cases of (EK)-style reasoning — does well in the S-project. 
And this is so because (WARRANT FOR 1) can be evidence directly for (3).
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(WARRANT FOR 1) The table looks red.
(Local Sufficient? No)
(1)  The table is red.
(2)  If the table is red, then it is not white with red lights shining 
on it.
(3)  The table is not white with red lights shining on it.
Accompanying stipulation: Unlike with (EK), there’s no other 
(inductive) knowledge-conferring evidence available against the 
possibility that there are red lights shining on the table.
Such — ex hypothesi proscribed — (inductive) evidence could be 
perceptual, memorial, or testimonial. Such evidence can be evidence 
directly for the conclusion of (Local Sufficient? No), and thus deployment 
of it needn’t proceed by way of (EK)-style reasoning.25 (Note that this 
is merely a thought experiment designed to prise apart conceptually 
the real distinction driving Cohen’s intuition from the (cross-cutting) 
global/local distinction. There is thus no need to demonstrate that the 
accompanying stipulation is commonly true. Indeed, as a matter of fact, 
it will commonly be false. We are countenancing a scenario in which 
there is no other way of gaining evidence one way or the other about 
red lights, other than following through the (EK)-reasoning. One thing 
25  Needn’t so proceed; but can. Consider:
(WARRANT FOR 1) Inductive evidence that there aren’t red lights shining on 
the table.
(1)  There aren’t red lights shining on the table.
(2)  If there aren’t red light shining on the table, then the table is not white with 
red lights shining on it.
(3)  The table is not white with red lights shining on it.
Again (cf. n. 24), in principle this is a live candidate for being a case of (EK)-style 
reasoning. Indeed, let us grant that (1) is a piece of basic inductive knowledge. This 
time, however (cf. n. 24), we can note that, while (1) is, plausibly, an everyday 
proposition, it is also the negation of a sceptical hypothesis. It is thus a peripheral 
case of (EK)-style reasoning. Notably, reasoning with this argument — unlike 
central cases of (EK)-style reasoning — does well in the S-project. And this is so 
because (WARRANT FOR 1) can be evidence directly for (3).
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is clear, however: in order to keep the sceptical hypothesis relevantly 
local, the scenario cannot be one in which an evil demon is going to 
prevent our discovery of the red lights by providing experiences as of 
there not being red lights.)
So, why does (Local Sufficient? No)-reasoning dictate that the answer 
to (Local Sufficient?) is ‘no’? As with (EK*), (Local Sufficient? No)-reasoning 
has not generated intuitions of unsatisfactoriness to the level generated 
by (EK)-reasoning. But, in contrast with (EK*), it’s delivered (knowledge 
of) the falsity of a (merely) local sceptical hypothesis. I suggest the 
characteristic shared by (Local Sufficient? No) and (EK*), which explains 
our similar level of satisfaction with reasoning therewith, is that there’s 
(ex hypothesi) no other reliable evidence available — other, that is, than 
evidence acquired by (EK)-style reasoning — for coming to know, 
respectively, that there aren’t red lights shining on the table, and that I’m 
not a BIV.26 Consider the following dilemma apropos of (Local Sufficient? 
No): Either one doesn’t know the conclusion at all — in which case 
(local) scepticism is true — or, in the absence of alternative satisfactory 
routes to knowledge of (3), one does know the conclusion by means 
of (EK)-style reasoning such as (Local Sufficient? No)-reasoning. Given 
we — I assume — don’t want to cave in to scepticism by taking the first 
horn, we must — however reluctantly — grasp the second horn. (As 
the accompanying stipulation will commonly be false, circumstances 
in which one would need to employ (Local Sufficient? No)-reasoning 
in order to acquire knowledge of (3) will be vanishingly small. But 
the moral to be drawn from this thought experiment is not that (Local 
Sufficient? No)-reasoning is a vital form of anti-sceptical reasoning. We 
are simply using this thought experiment to try to identify the correct 
basis on which (EK*)-reasoning — a (putatively) vital form of anti-
sceptical reasoning — is less unsatisfactory than (EK)-reasoning.)
Quite apart from the question whether the two thought experiments 
are ultimately dialectically effective, there seems to be something 
intuitive about the main idea. On the whole — and especially when 
we are doing science, for example — we prefer evidence that retains its 
26  There is, however, a salient difference between (Local Sufficient? No) and (EK*) in 
this regard: in the former, such evidence is stipulated to be de facto unavailable, 
whereas in the latter, such evidence is in principle unavailable. Considering further 
possible implications of this difference is a good exercise.
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evidential status even if we begin by doubting the hypothesis that the 
evidence is supposed to support. We are not keen to allow that evidence 
that lacks this property provides a route to knowledge, if evidence that 
has the property is available. But if we do well doxastically in a case 
where there is no possibility of evidence with the preferred property, 
then we are inclined to allow that this might be sufficient for knowledge. 
(We might also think that there is a distinction to be made between 
knowledge that meets the additional condition and knowledge that 
does not, because it cannot, meet it.)
3.6 In sum: there is something to be said for the idea that doing well in 
the D-project yields knowledge. But there is also something to be said 
for the idea that knowledge requires doing well in the S-project. When 
someone does not do well in the S-project — say, in (EK), by not being 
able to settle the question whether (3) is true — it is natural to say that 
he has not come to know (3), because there is a higher standard that 
the person could meet. This generates conflicting pressures on our use 
of ‘knows’, since there are some cases where one does well in the (less 
demanding) D-project, but not in the (more demanding) S-project.27 
One of those pressures is towards saying that knowledge requires 
doing well, not only in the D-project but also in the S-project. So, when 
Cohen’s son asks: ‘How do you know?’, he is (usually) looking for an 
answer to the question how Cohen did well in the S-project. That is, how 
did Cohen deploy evidence to settle the question whether (3) is true?28 
The answer that Cohen gives his son in the case of (EK) is unsatisfying. 
It says nothing, for example, about evidence that shifts the balance of 
probability in favour of proposition (1), ‘The table is red’, and against 
27  There may be additional conflicting tendencies generated by the S-project itself. 
Consider a case — say (EK) — in which the thinker did well in deciding to believe 
(1) and also in settling the question whether (1), but is not able to settle the question 
whether, say, (3): On the one hand, the thinker did settle the question whether (1) 
was true, so we might say that he did come to know that (1) is true (even by the 
demanding standard of doing well in the S-project). On the other hand, a plausible 
closure principle, plus the fact that the thinker is unable to settle the question 
whether (3) is true, may add up to a reason for saying that he does not know (by the 
demanding standard of doing well in the S-project) that (1) is true after all. So there 
may be conflict between the two standards and there may be additional conflicts 
within the use of the more demanding standard.
28  This would have to be evidence that one could rationally deploy even while 
suppositionally regarding the question as open pro tem.
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the sceptical hypothesis ~(3). But now we see that this is equally true 
in the case of (EK*). Yet, in this case, it is less clear that the account is 
unsatisfying, and it is less clear that we want to conclude that Cohen 
really does not know.
What all this suggests is that there is pressure towards saying that 
knowledge requires doing well in the S-project except in cases where it 
is not possible to use evidence — no other reliable evidence is available — to 
settle the question whether the proposition in question is true or not.29 
The foregoing, and related, modals are left uninterpreted.30, 31 Perhaps 
the pressure towards saying that knowledge requires doing well in the 
S-project reduces as the operative notion of possibility (and availability) 
becomes more difficult to meet (and vice-versa). In the case of (EK) it 
is possible to use evidence — other reliable evidence is available — to settle 
the question whether or not (3) is true: deploying inductive evidence, 
for example (though not the evidence of a table looking red).32 So, in the 
case of (EK), Cohen has failed to measure up to a standard that he could 
have measured up to — doing well in the project of settling the question 
whether or not (3) is true. The question-settling warrant provided by the 
evidence described in (WARRANT FOR 1) cannot be redeployed as a 
29  Quotidian extensions of knowledge by competent deduction or inference — in 
which there is often other reliable evidence available for the conclusion — are 
correctly permitted: such deductions or inferences do well in the S-project.
30  Clearly, in one sense — the sense that such uninterpretedness leaves some degree 
of indeterminacy about application of my proposal — this is regrettable (cf. 
n. 21 supra). However, in another sense, such uninterpretedness is welcome. My 
proposal, though abstract, is still assessable. And there is a sense in which it can 
be considered a merit of an abstract proposal such as this that it can be assessed 
independently from, and in advance of, committing on how to interpret the modals 
in question. Finally, we can note that in the case of (EK*), however these modals are 
cashed out, there is no (reliable) evidence (available) to settle the question whether or 
not (3) is true.
31  Relatedly, it is possible — though I have not done so here — explicitly to prise apart 
two notions in the area of ‘evidence (un)availability’: (1) there is a kind of evidence 
such that, if one were to experience it, then one would have some support for X; 
(2) there is a kind of investigation that one can undertake, which has some prospect of 
uncovering evidence that would provide some support for X. It may be that ~(1) is a 
more natural understanding of ‘unavailability’ when considering the Weak/Strong 
BIV distinction and ~(2) is more natural when considering ‘red-table’ cases. Be that 
as it may, I’m confident my proposal — perhaps, once the two notions are explicitly 
prised apart, provided we do not flit unreflectively between them — survives such 
an observation.
32  The evidence described in (WARRANT FOR 1) does, however, normally count as 
settling the question whether the table is red or blue, for example.
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question-settling warrant for (3), but other evidence, we’ve noted, could 
have been used in an S-project for (3). In the case of (EK*), in contrast, 
Cohen has failed to measure up to a standard that he could not have 
measured up to. It is not just that the evidence described in (WARRANT 
FOR 1) cannot be redeployed to settle the question whether or not (3) is 
true. There is no evidence that could be deployed to settle that question. 
Both (EK)-reasoning and (EK*)-reasoning count as examples of doing 
badly in the S-project.33 But in the case of (EK*), this failure does not 
exert as much pressure towards saying that the reasoning is not a route 
to knowledge.34
33  By dint of suffering transmission failure. Davies (2009) uses two notions of 
transmission failure. The kind of transmission failure that he discerns in easy 
knowledge arguments is not, however, the kind that is closely related to epistemic 
circularity. (On a dogmatist conception of the situation, there is, of course, no 
epistemic circularity in these examples.)
34  Objection: consider the following kind of (direct) inference: The table is red; 
therefore, either I am not a BIV being deceived into falsely believing that the table 
is red, or there is not a zebra standing behind me right now. This disjunction is 
presumably one that a subject could come to know by other reliable means (by 
knowing the second disjunct via, say, perception or testimony). Given this, my 
proposal, given such reasoning does badly in the S-project, thereby classifies such 
reasoning as defective. But — objection — the reasoning is, intuitively, not clearly 
defective. Reply: we explain this intuition by noting that the conclusion can be 
reached non-defectively in two discrete steps: I (step 1) infer the first disjunct by 
satisfactory (EK*)-reasoning; I then (step 2) reach the conclusion by disjunction 
introduction.
4. Evidence and  
Transmission Failure
Against the claim that the impression that there are instances of transmission 
failure is the product of a flawed conception of evidence, I argue that 
transmission failure (conceived as related to epistemic circularity) is possible 
on most plausible accounts of evidence. The importance of this (exploratory) 
chapter is primarily theoretical, rather than dialectical.
0.1 Consider the following argument:
(MOORE)
(1)  I have hands.
(2)  If I have hands an external world exists.
(3) An external world exists.
Our focus in this chapter is on (MOORE), but points will generalise 
to (reasoning by means of) arguments with a similar structure (e.g. 
(TABLE)/(EK)). (MOORE) is clearly valid and its premises are true. 
Yet, to many, reasoning by means of this argument — which we are 
calling (MOORE)-reasoning — seems defective. On one view (e.g. 
Wright’s), it is an example of transmission failure. In section 2 we’ll come 
to precisify this concept. For now let’s make do with a very rough first 
pass at transmission failure. Philosophers locating the defectiveness of 
(MOORE)-reasoning in transmission failure, typically take (MOORE)-
reasoning to suffer from a form of epistemic circularity: it’s only if one 
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already has warrant for (3), that one can have a warrant for (1). If 
(MOORE)-reasoning suffers from transmission failure in this way, we 
can say that propounding the argument cannot offer one a new route to 
a warranted belief in its conclusion.
0.2 What’s one’s warrant to believe (1)? Put differently: what’s one’s 
evidence for (1)? (Suppose the conditional premise (2) is knowable a 
priori.) These questions are badly formed. There are various different 
warrants one might have for (1). Lots of things could be one’s evidence for 
(1). Suppose I’m sitting blindfolded, unable to see my hands, and Edna 
whispers gently in my ear: ‘You have hands’. Edna’s utterance — on 
one plausible view — counts as good testimonial evidence for me that I 
have hands. That’s one form of evidence I might have for (1), and there 
are many others.
Let’s focus, though, on visual-perceptual evidence that I have hands, 
and specifically the mere having of a visual experience as of having 
hands — the having of which is compatible with my failing to have 
hands.1 (Indeed, unless we focus on a particular form of evidence 
it will be indeterminate whether transmission failure occurs.) With 
this assumption about the nature of my evidence for (1), the idea 
that (MOORE)-reasoning involves epistemic circularity has some 
initial plausibility. For, it might be said, it’s only if I antecedently and 
independently have a warrant for (3) that an experience as of having 
hands constitutes a warrant for (1). If, by contrast, I had good reason 
to think that (3) was false and that I was a handless brain-in-a-vat (BIV) 
with experiences that were being generated by an evil scientist, then 
merely having a visual experience as of having hands would not be 
such good evidence for (1). (But, whether or not you think that you are 
a BIV, it can be maintained that an experience as of having hands raises 
1  An experience as of x is an experience representing x, the having of which is 
compatible with ~x (and, indeed, compatible with x). This may need to be 
finessed, depending on one’s view on object-dependent experience, to the 
following: an experience as of x is an experience representing x, and the having of 
an experience with the same conscious character is compatible with ~x (and, indeed, 
compatible with x). Finally, note that even when we settle on a specific possible 
warrant for (1), the questions may still be alleged to be badly formed on account 
of the notion of evidence not having been explicitly introduced (e.g. the Bayesian 
might ask is evidence simply a proposition on which credences can be updated by 
conditionalisation?).
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the probability of (1) [I have hands — rather than flippers, or bloody 
stumps] and also of (1)´ [I am a BIV and the evil scientist is producing an 
experience as of having hands — rather than producing an experience 
as of having flippers or as of having bloody stumps].)
If (MOORE)-reasoning does involve epistemic circularity, then 
following through the reasoning could not provide a new route to a 
warranted belief in (3). Even if one were to allow that it would provide a 
new, gratuitously circuitous, route, still it would not be a way of arriving, 
for the first time (cf. Wright 2002: 333), at a position in which one had a 
warrant to believe (3). (Recall, in Chapter One I showed that, even if it 
would not be a way of arriving, for the first time, at a position in which 
one had some warrant or other to believe (3), it could still be a way 
of arriving, for the first time, at a position in which one had a (partly) 
perceptual warrant to believe (3).)
0.3 Some philosophers — viz. Timothy Williamson (2000: ch.9), John 
Hawthorne (2004: 34, n. 86),2 and Nicholas Silins (2005)3 — (can be taken 
to) claim that there are no genuine instances of transmission failure, 
provided we operate with the right account of the sources of warrant-or-
evidence4 for future reasoning.5 This novel terminology requires some 
preliminary exposition. As to sources of warrant-or-evidence, pre-
theoretically, or before commitment to any particular theory, warrant 
or evidence can come in myriad forms: blood and DNA samples, 
2  “I find most alleged examples of [transmission failure] unconvincing.”
3  But cf. Silins (2007: 128, n. 27) for an evolution in his views. These three 
philosophers — viz. Williamson, Hawthorne, and Silins — say very different things 
of relevance to the issues presently under consideration; moreover, they do not 
always explicitly mention such issues when saying things of relevance thereto 
(hence my hedging device of ‘can be taken to’ in the main text). For example, here 
are two distinct, but closely related claims (and it is not always clear which is best 
ascribed to these philosophers): (1) there are no genuine instances of transmission 
failure (full stop); (2) it can seem as if there are cases of transmission failure, but 
when you look more closely you will see that these seemings are the product of a 
flawed view about sources of warrant-or-evidence for future reasoning.
4  Cf. Klein’s (1995) notion of ‘sources of justification’.
5  We can certainly grant to these epistemologists that there is an exceptionless notion 
of what we might call warrant transmission. We would then say that when other 
epistemologists talk about there being instances of transmission failure, this suggests 
that they are using a more demanding notion of warrant transmission than the 
exceptionless notion. And one possible more demanding requirement — our 
focus — would be to exclude epistemic circularity.
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hearsay, facts, states of affairs, objects etc. Our principal focus, though, 
will be on two particular possible sources of warrant-or-evidence: an 
experience and a premise (i.e. a proposition).6 As to future reasoning, 
we may take inference to be our paradigm case thereof (as contrasted, 
for example, with coming to know that from which one infers).7 My aim 
in this chapter is to (begin to) clear the way for instances of transmission 
failure regardless of the account of the sources of warrant-or-evidence for 
future reasoning with which one operates. My aim is not to claim there 
are in fact genuine instances of transmission failure; merely to render it 
possible on all — or most — plausible accounts of the sources of warrant-
or-evidence for future reasoning.8
0.4 Silins (2005: 84–89) claims instances of transmission failure only 
arise on a particular — putatively flawed — account of the sources 
of warrant-or-evidence for future reasoning.9 Call this Silins’s claim. 
Here’s a key commitment of this account. (Silins is going to reject the 
commitment and reject the account of which it is a commitment. It may 
help to keep (MOORE) in mind when reading this passage.):
[Y]ou might know a certain premise, or indeed be absolutely certain that 
the premise is true, yet still not possess the premise as a warrant for a 
conclusion you have competently deduced from the premise. On this 
view, if your inference provides you with any warrant for believing10 
6  Regarding experience: cf. Conee and Feldman (2008), for whom all ultimate 
evidence is experiental. Regarding premises: some readers may find it hard to think 
of a premise in an argument as warrant-or-evidence. My parenthetical reference to a 
proposition may make it less hard. Regardless, I ask for patience on the part of the 
reader, and trust the idea will be clearer by the chapter’s end.
7  And so ‘future’ is not the temporal notion where the contrast is with ‘past’ and 
‘present’ reasoning. Instead, in our paradigm case, we suppose a reasoner knows 
a proposition and ask what sources of warrant-or-evidence such a reasoner has at 
his disposal should he go on (in the future; subsequently) to perform an inference. 
Finally, our focus in this chapter is on future deductive reasoning.
8  And, indeed, on all — or most — plausible conceptions of evidential warrant (a term 
explained in 1.1 infra).
9  I call the account fallibilism— (explained in 1.2 infra). Strictly it is an account of the 
sources of warrant-or-evidence for future reasoning and a conception of evidential 
warrant. Silins’s claim receives a sharpening later (see n. 37 infra), but this version 
will do in the meantime. Finally, I take it this claim can be fairly ascribed to Silins. 
Nonetheless, should he resist it, the claim itself is worth independent exploration.
10  For Silins (2005: 74), “when [he] say[s] that someone’s warrant for believing that p is 
that w…[he] means that the person believes that p, and that the person believes that 
p on the basis of the relevant [warrant, w]”. (And so Silins appears to use ‘warrant 
 994. Evidence and Transmission Failure 
the conclusion at all, the warrant provided is the prior warrant for which 
you believe the premise. Thus even if you know that p, or are absolutely 
certain that p, it is still not the case that your warrant for believing the 
conclusion is that p. (Silins 2005: 88)
Sticking with (MOORE), suppose, as before, my warrant to believe (1) is 
my having an experience as of having hands. Nonetheless, suppose I can 
come to know, on the basis of this warrant, that I have hands. Suppose 
also, that I know (1), and am certain that (1) is true. Finally suppose I 
competently deduce — using the conditional, (2) — (3) from (1). Silins 
now cuts in that, on this (to-be-rejected) account of the sources of warrant-
or-evidence for future reasoning, if my inference provides me with any 
warrant to believe (3) at all, the warrant provided is my experience as of 
having hands. Crucially, Silins points out, on this account, even though 
I know that I have hands, and am certain that I have hands, it’s not the 
case that I can use the fact that I have hands as a source of warrant-
or-evidence for future reasoning. Specifically, I can’t use the premise that 
I have hands — a premise, note, whose truth is incompatible with my 
being in an idealistic world — as a source of warrant-or-evidence to 
believe there to be an external world. Rather, on this account, all I can 
use is my experience as of having hands, combined with inference — an 
experience, note, the having of which is not incompatible with my being 
in an idealistic world.11
Silins’s claim that instances of transmission failure arise only on one 
(to-be-rejected) account is resisted in this chapter. One cannot confine 
the possibility of transmission failure to this one account of the sources 
of warrant-or-evidence for future reasoning. So, at least, I shall argue.
for believing’ for doxastic, rather than propositional, warrant.) I do not take this to 
be orthodox usage, but we can grant it for present purposes without harm.
11  Silins pins this account on Wright (2002) and Davies (2003). It might be worth 
quickly pointing out what else a philosopher operating with this account can do 
(all assuming he meets the epistemic standards for knowing (1)). First, he can 
competently deduce (3) and come to believe (3) on that basis: he can allow that, in 
the exceptionless sense of what we might call warrant transmission (cf. n. 5 supra), 
the experiential warrant for (1) is transmitted to (3). Second, if such a philosopher is 
a dogmatist (see Pryor 2000), he can allow that, even in a more demanding sense of 
warrant transmission that excludes epistemic circularity, the experiential warrant 
for (1) is transmitted to (3). Finally — whether dogmatist of not — he can allow that, 
if asked why he believes (3), he can legitimately reply: well, I have hands — I know 
that much — and (3) follows from what I know.
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1. Conceptions of Evidential Warrant and 
Accounts of Sources of Warrant-or-Evidence for 
Future Reasoning
1.1 Consider (where, throughout, ‘S’ is a placeholder for a subject and 
‘p’ for a proposition):
Fallibilism: S can know p when S’s evidence for p is compatible 
with ~p.
Infallibilism: S cannot know p when S’s evidence for p is compatible 
with ~p.
Focusing on (MOORE), fallibilists can suppose my having an experience 
as of having hands is — or can be — (part of) my way of coming to know 
that I have hands.12 Infallibilists, by contrast, typically suppose my 
seeing that I have hands is my way of coming to know that I have hands, 
where my seeing that I have hands is incompatible with my not having 
hands.13 Think of fallibilism and infallibilism as particular conceptions 
of evidential warrant: they’re particular views of what it takes for a piece 
of evidence to warrant a belief in a proposition for a subject such that 
that subject can acquire knowledge. A philosopher’s conception of 
evidential warrant is typically associated with a particular account of 
the sources of warrant-or-evidence for future reasoning. A fallibilist 
typically takes an experience as of having hands as his source of 
warrant-or-evidence for future reasoning (and indeed sometimes, 
perhaps often, for (1) itself). An infallibilist typically takes (knowledge 
of) (1) itself — a premise — as his source of warrant-or-evidence for 
future reasoning (and indeed sometimes, perhaps often, as his source 
of warrant-or-evidence for (1) itself).
12  Such fallibilists will be dogmatists. All dogmatists are fallibilists; but not all 
fallibilists are dogmatists. For non-dogmatist fallibilists (e.g. Wright) we must rely 
on the parenthetical ‘part of’: this experience is supplemented with my having an 
unearned warrant to accept/trust/believe that I am not a BIV etc.
13  Cf. McDowell (1982, 1986, 2008), a fact disjunctivist, and Williamson (2000: ch.1) 
for whom seeing that p entails knowing that p. Note that a fallibilist may also, for 
example, allow that sometimes, perhaps often, we see that p — that is, we enjoy 
evidence incompatible with ~p.
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1.2 Philosophers who’ve explored the possibility of transmission 
failure in (MOORE)-reasoning (and in like arguments) — viz. Martin 
Davies (2004, 2009), James Pryor (2004), and Crispin Wright (1985, 
2002) — operate with a fallibilist conception of evidential warrant. 
Let’s — exhaustively and exclusively — partition fallibilism as follows:
Fallibilism—: S can know p when S’s evidence for p is compatible 
with ~p, and when S knows p, p itself is not part of S’s evidence-
base for future reasoning.14
Fallibilism+: S can know p when S’s evidence for p is compatible 
with ~p, and when S knows p, p itself is part of S’s evidence-base 
for future reasoning.
These theses are constructed by combining a conception of evidential 
warrant (first conjunct: fallibilism) with an account of the sources of 
warrant-or-evidence for future reasoning (second conjunct: ‘evidence-
base for future reasoning’).15 Precisely what the second conjunct of 
fallibilism— forbids is a subtle matter (cf. n. 11 supra). I take it, somewhat 
suggestively, to be the following: the fallibilist— denies that a known 
premise, p, can itself be used in future reasoning, but this leaves open 
that future reasoning from a known premise, p, can lead to, for example, 
further knowledge.16 Fallibilists are typically fallibilists—;17 but nothing 
in fallibilism rules out being a fallibilist+.
14  Note that this leaves open that, though p itself is not part of S’s evidence base for 
future reasoning, it is part of S’s evidence base for knowing p.
15  A note about the exhaustivity of these two theses: I take it that p either necessarily is 
or necessarily is not part of S’s evidence base for future reasoning. Consistently with 
this, contingent matters could be in play rendering p, though part of S’s evidence 
base for future reasoning, not exploitable (e.g. on account of epistemic circularity). 
(Alternatively, one might recast the second conjunct of fallibilism— as ‘p itself 
necessarily is not part of S’s evidence base for future reasoning’ and the second 
conjunct of fallibilism+ as ‘p itself is or can be part of S’s evidence base for future 
reasoning’.)
16  Where ‘used’ is, perhaps, elliptical shorthand for ‘used as a source of warrant-or-
evidence’. And where ‘future reasoning from a known premise’ is, perhaps, elliptical 
shorthand for ‘future reasoning from warrant for a known premise’. Finally, such a 
fallibilist can allow that, if the premise, p, is not known, perhaps because it is not 
true, then reasoning from p to a conclusion may be above reproach and yet will not 
normally lead to knowledge.
17  E.g. Fred Dretske, notwithstanding that he’s classifiable as an infallibilist on a 
different way — present in the literature — of carving things up. Finally, I take it 
that dogmatists can be either fallibilists— or fallibilists+.
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1.3 Now consider:
Infallibilism+: S cannot know p when S’s evidence for p is 
compatible with ~p, and when S knows p, p itself is part of S’s 
evidence-base for future reasoning.18
As with our previous two theses, this thesis is constructed by combining 
a conception of evidential warrant (first conjunct: infallibilism) with 
an account of the sources of warrant-or-evidence for future reasoning 
(second conjunct: ‘evidence-base for future reasoning’). To conclude: 
how do the fallibilist+ and infallibilist+ differ? Each, after all, allows p itself 
into one’s evidence-base for future reasoning. Two features distinguish 
them. First, most obviously, they operate with different conceptions 
of evidential warrant: for the former — but not the latter — one can 
know p when one’s evidence for p is compatible with ~p. Second, and 
less obviously, the latter’s allowance of p itself into one’s evidence-base 
may well not be confined to future reasoning (p itself, on versions of this 
view, is part of one’s evidence-base for knowing p), while the former’s 
allowance may well be so confined (on versions of this view) — cf. 
nn. 13 and 14 supra. In part because our chief focus in this chapter is 
on future reasoning, and in part because we only seek to secure the 
possibility — rather than genuine instances — of transmission failure, 
neither difference, though important, turns out to be fundamental for 
our purposes.19
We now have a (novel) taxonomy of conceptions of evidential 
warrant and accounts of the sources of warrant-or-evidence for future 
18  There is close to being merely logical space for infallibilism— (modulo ‘evidence base’ 
being used in the way I describe). At any rate, it’s difficult to discern the motivation 
for such a thesis. Given this, in the main text I quickly revert to simply talking of 
infallibilists.
19  Many issues I’ve opened up in this section require more detailed treatment. For 
example: What does it take — knowledge? warrant(ed belief)? truth? — for a 
proposition to be included in one’s evidence? Is (possession of) propositional 
evidence for p compatible with ~p? On some views your evidence will include 
the proposition that p when you know p, but you could have had that evidence 
even if you warrantedly, yet falsely, believed that p. Moreover, my discussion of 
the presented theses has proceeded in hedged terms with, for example, ‘often’, 
‘typically’, and ‘may well’ in place of ‘necessarily’ at many junctures (here and in 
what follows). I don’t see that this is avoidable, however.
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reasoning to hand. Now let’s try to precisify the concept of transmission 
failure and locate it within this taxonomy.
2. Transmission Failure and (In)fallibilism
2.1 Consider this (sufficient) condition for non-transmission:
(NT) Non-transmission of warrant
Epistemic warrant is not transmitted from the premises of a valid 
argument to its conclusion if the putative support offered for one of the 
premises is conditional on its being antecedently and independently 
reasonable to accept the conclusion. (Davies 2004: 221)
Let’s spell out one view of how (MOORE)-reasoning might suffer 
from transmission failure. Let’s take the fallibilist—. Suppose the 
fallibilist— claims (cf. Wright 1985, 2002, 2004) that:
(AW) In order for one’s visual experience as of having hands 
to act as warrant for (1) one must, antecedently, have warrant 
for (3).20
If (AW) is true, one’s warrant for (1) will depend on an antecedent 
warrant for (3). So (MOORE)-reasoning will suffer from epistemic 
circularity and (NT) will be triggered. Suppose that one in fact has 
antecedent warrant for (3), so that one’s visual experience does count 
as warrant for (1). Then, according to (NT), the warrant for (1) that is 
constituted by one’s experience as of having hands is not transmitted 
across the conditional — (2) — to serve as warrant for (3).21
20  Rejection of (AW) is a defining feature of dogmatism. In this section we focus on 
fallibilists not flatly rejecting (AW): that is, fallibilists allowing that (MOORE)-
reasoning might involve epistemic circularity, and so might suffer from 
transmission failure. Indeed given the chapter’s overall focus is not to claim there 
are in fact genuine instances of transmission failure, but merely to render it possible 
on all, or most, plausible accounts of the sources of warrant-or-evidence for future 
reasoning, we do not definitively adjudicate on (AW) (or its cognate, (AW*) — see 
3.2 infra) at all in this chapter.
21  This failure of transmission is, trivially, not a failure of transmission in the 
exceptionless sense (cf. n. 5 supra). It is failure of transmission in the more demanding 
sense that requires that there not be epistemic circularity. And it seems that this 
remains the situation even if we regard the warrant for (1) as being constituted by 
both the experience as of having hands and the antecedent warrant for (3).
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2.2 What about our fallibilist+ (cf. Silins 2005)? Consider him debating 
with our fallibilist—, and arguing thus: if you, fallibilist—, are allowing, 
as a good fallibilist should, that I can come to know p notwithstanding 
my evidence for p is compatible with ~p, and allowing that I do indeed 
come to know (1) on the basis of such non-entailing evidence, why 
are you preventing me from using (1) itself as evidence in my future 
reasoning? (I leave open whether the non-entailing evidence for (1) is 
just the experience, or is additionally the antecedent warrant for (3).) 
If you were a sceptic about our knowledge of quotidian propositions, 
I’d vehemently disagree with you, being a good fallibilist myself, 
but I could at least make sense of your prohibition on my use of (1) 
as evidence in future reasoning: I couldn’t so use (1) as I wouldn’t, ex 
hypothesi, know (1). But given, as we can happily agree as fallibilists, I 
know (1), your exclusion of it — that premise — from my evidence-base 
for future reasoning is unmotivated.22
Our fallibilist+ makes a good case. So let’s grant him, pro tem, victory 
over his fallibilist— foe. Our fallibilist+ may have won this particular 
battle, but not yet the war. Fallibilist— is a dogged soul. Suppose he 
accepts defeat over the inclusion of (1) itself in one’s evidence-base for 
future reasoning, but then marshals (AW) and claims that fallibilist+’s 
(MOORE)-reasoning thereby suffers transmission failure.
If, however, fallibilism+ is true, it’s no longer clear that (AW) leads to 
(MOORE)-reasoning suffering (complete)23 transmission failure. Why 
not? After all, isn’t it still the case, thanks to (AW), that (NT) is triggered? 
Recall, (NT) distinguishes between premises (which are propositions 
22  Both of these fallibilists should agree that, provided that one knows (1), one will do 
well to believe (3), since it follows from (1) by a palpably valid inference (cf. n. 11 
supra). (Of course, if one gets good evidence against (3), then the palpably valid 
inference may have to be run in the opposite direction.) But, because of possible 
epistemic circularity, there is more to be said about why one does well to believe 
(3). The argument via (1) and (2) appears to involve a detour and, in order to 
understand one’s warrant to believe (3) after the inference, one needs to articulate 
the nature of the antecedent warrant — that is, one’s warrant to believe (3) even 
before the inference.
23  As will become clear, here (and in what follows), when I talk of ‘complete’ 
transmission failure I am bracketing any exceptionless notion of warrant 
transmission (cf. n. 5 supra) and focusing on a more demanding notion. If there is, 
in this sense, ‘complete’ transmission failure, it means all, and not just some, of one’s 
sources of warrant-or-evidence for future reasoning fail to transmit. I explicitly 
expand what I call the standard account of warrant in 3.2 infra.
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like (1), in the (MOORE) example) and support for premises (which is 
an experience as of having hands, in the (MOORE) example). (NT) talks 
about a valid argument, and the only valid argument in view is from (1) 
via (2) to (3).
The wrinkle, though, is that it’s no longer clear that (NT) is applicable, 
given the truth of fallibilism+. This is because of (NT)’s mere talk — when 
it comes to matters of transmission — of “support […] for one of the 
premises”, and not, additionally, talk of premises themselves.24 (NT) 
seems, pace fallibilism+, to preclude (1) itself from counting amongst 
one’s evidence-base for future reasoning. In other words, (NT) doesn’t 
seem to capture adequately the account of the sources of warrant-or-
evidence for future reasoning with which a fallibilist+ operates. Take 
this to be what I’m driving at in suggesting (NT) isn’t applicable to 
fallibilism+ (and, mutatis mutandis, in subsequent uses of ‘applicable’). 
Put differently: the non-transmission of one’s warrant for (1) — which, 
by (NT), is one’s support for (1) — leaves open that (1) itself (which one ex 
hypothesi knows) transmits across the conditional ((2)) — perhaps, better, 
to account for the optionality of (2): across the relevant inference — to 
provide warrant for (3). In sum, I think, for all we’ve said, our fallibilist+ 
has won another (interim) battle.
Might it be objected that, if (1) itself is here being considered as a 
warrant that might be transmitted across the valid argument from (1) 
to (3), then presumably (1) itself, qua warrant, starts out as a warrant 
for (1), and is then transmitted to (3)? But, continues the objector, qua 
warrant for (1), (1) itself is not a fallibilist warrant but an infallibilist 
warrant. Such an objection misunderstands things. We noted before 
(cf. n. 13) that fallibilism— is compatible with the premise itself being 
part of one’s evidence-base for knowing the premise (it just precluded the 
premise from forming part of one’s evidence-base for future reasoning); 
a fortiori this is so for fallibilism+ (which has no such preclusion with 
respect to future reasoning). Fallibilism, abstracting from its species, is 
only a claim about what can, not what must, be the case when coming to 
know a proposition.
2.3 Before responding to our fallibilist+, let’s tie together the fallibilist+ 
and the infallibilist (i.e. the infallibilist+, cf. n. 18 supra). To be sure each 
24  This is evidence that philosophers operating with (NT) are (closet) fallibilists—.
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philosopher, both the fallibilist+ and the infallibilist, operates with a 
different conception of evidential warrant. However, for the purposes 
of this transmission failure debate, this difference is less important than 
one’s account of the sources of warrant-or-evidence for future reasoning.25 
Of more importance, then, is whether or not, when a subject comes to 
know (1) (or a like proposition), (1) itself becomes part of that subject’s 
evidence-base for future reasoning. Their response unites the fallibilist+ 
and the infallibilist: it does. We thus must alter standard taxonomies. 
Typically, in debates pertaining to evidence, fallibilists and infallibilists 
are taken to be the two camps ripe for comparison.26 However, in this 
transmission failure debate, it’s best to group fallibilists— in one corner 
(by dint of their refusal to allow (1)-type propositions into one’s evidence-
base for future reasoning), and fallibilists+ and infallibilists together in 
the other corner (by dint of their allowing (1)-type propositions into one’s 
evidence-base for future reasoning). To be clear, the fallibilist— does 
allow that (1)-type propositions are premises in future reasoning, in 
the sense that conclusions can be (competently) deduced from them; 
the prohibition is simply that (1)-type propositions can’t be sources of 
warrant-or-evidence for said conclusions. We thus might hope that a good 
response, in the case at hand, to the fallibilist+ will also count as a good 
response to the infallibilist.
3. Modifying (NT) (and other germane theses)
3.1 The challenge is to see if we can construct a motivated (sufficient) 
condition for non-transmission of warrant which, unlike (NT), is 
applicable to fallibilism+ and infallibilism, and which, if the condition 
is satisfied, precludes (1) itself from transmitting across the conditional 
25  Our excursus into conceptions of evidential warrant was still useful. First, standard 
taxonomies foreground conceptions of evidential warrant: so this excursus helps 
locate our taxonomy in relation to standard ones. Second, while there are no 
entailments in play from one’s conception of evidential warrant to one’s account of 
the sources of warrant-or-evidence for future reasoning (or conversely), we might 
think that the former helps explain the latter.
26  Or a divide is effected between forms of internalism (typically associated with 
fallibilism) and externalism (typically associated with infallibilism). Effecting such a 
divide will not serve present purposes.
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((2)) to provide warrant for (3).27 A natural first response to putting the 
challenge this way would be to ask: what does it mean for (1) itself to fail 
to transmit across the conditional ((2)) to provide warrant for (3)? After 
all, (MOORE) is an instance of modus ponens. Let’s assume a plausible 
knowledge-closure principle, say: If S knows p and S knows p entails 
q, then S knows (or at least is in a position to know) q. Given this (and 
given (2) is knowable a priori), if I know (1), I know (or am in a position to 
know) (3). What room is there for a motivated principle — a modification 
of (NT) — granting this, yet allowing that (1) itself can fail to transmit 
across the conditional ((2)) to provide warrant for (3)?
3.2 First, let’s distinguish between a closure question and a transmission 
question. The germane closure question asks: is it possible to know 
(1), know that (1) entails (3), yet not be in a position to know (3)? The 
germane transmission question asks: is it possible to know (1), know 
that (1) entails (3), yet not thereby — that is, in virtue of knowing (1) and 
recognising the entailment from (1) to (3) — be in a position to know (3)? 
Or, putting the transmission question differently: is it possible to know 
(1), know that (1) entails (3), yet not be in a first time position to know 
(3)? Let’s answer the closure question ‘no’ (closure is exceptionless), yet 
remain agnostic about the transmission question.28 I take it that, even 
answering the closure question ‘no’, conceptual room is left open to 
deny that (1) itself transmits.
Second, let’s expand what I’ll call the standard account of warrant. 
Standardly, one’s warrant is one’s warrant for this or that proposition, and 
does not include the proposition itself; but we’re not bound by standard 
usage. Indeed we’re currently granting the fallibilist+ and infallibilist 
their claims that premise (1) becomes part of one’s evidence-base for 
future reasoning, once one knows (1). We might therefore modify (NT) 
27  The notion of non-transmission of warrant in play here is still based on epistemic 
circularity. Ideally this condition would also be applicable to fallibilists—. But this 
seems unrealistic. Nonetheless, a desideratum of parsimony (viz. ceteris paribus, 
construct as few theses as possible) operates in what follows.
28  For philosophers answering the closure question: ‘yes’, cf. Dretske (1970, 1971, 
2005a, 2005b), Nozick (1981), and Heller (1999). For remarks on how one’s operative 
account of the sources of warrant-or-evidence for future reasoning affects one’s 
answer to the closure question, see Klein (1995).
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by making explicit that warrant includes any known premises.29 Here’s 
a first pass:
(NT*) Non-transmission of warrant
Epistemic warrant — where warrant includes any known 
premises — is not transmitted from the premises of a valid 
argument to its conclusion if the putative support offered for 
one of the premises — or knowledge of any of the premises 
themselves — is conditional on its being antecedently and 
independently reasonable to accept the conclusion.30
Recall that, to show that (MOORE)-reasoning suffers transmission 
failure by (NT), our fallibilist— marshalled thesis (AW). And we can 
construct a thesis paralleling (AW) (call it (AW*)) which makes room for 
(complete) transmission failure in (MOORE)-reasoning by (NT*):
(AW*) In order for one’s warrant for (1), where warrant includes 
any known premises, to so act as warrant, one must, antecedently, 
have warrant for (3).
If (AW*) is true, and (as a central case) if one in fact has antecedent warrant 
for (3), (MOORE)-reasoning suffers transmission failure by (NT*). Is the 
pair of theses (NT*) and (AW*) motivated?31
4. Motivating our Modifications
4.1 Let’s start with (AW*). As with (AW), I don’t want to marshal 
arguments purporting to secure (AW*)’s truth. Instead, I simply want to 
29  ‘Warrant’ is hereinafter used in this broad sense unless indicated otherwise.
30  Objection: if knowledge of a premise is conditional on antecedent warrant for 
the conclusion then this will be because epistemic warrant for the premise is 
conditional on antecedent warrant for the conclusion. It is therefore unclear why 
we need to introduce (NT*). Reply: insofar as this objector is adopting my expanded 
account of warrant, I agree with the premise but not the conclusion. Only (NT*) 
allows us to make explicit the pivotal relation of epistemic antecedence between a 
(known) premise and a standard warrant (see sections 4 and 5 infra). Finally, insofar 
as warrant now includes known premises, it also a fortiori includes doxastically 
justified premises (cf. Tucker (2010), sections 2.1 and 3.1).
31  My focus in this section (and those to come) is on known premises. What happens 
when, say, the premise is false but warrantedly believed (cf. n. 19 supra)? I bracket 
this question, but see, inter alia, Klein (2008: 25–61).
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present a way of formulating or expressing a defense of these (modified) 
theses. Recall, our overall strategy is not to secure genuine instances 
of transmission failure; it’s merely to render it possible, on all — or 
most — plausible accounts of the sources of warrant-or-evidence for 
future reasoning. So, how might one go about expressing a defense 
of (AW*)? Let’s approach this question indirectly. We’ll first consider 
how one might express a defense of (AW) and see if that helps us in 
discerning a way to express a defense of (AW*). Recall (AW):
(AW) In order for one’s visual experience as of having hands to 
act as warrant for (1) one must, antecedently, have warrant for (3).
One (likely) way of formulating or expressing a defense of this thesis 
would be by making use of notions contained within an account of a 
relation of epistemic antecedence (or priority):
(EA) One’s warrant for accepting p is antecedent to one’s warrant 
for accepting q iff one’s reasons for accepting p do not presuppose 
or rest on one’s reasons for accepting q.32
Someone defending (AW) would likely claim that one’s visual experience 
acting as warrant for (1) presupposes, or rests on, one’s reasons for 
accepting an external world exists. We don’t need to agree with that bald 
statement offered in defense of (AW). Indeed we here offer no reasons 
for (AW)’s (or (AW*)’s) truth. We just need to understand the claim so 
formulated or expressed.33
32  Cf. Pryor (2000: 525). Should the left-hand-side of (EA) strictly be: it’s not the case 
that one’s warrant for accepting q is epistemically antecedent (or prior) to one’s 
warrant for accepting p? Couldn’t the right-hand-side be satisfied and one’s 
warrant for p be epistemically neither-prior-to-nor-posterior-to one’s warrant for q? 
Finally, note that we can also, I take it, say: one’s warrant for p1 is antecedent to 
one’s warrant for p2 iff one’s warrant for p2 is dependent on one’s warrant for p1 and 
one’s warrant for p1 is not dependent on one’s warrant for p2.
33  Two related points. First, to see (EA)’s relevance to (AW), it is best to revert to n. 32’s 
left-hand-side: if warrant for (1) presupposes or rests on one’s warrant for (3), then 
it follows from (EA) that one’s warrant for accepting (3) is epistemically antecedent 
(or prior) to one’s warrant for accepting (1). Second, we need not find this notion 
of one reason presupposing or resting on another perfectly perspicuous; it’s left 
intuitive.
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4.2 That’s (AW). Now what about (AW*)? We might formulate or 
express a defense of (AW*) by making use of notions contained within 
an account of the following relation of epistemic antecedence:
(EA*) One’s warrant for accepting p is antecedent to one’s 
warrant for accepting q — where warrant includes any known 
premises — iff one’s reasons for accepting p do not presuppose 
or rest on one’s reasons for accepting q — where one’s reasons 
include any known premises.
We’re supposing, recall, that (1) itself — which we ex hypothesi know — is 
part of our evidence-base for future reasoning. (We’re leaving open 
whether or not (1) itself is part of our warrant for accepting (1). If it is, 
one might argue that my experience as of having hands isn’t also part of 
my warrant for accepting (1), because (1) itself is an entailing (logically 
sufficient) warrant for (1), and so (1) does not need any additional 
support from the experience. Be this as it may, our chief focus is on 
one’s evidence-base for future reasoning, and, as we’ll come to see, this 
argument will not carry over to future reasoning in a straightforward 
manner.) In assessing (MOORE)-reasoning armed with notions from 
(EA*), we’re (in part) asking: does my knowing that (1) presuppose or 
rest on my reasons for accepting (3)?
Let’s make an assumption — an assumption favourable to fallibilists+ 
in particular. To understand why we’re making this assumption we 
need to understand a claim some (prominent) infallibilists make. Some 
infallibilists claim that all and only what one knows is one’s evidence (see 
Williamson 2000: ch.9). So for this type of infallibilist our supposition 
that (1) itself is part of one’s evidence-base for future reasoning, and that 
one’s evidence-base for future reasoning includes (1) itself, is a slightly 
misleading supposition: for them, (knowledge of) (1) itself exhaustively 
constitutes one’s evidence-base for future reasoning (prior to an act of 
inferring (3)).34 Any pragmatic implication that there must or may be 
34  An infallibilist might claim that one’s evidence for (1) consists of knowledge of (1) 
and knowledge of one’s having an experience as of having hands. If he does so, the 
points I make in relation to the fallibilist+ here can be marshalled, mutatis mutandis, 
with respect to this infallibilist. But this is — for good reason — currently an 
unpopular way to be an infallibilist, so I’ll ignore it in what follows. An infallibilist 
will typically only claim that one’s evidence for (1) consists of knowledge of one’s 
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more to one’s evidence-base for future reasoning than (1) itself should 
be cancelled. (We can call this the pragmatic implication objection, with 
the cancellation operating as a reply thereto.) I hereby cancel any such 
implication by explicitly noting that ‘part’ does not mean ‘proper part’, 
and ‘includes’ does not mean there need be any more evidence. For our 
fallibilist+, meanwhile, all that one knows is in one’s evidence-base for 
future reasoning, but not only what one knows: one still, in addition to 
(knowledge of) (1) itself, has one’s visual experience as of having hands 
as part of one’s evidence-base for future reasoning. This, at least, is one 
plausible way of carving up evidence for a fallibilist+.35
What’s the purpose of this detour? Recall, the strategy is to explore 
using notions from (EA*) to formulate or express a defense of (AW*), 
and to claim that (AW*) opens up the possibility of transmission failure 
for fallibilists+ and infallibilists by (NT*). Given this, we don’t want the 
fallibilist+36 to be inexorably lumbered with (complete) transmission 
failure in (MOORE)-reasoning because part of his warrant for (1), the 
part he shares with the fallibilist—, viz. a visual experience as of having 
hands, fails to transmit to (3).37 To allow for this would be to slur over 
the important difference between the fallibilist— and the fallibilist+. 
To preclude this from happening, we make our assumption, viz. some 
of one’s warrant can fail to transmit in an argument without all of 
one’s warrant failing to transmit.38 Maybe this assumption seems too 
having an experience as of having hands in the bad case — that is, when ~(1) — but 
our principal focus in this chapter is not on bad cases.
35  There’s logical space for a fallibilist+ to claim that his knowledge that (1) trumps or 
wipes out any non-entailing evidence he has for (1). But I find this a peculiar way of 
carving things up. To complete the picture, for our fallibilist— neither all that one 
knows, nor only what one knows, is in one’s evidence base for future reasoning.
36  Or the infallibilist (cf. n. 34), but the fallibilist+ is the philosopher driving our 
present concern.
37  Recall that the fallibilists+ allows that when S knows p, p itself is part of S’s evidence 
base for future reasoning. It is thus not a flawed account of the sources of warrant-
or-evidence for future reasoning by the lights of Silins’s claim (cf. 0.4 supra). 
It should, however, be clear that we would not have answered Silins’s claim by 
showing that the warrant the fallibilist+ can share with the fallibilist— may fail to 
transmit. To make the dialectic clearer we may wish to sharpen Silins’s claim thus: 
instances of complete transmission failure only arise on a particular, and putatively 
flawed, account of the sources of warrant-or-evidence for future reasoning (cf. n. 23 
supra).
38  Mutatis mutandis for reasons: some of one’s reasons for (1) may presuppose or rest 
on one’s reasons for (3) without other of one’s reasons for (1) presupposing or 
resting on one’s reasons for (3).
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obvious to need stating. But note that, without this assumption, if we 
suppose that (AW*)’s truth can be secured (perhaps with use of notions 
from (EA*)), this inevitably leads to a fallibilist+ being committed to 
(MOORE)-reasoning suffering transmission failure by (NT*). That’s 
because our trio of theses, (EA*), (AW*), and (NT*), don’t themselves 
discriminate between different warrants one might have for (1) (and 
for (3)). Given the two types of warrant on which we’re focusing, 
viz. an experience and a premise, are lumped together, if one type 
fails to transmit in (MOORE)-reasoning (viz. the experience) (NT*) is 
sufficiently coarse-grained (a bad thing) that it delivers the result that 
(MOORE)-reasoning suffers from transmission failure, period. (We 
can call this the coarse-grained objection, with the ensuing deflection 
operating as a reply thereto.) This is an unwelcome result: our modified 
(transmission failure) theses — (EA*), (AW*), and (NT*) — should be 
able to discriminate on the basis of the salient differences between the 
fallibilist— and the fallibilist+. We need theses which leave room, in 
line with our assumption, for one type of warrant to fail to transmit in 
(MOORE)-reasoning (e.g. here, the experience), and another type of 
warrant to transmit (e.g. here, the premise). Rather than further refining, 
and complicating, our modified theses themselves, I leave the task of 
avoiding the foregoing unwelcome result to sensitive application of the 
modified theses.
(Let’s pause briefly to think back to Chapter One. If one adopts 
Wright’s view (which Silins would locate as fallibilism— in the present 
taxonomy), then (MOORE)-reasoning does not put one into a position of 
having warrant for (3) for the first time, but it does, I argued in Chapter 
One, put one into the position of having perceptual warrant for (3) for 
the first time. The antecedent warrant for (3) does not transmit, because 
one already had that warrant; but the perceptual warrant provided by 
the experience as of having hands (given the antecedent warrant for (3)) 
does transmit. Is this the opposite of what I am now saying in Chapter 
Four? No. Here I am simply countenancing the experience failing to 
transmit, compatibly with which the premise could transmit. In engaging 
with Silins, that was the apposite compatibility relation to consider. 
Whether the foregoing possibility actually obtains will depend on 
what the correct (non-)transmission theses decree (which, in turn, I’ve 
argued here, will depend on what relations of epistemic antecedence 
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obtain). In Chapter One I made an attempt, given certain background 
assumptions, at sketching some plausible (non-)transmission theses 
on which antecedent warrant does not, but perceptual warrant does, 
transmit.)
4.3 Let’s take stock. We might reconstruct the foregoing dialectic 
thus: we set out fallibilism—. We then set up three theses, (EA), (AW), 
and (NT), which seemed motivated, and captured adequately the 
fallibilist—’s account of the sources of warrant-or-evidence (for future 
reasoning). We used notions from (EA) to descry one way to express a 
defense of (AW). We then noted that, assuming (AW) and fallibilism—, 
we had transmission failure in (MOORE)-reasoning by (NT). Fine. We 
then noted that it wasn’t clear the account of the sources of warrant-or-
evidence (for future reasoning) presupposed by these three theses was 
the same account with which fallibilists+ and infallibilists operate. Next 
we set up three modified theses, (EA*), (AW*), and (NT*), to see if we 
could construct a motivated transmission failure thesis that operated 
with an account of the sources of warrant-or-evidence for future 
reasoning that was friendly to fallibilists+ and infallibilists. But while 
our three modified theses operated with a (disjunctive) account of the 
sources of warrant-or-evidence (for future reasoning) not unacceptable 
to fallibilists+ and infallibilists, they were vulnerable to two objections 
from the two camps: a pragmatic implication objection (from infallibilists, 
which we cancelled) and a coarse-grained objection (from fallibilists+, 
which we deflected).
In sum, our original three theses, (EA), (AW), and (NT), are serviceable 
for analysis of fallibilism— (but not fallibilism+ and infallibilism). 
Our three modified theses, (EA*), (AW*), and (NT*), are serviceable 
for analysis of fallibilism+ and infallibilism (but not fallibilism—). We 
therefore have two sets of three theses, which jointly cover all, or most, 
plausible accounts of the sources of warrant-or-evidence (for future 
reasoning).
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5. Might Introducing (EA*) be More Difficult than 
Introducing (EA)?
5.1 There may be especial problems involved with introducing 
our modified theses. Let’s focus on a putative problem arising over 
introducing (EA*) (which doesn’t arise when introducing (EA)). How 
exactly can a premise, a source of warrant-or-evidence for future 
reasoning by fallibilism+ and infallibilism, fail to transmit? I accept this 
explanatory challenge. Consider a fallibilist+ or infallibilist debating 
with a proponent of our modified theses, and reasoning thus: I can 
partially understand support for a premise — say, an experience — failing 
to transmit across entailments or inferences. I’ve heard talk of an abstract 
space of warrants and I can see that some warrants might be epistemically 
antecedent to others in that abstract space of warrants. So if I’m trying, 
without begging the question, to engage the external world sceptic, I can 
see that my warrant for (1) could fail to be epistemically antecedent to 
my warrant for (3). However, I can’t make sense of relations of epistemic 
antecedence between a premise ((1)) and a warrant for a conclusion ((3)). 
The former is a proposition I, ex hypothesi, know; the latter is warrant 
for a proposition I fail to know prior to inference. To talk of a relation of 
epistemic antecedence between a premise and warrant for a premise is 
close to a category error: it’s introducing an epistemic relation between 
two radically different things. While, for example, knowledge is an 
epistemic relation between a (knowing) subject and a proposition (at a 
time) — two very different relata if ever there were — there’s something 
distinctively problematic about introducing a relation of epistemic 
antecedence between two relata of radically different kinds. To introduce 
a relation of epistemic antecedence, don’t the relata have to be of the 
same kind?39 This, I take it, is a forceful objection that could be made by 
a fallibilist+ or infallibilist to (EA*), and any resultant use of (NT*) via 
(AW*).40
39  Cross-categorial relations are routinely posited in philosophy. An example 
from metaphysics: the truthmaker relation has been posited between a (non-
propositional) truthmaker and a (true) proposition (see Armstrong 2004). So the 
objection in the main text is a specific objection focused on the relation of epistemic 
antecedence.
40  A trio of theses such as these is a (prominent) way to argue for transmission failure; 
it may not be the only such way (cf. 2.1 supra).
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5.2 We must distinguish between a premise and knowledge of a premise. 
Once we do so the objection dissolves. So far I’ve played fast and loose 
with what form evidence for future reasoning takes (better: how we 
should describe such evidence) for a fallibilist+ or infallibilist. I’ve 
switched between (1) itself and knowledge of (1). I take it these are, for our 
purposes, two different descriptions of the same piece of evidence given 
we suppose I know (1). We can note that epistemologists who operate 
with the former description take (1) itself to be in one’s evidence-base 
for future reasoning because one (ex hypothesi) knows (1). I propose we 
describe (part of) the fallibilist+’s and the infallibilist’s evidence-base 
(source of warrant-or-evidence) for future reasoning as knowledge of (1) 
(rather than as (1) itself).41 Once this is done there’s no especial problem 
about seeing how a relation of epistemic antecedence might hold. We 
simply ask: does my knowing (1) presuppose or rest on my warrant for 
(3)? To be sure, different epistemologists will give different answers to 
this question, but that’s no slur on its intelligibility: indeed, it counts 
in its favour.42 A caveat: to require that the fallibilist+ and infallibilist 
describe this evidence in this way in this transmission failure debate, 
isn’t to require that he always so describes his warrant. Nor, relatedly, 
is it to say that the alternative description of the evidence is deficient.
In sum, one might have difficulty with the intelligibility of notions 
of epistemic antecedence or epistemic dependence, period. But I’ve 
shown there’s no especial problem of applying the notion of epistemic 
antecedence to a fallibilist+’s and an infallibilist’s account of the sources 
of warrant-or-evidence for future reasoning. Put differently: if one 
hasn’t a problem with (EA), then one shouldn’t have a problem with 
(EA*).
41  Why, then, did I play fast and loose with my description of the evidence? First, 
I want to leave open (cf. n. 19 supra) that something short of knowledge of a 
proposition can suffice for a proposition to be in one’s evidence base for future 
reasoning. Second, I want to keep vivid, with Silins, the thought that, upon 
competent inference from a known premise, the premise itself can become one’s 
warrant to believe the conclusion.
42  Indeed, even the following extreme response, I take to count in its favour: once I 
know (1), never mind how, I’ll be able to exploit (1) as evidence for (3).
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6. Conclusion
6.1 I take myself to have shown that motivated transmission failure 
conditions can be constructed which are applicable to — capture 
adequately — all, or most, plausible accounts of the sources of warrant-
or-evidence for future reasoning. I haven’t shown that there are in fact 
genuine cases of transmission failure. I have, though, demonstrated that 
the fallibilist+ and infallibilist cannot evade questions of transmission 
failure as easily as they might have hoped. Williamson’s, Hawthorne’s, 
and Silins’s hard line against genuine instances of transmission failure 
is not warranted.43
43  It is a further task — one not attempted in this chapter — to show why, for example, 
an infallibilist might plausibly take (MOORE)-reasoning to suffer from some kind 
of epistemic circularity. Finally, see Tucker (2010: esp. 517ff.) for another hard line 
against transmission failure, although it is different in form from those targeted in 
this chapter, in not (as I understand it) being reliant on any particular conception of 
evidence.
5. A Puzzle for Dogmatism
Returning to dogmatism and the pattern of objection, I present an apparently 
more serious puzzle for dogmatism. It seems that one must have had warrant 
to believe the conclusion of (EK)-reasoning antecedently to the perceptual 
evidence.
0.1 I want to consider a puzzle in the realm of confirmation theory. The 
puzzle arises from consideration of reasoning with an argument, given 
certain epistemological commitments. Here is the argument (preceded 
by the stipulated justification for the first premise):
(JUSTIFICATION FOR 1) The table looks red.
(EK)
(1)  The table is red.
(2)  If the table is red, then it is not white with red lights shining 
on it.
(3)  The table is not white with red lights shining on it.
As we’ve seen, (EK) — the easy knowledge argument (aka 
(TABLE)) — has received much epistemological scrutiny of late.1
0.2 The plan: First, I set out the epistemological commitments in play. 
Second, I set out an example, leading to the puzzle, which is putatively 
1  See, notably, Cohen (2002, 2005). Likewise for our (MOORE) argument (in respect 
of which the puzzle to come can, mutatis mutandis, also be run).
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troubling for dogmatism. Finally, I consider the implications of the puzzle 
for dogmatism.
1. Epistemological Commitments
1.1 Suppose that the mere having of the experience described in 
(JUSTIFICATION FOR 1) can give one defeasible perceptual justification2 
to believe (1) — that is, it is the subject’s having the experience, rather 
than the subject’s beliefs about the experience, that makes it epistemically 
appropriate for the subject to believe (1). And we might go further in 
claiming that this justification can (suffice to) give one knowledge of (1). 
This supposition and claim are distinctive features of dogmatist accounts 
of justification and knowledge respectively (see Pryor 2000, 2004). To 
refer specifically to dogmatism about justification, I’ll use ‘j-dogmatism’, 
to refer to dogmatism about knowledge, I’ll use ‘k-dogmatism’, and to 
refer to dogmatism generically, I’ll use ‘dogmatism’. I take it the truth 
of k-dogmatism entails the truth of j-dogmatism; but the converse 
entailment does not hold.
Dogmatists are (necessarily?) fallibilists about knowledge: “[W]e can 
have knowledge on the basis of defeasible justification, justification 
that does not guarantee that our beliefs are correct” (Pryor 2000: 518).3 
It’s the defining feature of dogmatism that the justification one gets 
for (1) is immediate: you don’t need antecedent justification for any 
other propositions in order for the having of the experience described 
in (JUSTIFICATION FOR 1) to give one justification for (1). Some 
find dogmatism an appealing way to think of perceptual justification 
and knowledge. So let’s suppose, pro tem, we’re dogmatists and 
fallibilists — that is, we are fallibilists in this dogmatist sense.4
2  ‘Justification’ is used in this chapter as a broad term of epistemic appraisal and is 
interchangeable with ‘warrant’.
3  If one wants to frame fallibilism in terms of conditional probabilities (cf. Pryor MS), 
one will claim that a subject, S, can know a proposition, p, when the probability of 
p conditional on S’s evidence, e, is less than 1. Note that conditional probabilities 
involve two propositions: one about the world, p, and one about the subject’s 
evidence, e. However the subject does not have to believe the proposition about 
evidence in order to possess the evidence.
4  This supposition keeps things manageable. Our puzzle assumes fallibilism. Note, 
however, that one can (see Hawthorne 2004: 75–77) give a rendering of a similar 
puzzle on the assumption of infallibilism (fallibilism’s negation).
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1.2 At a highly general level, it seems that dogmatists must give some 
account of the defectiveness of (certain instances of) reasoning by means 
of (EK). Why so? Here’s the worry: on a dogmatist view, the mere having 
of a perceptual experience (giving justification for and, say, knowledge 
of, (1)), combined with some elementary logical reasoning (via (2)), can 
seemingly lead us — all too easily — to knowledge of the falsity of certain 
sceptical hypotheses ((3)). Thus the problem of easy knowledge (discussed 
at length in Chapters Two and Three). Our ensuing puzzle uses tools 
from confirmation theory to challenge dogmatism more directly.
2. Example, Leading to the Puzzle for Dogmatism
2.1 Example: Let us, for simplicity, consider only red tables and 
white tables,5 and only red light and white (natural) light. Suppose 
that the prior probabilities are divided equally between red table (RT) 
(0.5) and white table (WT) (0.5) and in the ratio 1:2 between red light 
(RL) (0.33) and white light (WL) (0.67). So the prior probabilities of 
the four hypotheses (assuming the table colour and the light colour 
are independent) are: (RT&RL) 0.167; (RT&WL) 0.33; (WT&RL) 0.167; 
(WT&WL) 0.33.6 Now I have a visual experience as of a red table. We 
know that the posterior probability of each of the four hypotheses is 
proportional to the product of the prior probability and the likelihood 
(that is, the probability of the evidence given the hypothesis). Keeping 
things simple, suppose that the probability of a table looking red is the 
same given (RT&RL), or given (RT&WL), or given (WT&RL). Suppose 
(idealising) that the probability of a table looking red given (WT&WL) 
is zero. Then the posterior probabilities are: (RT&RL) 0.25; (RT&WL) 
0.5; (WT&RL) 0.25; (WT&WL) 0.
Thus, given the evidence described in (JUSTIFICATION FOR 1), 
the probability of premise (1) [that is, red table with either red light 
or white light] is raised from 0.5 to 0.75; the probability of premise (2) 
is 1 because it is a priori true; and the probability of the conclusion (3) 
5  One could, to make things more realistic, generate a similar example by considering, 
say, ten equiprobable colours the table might be.
6  The prior probability assigned to the ‘sceptical hypothesis’ (WT&RL) is low because 
the prior probabilities favour the white (natural) light hypothesis over the red 
(tricky) light hypothesis. It might seem like a reasonable prior, but it would not be 
acceptable to the (local) sceptic (cf. Wright 2007, 2008).
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[~(WT&RL)] is decreased from 0.833 to 0.75. That is, the probability 
of the ‘sceptical hypothesis’, (WT&RL), is increased from 0.167 to 
0.25 (essentially because one of the hypotheses, (WT&WL), has been 
eliminated by the evidence and its share of the prior probability has 
been redistributed amongst the remaining three hypotheses). The 
ratio of the posterior probabilities of premise (1) — that is, RT — and 
the ‘sceptical hypothesis’ (WT&RL) is 3:1. But this is so only because 
the ratio of their prior probabilities was 3:1. The evidence described 
in (JUSTIFICATION FOR 1) is not diagnostic between these two 
hypotheses.
2.2 The foregoing worked example, though simplified and idealised, 
serves to support premise (iii) in the following argument against 
j-dogmatism, viz. getting (JUSTIFICATION FOR 1) diminishes the 
credence one ought to have in (3).7 Similarly, the worked example 
serves to support premise (iii*) in the subsequent argument against 
k-dogmatism. Here, first, is the argument against j-dogmatism:
7  In itself, that a piece of evidence disconfirms a hypothesis (known to be) entailed by 
a hypothesis that the evidence confirms is not problematic. Consider the following 
thesis (cf. Hempel 1945, whose theory of confirmation lacks the following property):
(CC) If E confirms H and H entails H´, then E confirms H´.
Due to counterexample(s), we have good reason to reject (CC). (Of course, principle 
(CC) is fine if by ‘E confirms H’ we mean only that the probability of H given E is 
greater than some threshold (e.g. 0.9). If the probability of H given E > 0.9 and H 
entails H´, then the probability of H´ given E > 0.9. However the principle (CC) 
is not fine if by ‘E confirms H’ we mean that E raises the probability of H (i.e. the 
probability of H given E is greater than the prior probability of H). It is thus this 
latter understanding of confirmation with which we are operating here.) Consider: 
E = card is black, H = card is the ace of spades, and H´ = card is an ace. Clearly, 
H entails H´ while E confirms H but not H´. Note the following weaker thesis, 
however:
(CC*) If E confirms H and H entails H´, then E doesn’t disconfirm H´.
While the counterexample we considered to (CC) is not a counterexample to (CC*), 
Pryor’s (2004: 350–51) case of ‘Clio’s pet’ plausibly is.
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(i) If one has justification to believe (1) after getting 
(JUSTIFICATION FOR 1), one has justification to believe (3) 
after getting (JUSTIFICATION FOR 1).
(ii) If having a certain experience diminishes the credence one 
ought to have in a proposition, then, if one has justification to 
believe the proposition after having the experience, one must 
have had justification to believe the proposition antecedently to 
the experience.
(iii) Getting (JUSTIFICATION FOR 1) diminishes the credence 
one ought to have in (3).
(iv) Therefore, if one has justification to believe (1) after getting 
(JUSTIFICATION FOR 1), one must have had justification to 
believe (3) antecedently to getting (JUSTIFICATION FOR 1).
(v) Therefore j-dogmatism is false: (JUSTIFICATION FOR 1)’s 
ability to provide justification to believe (1) is not independent 
of whether one has antecedent justification to believe (3).8
8  I take something like this argument to be extractable from White (2006), whose 
focus is specifically on j-dogmatism. Cf. also Schiffer (2004) and Wright (2007). Note 
premises (i) and (i*) each rest on a closure principle; I explore this further in section 
3. Note also premises (iii) and (iii*) can form the basis for an explication of the 
phenomenon of transmission failure (cf. Okasha (2004), Chandler (2010), and Moretti 
(2012)). Note, finally, that if one added a further premise to these arguments that we 
don’t in fact have justification to believe — aren’t in fact in a position to know — (3) 
prior to experiencing (JUSTIFICATION FOR 1), one would have the makings of a 
full-fledged argument for scepticism.
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The argument against k-dogmatism is similar:
(i*) If one knows (1) after getting (JUSTIFICATION FOR 1), one is 
in a position to know (3) after getting (JUSTIFICATION FOR 1).
(ii*) If having a certain experience diminishes the credence one 
ought to have in a proposition, then if one is in a position to 
know the proposition after having the experience, one must have 
been in a position to know the proposition antecedently to the 
experience.
(iii*) Getting (JUSTIFICATION FOR 1) diminishes the credence 
one ought to have in (3).
(iv*) Therefore, if one knows (1) after getting (JUSTIFICATION 
FOR 1), one must have been in a position to know (3) antecedently 
to getting (JUSTIFICATION FOR 1).
(v*) Therefore k-dogmatism is false: (JUSTIFICATION FOR 1)’s 
ability to confer knowledge of (1) is not independent of whether 
one is antecedently in a position to know (3).9
Note that this second argument contains the locution ‘in a position to 
know’ at several junctures. I take it that one is in such a position just in 
case one has (evidential) justification for the true proposition in question, 
and some anti-luck condition is fulfilled thwarting Gettierisation. 
Admittedly this account is vague and context-dependent at a number 
of points (cf. Williamson 2000: 95), but this working definition will do 
for our purposes.
I take it that, with these two arguments, we’ve identified the major 
puzzle in confirmation theory for dogmatism. They purport to establish, 
contra dogmatism, that the role of a perceptual experience (of the table 
looking red) in providing justification to believe (1), and ultimately 
knowledge of (1), depends on an antecedently available justification 
to believe (3), or on being antecedently in a position to know (3). Each 
argument has three premises. Unless there is some flaw in the reasoning 
9  I take something like this argument to be extractable from Hawthorne (2004: 73–75), 
whose (effective) focus is specifically on k-dogmatism. Cf. also Cohen (2005: 425).
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that takes us from the three premises to the interim conclusion, and 
thence to the conclusion, the dogmatist must identify a false premise. 
Each of the premises, however, is plausible.
3. Implications of the Puzzle
3.1 The arguments comprising our puzzle for dogmatism (see 2.2) are 
valid, so let’s isolate a premise on which some doubt might be cast. An 
obvious move at this stage, given the apparent security of the second and 
third premises,10 is to flag premises (i) and (i*):
(i) If one has justification to believe (EK1) after getting 
(JUSTIFICATION FOR 1), one has justification to believe (EK3) 
after getting (JUSTIFICATION FOR 1).
(i*) If one knows (EK1) after getting (JUSTIFICATION FOR 1), 
one is in a position to know (EK3) after getting (JUSTIFICATION 
FOR 1).
Each premise, respectively, presupposes (something like) the following 
(single-premise) closure principles:
(J-Closure) If one has justification to believe P and can tell that P 
entails Q then — ceteris paribus — one has justification to believe 
Q.
(K-Closure) If one knows P and competently deduces Q from P, 
thereby coming to believe Q, while retaining one’s knowledge 
that P, one comes to know that Q.
A defender of j-dogmatism or k-dogmatism who wants to question the 
truth of (i) or (i*) should offer reasons to reject (J-Closure) or (K-Closure), 
10  In the coming Interim Review, I suggest a line of argument to the effect that their 
security is only apparent. I thus do not mean to commit to the ensuing move being 
the most promising way for dogmatism to get out of the puzzle; just an obvious way.
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respectively.11 However, these are highly plausible closure principles. 
Thus dogmatism is — or seems very likely to be — false.12
11  Note that (K-Closure) is difficult to distinguish from a principle about transmission 
(here, transmission of epistemic status). One might then ask: would there not be a 
similar principle about justification, that would speak of coming to have a justified 
belief? The principle that White calls ‘Justification Closure’ (2006: 528) would 
seem to be like this (using, as it does, the ‘justified in believing’ nomenclature — a 
nomenclature I noted in the Introduction to be associated with doxastic 
justification).Why, then, is it important here to have (J-Closure) be a principle 
about (propositional) justification to believe rather than about (doxastic) justified 
belief (or being justified in believing)? First, even though White uses nomenclature 
associated with doxastic justification, it is not unequivocally so associated, and 
White’s surrounding remarks suggest instead a propositional focus. Second, as 
can be seen from the argument, a propositional justification closure principle is 
all White needs — and this is a good thing, given the familiar counterexamples to 
doxastic justification closure principles. Finally, see Lasonen-Aarnio (2008) for an 
interesting exploration of so-called deductive risk — a phenomenon which provides 
a novel basis for questioning (K-Closure).
12  As hinted (n. 10), I consider, and canvass, a range of possible dogmatist responses to 
these arguments in the coming Interim Review.
Interim Review
As we now transition from Part One to Part Two of the book, let’s 
take stock of what has been achieved in Part One and what remains 
to be achieved in Part Two. First, what has been achieved? Essentially, 
immediate justification (such as perceptual justification as understood 
by the dogmatist) allows for basic knowledge, and basic knowledge 
seems to give rise to at least two problems. (A) It would allow that 
provides an adequate response to the sceptic. (B) It would allow a 
‘too easy’ inferential route from basic knowledge to other knowledge. 
This was my pattern of objection to dogmatism, immediate justification, 
and basic knowledge. In Chapter One, I argued that Wright’s position 
(which does not accept that there is immediate perceptual justification 
to believe the Moorean premise ‘I have hands’) still faces the (MOORE)-
transmit problem. In Chapter Three, I argued that, even if (MOORE)-
reasoning and (EK)-reasoning do transmit warrant and do not involve 
any epistemic circularity, they still exhibit an epistemological limitation. 
At that point we could have concluded that the prospects of allowing 
for immediate justification and basic knowledge would be rather good.
In Chapter Four I argued that a concept central to the work 
of philosophers debating over immediate justification and basic 
knowledge — viz. transmission failure — is secure from a particular 
challenge. Specifically, I argued that transmission failure is possible on 
all or most plausible accounts of the sources of warrant-or-evidence 
for future reasoning. Of course, the notion of transmission failure 
discussed in that chapter is connected with epistemic circularity; and 
a core upshot of dogmatism is that there is no epistemic circularity in 
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(MOORE)-reasoning. The challenge faced by the dogmatist is to respond 
to problems (A) and (B) without appeal to epistemic circularity. Thus, the 
importance of Chapter Four is more theoretical than dialectical.
The dialectical importance of the final chapter in Part One is, by 
contrast, extreme. There, I argued that epistemological dogmatism is 
vulnerable to a strong objection. Here, I consider whether there are any 
good responses to that objection.
1. Reacting to Chapter Five’s Objection to 
Dogmatism
I closed Chapter Five by suggesting that a defender of dogmatism 
about justification or dogmatism about knowledge may well look to 
offer reasons to reject (J-Closure) or (K-Closure), respectively. In the 
coming chapters — Chapter Six and, in particular, Chapter Seven — I 
oppose, specifically, John Hawthorne’s recent defense of (K-Closure). 
Those chapters join Hawthorne in, arguendo, assuming that something 
in the region of conclusive reasons or sensitivity is a condition on 
knowledge, before going on to render those conditions in as plausible 
a form as possible.1
In section 5 of the Introduction I mentioned a way — involving 
taking conclusive reasons or sensitivity to characterise justification — of 
extending any rejection of closure from (K-Closure) to (J-Closure).2 
I noted, though, that even with conclusive reasons or sensitivity 
conceived as a necessary condition for justification, that would 
not guarantee an exception to (J-Closure). This is because: although 
if the conclusion did not meet the conclusive reasons or sensitivity 
1  It might seem that a defense of dogmatism about knowledge (a position which, 
concededly, hasn’t clearly been endorsed by any philosopher thus far, but which 
has been articulated and which is independently interesting) ideally ought not to 
rest on such an assumption. This is not because these conditions are peculiarly 
anti-dogmatist in spirit; it is rather just that a defense of dogmatism should rely 
on as few assumptions as possible, in order to avoid creating hostages to fortune. 
But note: if such a defense works, there couldn’t be knowledge by inference of the 
conclusion of (EK) (or (MOORE)).
2  If this extension works, there couldn’t be justification by inference of the conclusion 
of (EK) (or (MOORE)). So (EK)-reasoning would be an example of transmission 
failure. So, apparently, there could be transmission failure that was not related to 
epistemic circularity.
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condition it would not be justified, the premise might also not 
be justified, despite meeting the conclusive reasons or sensitivity 
condition. However, I noted that in any actual case there might be 
no reason to suppose that the premise, which meets the conclusive 
reasons or sensitivity condition, nevertheless fails to meet some other 
necessary condition for justification. Consider the dialectical context 
where someone is trying to pin a problem on dogmatism by using 
(J-Closure) to proceed from justification to believe (1) to justification 
to believe (3). The person posing this problem is content to assume 
that the conditions for justification to believe (1) are met, and we can 
add that (1) meets the conclusive reasons or sensitivity condition. So 
it is hard to see that the problem-poser has any good reason to reject 
the continuing assumption that there is justification to believe (1) 
or justified belief in (1), even with conclusive reasons or sensitivity 
now added as a necessary condition on justification. But (3), though 
putatively justified, fails the conclusive reasons or sensitivity test. So 
there is plausibly an exception to (J-Closure).
In sum, while I believe such an extension is worthy of serious 
consideration, it must be conceded that I have offered no decisive 
argument against (J-Closure).3 So, even if I can make out a successful 
(fully general) case for rejecting (K-Closure) — and so for rejecting 
the argument against dogmatism about knowledge — I cannot 
presently claim that that success carries over to vindicate rejection of 
(J-Closure) — and so rejection of the argument against dogmatism 
about justification.
However, I am not resigned to accepting that dogmatism about 
justification is false, and one might reject the arguments against 
dogmatism by other means than a rejection of closure principles. Here, 
I briefly suggest an alternative way of responding to the arguments 
presented in Chapter Five against dogmatism. This alternative — not 
pursued in Chapter Five — involves a form of departure from the 
standard Bayesian picture. To some degree, which of these two routes 
a defender of dogmatism pursues — and I do not claim them to be 
exhaustive — will depend on the costs associated with, respectively, 
3  Recall, (J-Closure) is defined in terms of justification to believe. While there any 
surely reasons to reject a closure principle defined instead in terms of justified 
belief, such a principle is not presently germane.
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rejection of closure principles and a departure from standard Bayesian 
assumptions.
Davies’s (2009) account, on which I build in Chapter Three, 
“involve[s] some departure from the standard Bayesian requirement 
that a probability distribution must assign some probability, high or 
low, to each proposition, including [MOORE(3) An external world 
exists]” (356).4 We can take it that this also includes: The table is not 
white with red lights shining on it.
These propositions — the conclusions of (MOORE)-reasoning and 
(EK)-reasoning respectively — may be outside the subject’s conceptual 
repertoire when the subject first comes to believe the premise, ‘I have 
hands’ or ‘The table is red’, on the basis of a perceptual experience as 
of having hands or as of a red table. Once the conclusion proposition 
is grasped, and the entailment is recognised, the subject is committed 
to assigning a posterior credence to the conclusion that is no lower 
than the posterior credence assigned to the premise. However, we 
might depart from the requirement that a coherent assignment of 
prior credences should encompass propositions of which the subject 
has, at that stage, no understanding. While much work would need 
to be done, it might be that this kind of departure from the standard 
Bayesian picture could offer another way to respond to Chapter Five’s 
arguments against dogmatism.
We have briefly reviewed two possible methods of resisting 
Chapter Five’s arguments against dogmatism. I now want to review 
a third possible method. Nico Silins (2007) can be taken to claim that 
White’s arguments — which I sought to capture in Chapter Five — only 
establish (I) that it is impossible for anyone ever to acquire evidence 
4  A departure of this kind, for Davies (2009: 356) results from “[s]upposing […] that 
there were a theory of evidential support with the following two features. First, 
Moore’s experience as of hands would provide no support for MOORE(1) [I have hands] 
given the negation of MOORE(3) as background assumption but, second, Moore’s 
experience could provide support for MOORE(1) even without the positive adoption 
of MOORE(3) as a background assumption.” Indeed, more generally Davies’s 
distinction between two epistemic projects (and associated resultant distinctions) 
may be difficult to capture in the standard Bayesian framework. Cf. Pryor (2012: 
282–83) for a related “propos[al] to set […] probabilistic considerations aside for 
[…] discussion [of transmission-failure]” on account of “many complications 
at play”. More generally on this issue — that is, resolution of potential conflict 
between formal considerations and a family of views of which dogmatism is a 
member — see Pryor (2013).
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that justifies ordinary empirical propositions unless they already had, 
prior to acquiring that evidence, propositional justification for rejecting 
sceptical hypotheses, and so do not establish (R) that our justification 
for ordinary empirical propositions essentially rests on or is supported by 
our justification for rejecting sceptical hypotheses.5
This is a promising strategy. Does Silins make good on his claim? 
(To the extent that he does, of course, the dogmatist will have another 
possible escape route from Chapter Five’s objection.) Consider the 
following example: (Prime) If it is a necessary truth that every thinker 
always has (propositional) justification for certain a priori knowable 
propositions, then it is impossible ever to acquire evidence that 
justifies me in believing that I have hands unless I already had, prior 
to acquiring that evidence, propositional justification for believing the 
a priori proposition that there is no largest prime number; however 
it would not be that my justification for believing that I have hands 
essentially rests on or is supported by my justification for believing that 
there is no largest prime number. A supporter of Silins might suggest 
there is an analogy between Prime and the case(s) involving sceptical 
hypotheses.6 This analogy would suggest that, even if, for example, it is 
impossible to be justified in believing that I have hands on the basis of 
a perceptual experience as of hands unless I have antecedent warrant 
to believe the anti-sceptical proposition that there is an external world, 
still the warrant to believe that I have hands might not depend on the 
antecedent warrant to reject the sceptical hypothesis.
Here is a dogmatist-friendly view of what the Prime example 
establishes:
5  Let us not probe further into some of the notions introduced in (R) — e.g. essentially 
rests on, is supported by — other than to note that they are not Bayesian notions as 
such (likewise for the notions of immediate versus mediate evidential support). 
White (2006: 555, n. 14) gestures towards this Silins point, appealing to the “in 
virtue of” relation. Put somewhat vernacularly, the point might be that there is 
some slippage here between different notions of independence in the arguments as 
formulated in Chapter Five.
6  Note, though, while justification for believing that there is no largest prime number, 
ex hypothesi in Prime, is necessary a priori, it’s plausible that default justification for 
rejecting sceptical hypotheses, if it exists, is contingent a priori (cf. Hawthorne 2002 
and Cohen 2002: 320–22).
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(iv**) If one has justification to believe ‘I have hands’, after having 
perceptual experience as of having hands then one must have 
had justification to believe there is no largest prime number 
antecedently to having perceptual experience as of having hands.
This is of the same form as (iv) in the argument against j-dogmatism in 
Chapter Five. The point of the Prime example is that it obviously does 
not follow that j-dogmatism is false. It does, let us accept, follow from 
(iv**) that:
(v**) Perceptual experience as of having hands’ ability to provide 
justification to believe ‘I have hands’ is not modally independent 
of whether one has antecedent justification to believe that there 
is no largest prime. (One cannot have one justification without 
having the other.)
However, there is clearly a gap between that (allowing that it does 
follow) and ‘j-dogmatism is false’, which does not follow. The point 
is that from the modal dependence in (v**) it clearly does not follow 
that justification to believe ‘I have hands’ depends constitutively on 
justification to believe that there is no largest prime — even though 
one cannot have one justification without having the other. Having 
a justification to believe that there is no largest prime does not partly 
constitute having a justification to believe ‘I have hands’; it is not part 
of what it is for one to have a justification to believe ‘I have hands’. And 
I take it that epistemic dependence is a kind of constitutive, and not 
merely modal, dependence.
I think there is much merit in Silins’s strategy. I also think that 
we might not need even to grant that the argument of Chapter Five 
establishes the relation of modal dependence between epistemic 
warrants. We could allow that the argument does establish:
(iv—) If one has justification to believe ‘I have hands’, after having 
perceptual experience as of having hands then it must be that a 
coherent assignment of credences would have assigned a high 
credence to an anti-sceptical hypothesis antecedently to one’s 
having perceptual experience as of having hands.
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And then we could ask, with Pryor (2012: 282): “What’s the relation 
between probabilistically confirming and supplying warrant?”.
Still, it is not entirely clear to me, at this point, how best to respond to 
Chapter Five’s objection to dogmatism. While I have reviewed several 
options for the dogmatist — options which I take to be very much live 
and, indeed, promising — much remains to be done before any utterly 
convincing response to the objection could be presented.
I certainly do not at all assume that the objection to dogmatism is 
unanswerable. Indeed, my provisional view is that dogmatism remains 
a tenable position. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to consider the worst-
case possibility that, ultimately, dogmatism cannot be defended against 
the objection. It would be natural, at that point, to consider taking Roger 
White’s (2006) line, whose focus, recall, is specifically on dogmatism 
about justification.
White (2006: 552–53), not interested in questioning (J-Closure), 
considers retreating from dogmatism about justification to a distinct 
thesis which he calls JUSTIFICATION BY DEFAULT (cf. Pryor 2000: 
519).7 At points in the book up until now, we’ve had cause to highlight 
elements of White’s position as they were relevant. At this point, we do 
well to state it in full:
Suppose that we abandon dogmatism, and insist that in order to gain 
perceptual justification for believing that P, we must have independent 
justification for believing that we are not victims of a visual illusion that 
P. We could nevertheless insist that we have a kind of default justification 
for assuming the general reliability of our perceptual faculties. We are 
entitled to believe that our faculties tend to deliver the truth unless we 
have some positive reason to doubt this.8 Our faculties are generally 
reliable only if skeptical alternatives rarely obtain. So if I’m justified in 
taking my faculties to be reliable, then I need give very little credence 
to skeptical hypotheses (unless of course I have reason to suspect that 
one obtains). On the view that I’m sketching I do not need to explicitly 
believe in the reliability of my faculties or the falsity of sceptical 
alternatives in order to gain justification from perceptual experience, but 
justification for this reliability is available to me nevertheless […]9 [I]t is 
7  As White notes, JUSTIFICATION BY DEFAULT bears obviously similarities to 
Wright’s appeal to the notion of unearned warrant; Pryor rejects these stances.
8  Cf. Burge’s (1993, 2003) view, on which we have such an entitlement to rely instead 
on our faculties.
9  Thus, White has in mind propositional, and not doxastic, justification.
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denied that the justification for ruling out skeptical alternatives requires 
some prior empirical ground. This justification is available a priori by 
default. I am justified in my perceptually based beliefs, according to this 
view, in just the circumstances that the dogmatist claims that I am. Such 
a view seems to have all of the advantages of dogmatism but avoids all 
of my objections. No doubt the view requires closer examination and 
development. But if we are attracted to something in the ball park of 
dogmatism, it seems to be the right place to look.
What follows? Suppose we retreat from dogmatism, allow that 
justification to believe quotidian propositions epistemically 
depends on justification to believe an anti-sceptical hypothesis or 
reliability hypothesis, and accept — with White — that we have such 
JUSTIFICATION BY DEFAULT. A corollary of such a retreat would 
appear to be that we could then say that the solution to problems (A) and 
(B) — outlined at the outset of this Interim Review — is that the relevant 
reasoning involves epistemic circularity in each case.10 However, the 
situation is not so straightforward. I showed in Chapter One (in effect) 
that there can still be transmission of some warrant even where there is 
a kind of epistemic circularity. More on this later, in section 2.
Now if we have justification by default for a reliability hypothesis, 
we might not need to believe it, still less to know it, in order to know 
quotidian propositions: there could be antecedent justification to believe, 
but no antecedent belief and so no antecedent knowledge. Still, any 
such knowledge of quotidian propositions wouldn’t be (the logically 
stronger) Pryorian basic knowledge, because it depends epistemically 
(constitutively) on one’s having justification to believe the reliability 
proposition. Could it, though, be (the logically weaker) Cohenian basic 
knowledge? Interestingly, this is precisely the case about which it was 
said in the Introduction (p. 10) that it is at best unclear that it is a case of 
Cohenian basic knowledge.
Though White’s focus is on justification, the argument of Chapter 
Five did apply to knowledge, and not just justification. But the most that 
the argument in Chapter Five would establish is that if one knows, with 
source K, some quotidian proposition, then one was antecedently in a 
10  Insofar as Cohen doesn’t appeal to epistemic circularity to solve problems (1) and 
(2), we can be sure — confirming Chapter Three’s account of his position — that his 
position is not simply described in terms of such a retreat.
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position to know that K is reliable. That is not the same as saying that one 
would antecedently know that K is reliable. So far, so good for Cohen’s 
basic knowledge. However, if the argument in Chapter Five establishes 
that the justification to believe the quotidian proposition depends 
epistemically (constitutively) on the antecedent justification to believe 
that K is reliable, then I have said that it is at best unclear whether this 
is Cohenian basic knowledge. On the other hand, if the argument does 
not establish the constitutive epistemic dependence, then we should 
say that knowledge of the quotidian proposition is Pryorian (and thus 
Cohenian) basic knowledge — and that the challenge to dogmatism was 
unsuccessful.
2. Looking Back to Part One and Ahead to Part Two
Now what follows with respect to the work done in Part One and the 
work to be done in Part Two? First, what follows with regard to Part 
One? In Chapter One we saw that Wright, contra the standard view, 
faced the difficult (MOORE)-transmit problem — a problem standardly 
only taken to be faced by dogmatists. This problem — the particular 
problem of giving a plausible account of why something seems wrong 
with (MOORE)-reasoning given it can transmit warrant — cannot be 
answered by Wright by pointing out that there’s non-transmission of 
(disjunctive) warrant by the lights of his (non-)transmission theses. 
Wright cannot so answer because there’s transmission of evidential 
warrant by the lights of two other plausible (non-)transmission theses.11 
Crucially, in each case — that is, in both the case involving Wright’s 
theses and the case involving the two other plausible theses — the 
warrant under consideration is provided by the same experience, a visual 
11  It might be objected that Moore’s argument fails completely to reveal why our 
acceptance of its conclusion has the status of having any warrant whatsoever. One 
way of understanding this objection is that the evidential warrant that is transmitted 
from premise (1) of (MOORE) is — according to Wright’s view — dependent on 
the unearned warrant to accept premise (3) of (MOORE). Wright (2004) indicates 
a philosophical theoretical account of the nature of that unearned warrant but, of 
course, this piece of philosophical theory will not be within the grasp of ordinary 
non-philosophical thinkers. It will therefore be correct that Moore’s argument does 
not itself reveal why (3) has any warrant whatever — just as it does not reveal why 
(1) has any warrant whatever. On this understanding of this objection, (3) is in no 
worse shape than (1).
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experience as of having hands. (For why invocation of the two theses 
that license transmission of evidential warrant is not question-begging 
against Wright, see my introduction, and subsequent discussion, of 
theses (A)-(D) in Chapter One, section 2.4ff.) One natural idea would 
be for Wright to borrow the kind of story that I tell in Chapter Three 
(on behalf of the dogmatist) about the problem of easy knowledge. But 
Chapter One has shown that Wright cannot happily borrow that kind 
of story, especially given his (1985) position on the non-factuality of the 
proposition that there is an external world.
Insofar as dogmatism turns out not to be a live option, Wright 
would no longer be at a dialectical disadvantage vis-à-vis dogmatism. 
Nevertheless, insofar as Wright faces the (MOORE)-transmit problem, 
Chapter One can be taken to pose the following question to Wright: 
how do you answer the (MOORE)-transmit problem? Note also that 
in Chapter One (at 1.1) I wrote: “Assume, then — with the dogmatist 
and Wright — that something (at least) seems wrong with (MOORE)-
reasoning.” Meanwhile, in Chapter Three I claimed that reasoning 
fundamentally the same as (MOORE)-reasoning — namely, (EK*)-
reasoning — is less unsatisfactory than (EK)-reasoning. Is there any 
conflict between these claims from Chapter One and Chapter Three? 
No. All that the main argument of Chapter Three requires is that (EK)-
reasoning and (EK*)-reasoning are different, in that (EK*)-reasoning 
seems less unsatisfactory than (EK)-reasoning. Importantly, it does not 
require that either (EK*)-reasoning or (MOORE)-reasoning is wholly 
satisfactory. Indeed it diagnoses an epistemic limitation in each form of 
reasoning, namely that neither argument can be used in the epistemic 
project of settling the question — albeit that limitation doesn’t preclude 
knowledge.
Moreover, we can note that, if Wright ends up with a first time 
perceptual warrant for the proposition that there is an external world, 
then his position is, to that extent, similar to the dogmatist’s position, 
and Wright needs to explain why (MOORE)-reasoning seems not to be 
a satisfying response to the sceptic. That is quite consistent with the idea 
that (EK)-reasoning seems to be somehow epistemically worse than 
(EK*)-reasoning. I take Chapter Three to have established that none of 
the principles that have been proposed can account for this difference.
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Chapters Two and Three then looked at the problem of easy 
knowledge. These chapters explore a legitimate question: is there a 
solution to the problem of easy knowledge that is available to the 
dogmatist? My answer is: yes, there is. So if there is something wrong 
with dogmatism, it is not that it cannot respond to the problem of 
easy knowledge. Of course, we must now ask how things stand if the 
argument of Chapter Five shows dogmatism to be untenable. Then, the 
fact that justification for (EK1) depends on justification for (EK3) means 
that we have a kind of epistemic (justificatory) circularity. So that is at 
least part of the solution to the problem of easy knowledge (unlike the 
situation in Chapter Three). There might still be an additional problem 
if an argument like that made in Chapter One shows that there is an 
(EK)-transmit problem (despite the circularity). However, that raises 
issues quite different from those in Chapter Three.
Finally, what follows with regard to the ensuing Part Two — our 
exploration of certain conditions that some philosophers have claimed 
are necessary for knowledge, viz. conclusive reasons, sensitivity and 
safety? It bears emphasising that we need not assume that we have basic 
knowledge to make exploration of conclusive reasons, sensitivity,12 and 
safety worthwhile. Moreover, now that we have seen that a defender of 
dogmatism about knowledge may well want to offer reasons to reject 
(K-Closure), the outcome of our enquiry into (K-Closure) in Chapters 
Six and Seven (and an additional closely related knowledge-closure 
principle in Chapter Six)13 becomes of increased interest.14
12  It is noteworthy that Kripke (2011: 189–90) says: “Even if [Nozick’s sensitivity] 
account is restricted to perceptual (‘noninferential,’ or ‘basic’) knowledge — and 
I think [it is] much more plausible if so restricted — the red barn problem can still 
arise.” We encounter the ‘red barn’ problem, and related issues, in Chapter Seven.
13  This is the principle on which Dretske was originally focused which, unlike 
(Closure), does not involve the performance of a competent deduction.
14  We’ve seen several times that one might consider an effort to ‘carry over’ arguments 
against (K-Closure) to (J-Closure) by, for example, taking the conclusive reasons or 
sensitivity condition to characterise justification.

PART TWO  




Overview of Part Two
Our Overview of Part Two — in which, by turn, the status of conclusive 
reasons, sensitivity, and safety as necessary conditions on knowledge is 
considered — can be refreshingly brief. In large part this is because the bulk 
of the heavy lifting in setting out the overall narrative of the book has been 
completed. (The final chapter — looking at an application of safety to the 
domain of legal proof — is, of necessity, something of an outlier.)
It simply remains to (re)affirm the following. (1) Our Interim Review 
made clear that a rejection of closure is one — but not the only — means 
of responding on behalf of the dogmatist to the serious objection to 
dogmatism considered in Chapter Five. Insofar as conclusive reasons 
or sensitivity is necessary for knowledge, (K-Closure) fails. (2) Our 
Introduction outlined, in a very broad-brush manner, Martin Smith’s 
(2009) proposal to explain (a Part One issue) transmission failure (of 
knowledge) in terms of the safety condition (a Part Two issue). This 
proposal is considered in detail in the conclusion. Let us note for now, 
though, that safety’s status as a necessary condition on knowledge is 
essential if Smith is to establish his proposal.
Do I then, in the following chapters establish the status of any of the 
aforementioned conditions as genuinely necessary for knowledge? Not 
quite. Taking first the closely related conclusive reasons and sensitivity 
conditions, my aim is simply to make them as plausible as they can be as 
necessary conditions on knowledge. I explicitly disavow the challenge 
of rendering them bulletproof to counterexample(s). To the extent that 
I have rendered them more plausible, I will also have rendered more 
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plausible the (K-Closure)-rejecting (and, possibly, (J-Closure)-rejecting) 
response of the dogmatist to Chapter Five’s arguments.
The following objection to this as a dogmatist response may be raised 
at this point: the root idea behind standard dogmatisms is that seemings 
necessarily constitute prima facie justification for their contents. This is 
dogmatism’s core. The implication would appear to be that seemings 
provide this justification even if they aren’t backed by conclusive 
reasons and even if the resulting belief wouldn’t be sensitive. Therefore, 
dogmatism about justification and knowledge is incompatible with 
requiring conclusive reasons or sensitivity. (This objection, and my 
ensuing reply, carries over, mutatis mutandis, to the safety condition, 
though safety is, by contrast, preserved across competent deduction.)
My reply is that, while the premise(s) is true, this conclusion doesn’t 
follow therefrom. To be sure, conclusive reasons or sensitivity as 
necessary conditions on knowledge is no part of the core of dogmatism; 
but there is nothing incompatible about augmenting dogmatism 
therewith. Two routes for securing this compatibility (between which 
I can remain agnostic) present themselves. First, one might (arguably, 
taking these conditions at face value) insulate conclusive reasons 
or sensitivity from any role in justification — that is, from any load-
bearing weight in justification. Then, straightforwardly, the core of 
standard dogmatisms can be preserved, compatibly with conclusive 
reasons or sensitivity as necessary conditions on knowledge. (On this first 
route, this dogmatist response will only bear on (K-Closure).) Second, 
one might, plausibly, give conclusive reasons or sensitivity a role in 
justification — that is, give it load-bearing weight in justification. Still the 
core of standard dogmatisms can be preserved: seemings still necessarily 
constitute prima facie (or pro tanto) justification for their contents, but 
such justification would fail to be ultima facie (or all-things-considered) 
should conclusive reasons or sensitivity not be met. (On this second 
route, this dogmatist response will bear additionally on (J-Closure).)
A final note on Chapters Six and Seven, and the relationship between 
conclusive reasons and sensitivity. It must be acknowledged up front 
that these two putative conditions on knowledge are very similar. It is 
correspondingly no surprise that my initial fixes for the two conditions 
are also very similar. Several remarks are therefore in order. First, as I 
note in Chapter Seven, while the two requirements are similar, Dretske 
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(2005: 24, n. 4) himself is at pains to point out situations in which the 
requirements come apart. I think there is further interesting work to be 
done exploring this matter. Second, while the initial fix I propose for the 
two conditions is similar, in Chapter Seven’s treatment of sensitivity I go 
far beyond that initial fix to explore more wide-ranging modifications 
of sensitivity. Those more wide-ranging modifications have obvious 
potential to be carried over to conclusive reasons also. Finally, and most 
generally, the chapter ordering reflects the chronological sequence in 
which they were written (reflecting, in turn, a maturation of my thoughts 
on these conditions). Ideally, within the overall structure of the book, 
these two chapters should be read as a pair. While general morals are 
offered in Chapter Six for the future of conclusive reasons as a condition 
on knowledge, those morals are offered within the comparatively 
narrow context of the debate between Dretske and Hawthorne. Chapter 
Seven, meanwhile, while engaging with Hawthorne, operates at a more 
detached level, and explores sensitivity in abstracto.
Regarding safety, again, I aim to have made it as plausible as it can be 
as a necessary condition on knowledge, and take myself to have staved 
off a group of putative counterexamples thereto. Nonetheless, I also 
concede I cannot be taken to have definitively established (my) safety 
(condition) as a necessary condition on knowledge. Once again, though, 
to the extent that I have rendered it more plausible, I will also have 
rendered more plausible Smith’s explanation of transmission failure (of 
knowledge) in terms of the safety condition.
Finally, the weakness of my dialectical aims with respect to these 
putative conditions on knowledge should be emphasised. I’m 
attempting to defend these conditions as necessary for knowledge. In 
fact, it is slightly weaker than that still: I’m attempting to make these 
conditions as plausible as they can be — render them in as plausible 
a form as possible — as necessary conditions on knowledge. That 
aim is independently interesting, and also (for reasons already given) 
has a payoff for upshots of allowing for basic knowledge. My aim is 
avowedly not to provide an analysis of knowledge with one or more of 
these conditions forming a component part. In this context, consider a 
recent fascinating case presented by John Williams and Neil Sinhababu 
(2015 et al) — the Backward Clock:
142 Basic Knowledge and Conditions on Knowledge
You habitually nap between 4 pm and 5 pm. Your method of ascertaining 
the time you wake is to look at your clock, one you know has always 
worked perfectly reliably. Unbeknownst to you, your clock is a special 
model designed by a cult that regards the hour starting from 4 pm today 
as cursed, and wants clocks not to run forwards during that hour. So 
your clock is designed to run perfectly reliably backwards during that 
hour. At 4 pm the hands of the clock jumped to 5 pm, and it has been 
running reliably backwards since then. This clock is analogue so its 
hands sweep its face continuously, but it has no second hand so you 
cannot tell that it is running backwards from a quick glance. Awaking, 
you look at the clock at exactly 4:30 pm and observe that its hands point 
to 4:30 pm. Accordingly, you form the belief that it is 4:30 pm.
This innovative case is set up to be one in which the belief formed is 
sensitive (and presumably one for which one has conclusive reasons) 
and safe, but yet which is intuitively non-knowledge — the belief is 
too luckily true. Now, to be sure, the core cases I use as motivation 
to prompt fixes to conclusive reasons and sensitivity in Chapters Six 
and Seven are cases in which these conditions are met but which are 
clearly non-knowledge. Moreover, as I note in Chapter Eight (after 
stressing my weak dialectical aims), being readily able to invent cases 
of non-knowledge meeting my proposed safety condition is prima facie 
troubling; and I go on to consider possible such cases in the ballpark of the 
core case motivating my proposed fix to safety in that chapter. However, 
the fact remains: fascinating as the Backward Clock is, it does not dent 
my limited dialectical ambitions with respect to these conditions.
6. Conclusive Reasons
I explain Dretske’s challenge to knowledge-closure, based on his conclusive 
reasons condition on knowledge. I argue that his (1971) account of conclusive 
reasons can be supplemented so that his challenge to closure remains unmet.
0.1 Take the following principle (or schema)1 as the focus of the ensuing 
discussion (‘P’ and ‘Q’ are placeholders for propositions):2
(Closure) If one knows P and competently deduces Q from P, thereby 
coming to believe Q, while retaining one’s knowledge that P, one comes 
to know that Q. (Hawthorne 2005: 29)3
0.2 Some remarks about (Closure). First, it is defensible. Many closure 
principles are not worth defending. Consider, for example, the following:
(Closure’) If one knows P and, necessarily, P entails Q, then one 
knows Q.
1  As a schema it is assessable as valid/invalid (and not true/false).
2  And are so used throughout this chapter.
3  Precisely stating (Closure)’s relationship with transmission principles is a difficult 
thing to do. One way into this is to say that (Closure) is to be distinguished from 
transmission principles which, in addition to (Closure), require that one’s deduction 
furnishes one with — in a sense left intuitive here — a first-time warrant for Q. 
But, of course, (Closure) doesn’t explicitly mention warrant, so even this effort at a 
broad-brush statement may be too rough and ready to be particularly serviceable. 
Another way into this (anticipating the Conclusion’s discussion of Smith (2009)) 
is to distinguish between knowledge-closure (preservation) and knowledge-
transmission: to reach our knowledge-transmission principle, perhaps we could 
simply say at the end of the principle: ‘one comes to know for the first time that Q’. 
(Quaere: does ‘comes to know’ already include that it is for the first time?)
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This schema is not defensible. If P’s entailing Q is not known to the 
relevant subject, it is readily conceivable that the subject could know P 
without knowing Q.4
Second, to challenge (Closure) is not to challenge a fundamental rule 
of inference, modus ponens. Here is what Fred Dretske (2005a: 13) has 
written on the matter:
Closure is stronger [than modus ponens]. Modus ponens says that if P is 
true, and if P implies Q, then Q must be true. Closure tells us that when 
S knows that P is true, and also knows that P implies Q, then not only 
must Q be true (modus ponens gets you this much), S must know it is true.
Third, (Closure) respects Timothy Williamson’s view — endorsed by 
Hawthorne (2004: 33)5 — on the source of epistemic closure intuitions, 
namely that “deduction is a way of extending one’s knowledge” 
(Williamson, 2000: 117). Fourth, (Closure) is restricted to single premise 
inferences. (For remarks about closure principles involving multiple 
premises — in which issues concerning aggregation of risk become 
salient — see Hawthorne 2004: 46–50.)
Finally, what sense of entailment is in play in (Closure)? ((Closure) 
involves competent deduction of Q from P. I take it one can do this only 
if P entails Q — in some sense or other.) Closure principles are generally 
formulated in a way that requires the entailment to be strictly logical, but 
James Pryor (2012) notes:
[I]n practice epistemologists are pretty relaxed about what they count 
as “logical” […] [S]ay that a premise [P] implies for you a premise [Q] 
whenever you’re in a position to be reasonably certain that [P → Q], 
regardless of whether there’s really any strictly logical entailment.
I will follow Pryor’s lead in taking ‘implies for you’ to be a sufficient 
‘entailment’ relation for closure principles.
4  (Closure) is defended by Stalnaker (1984), but Stalnaker’s conception of belief is 
unorthodox.
5  Hawthorne (2004) (tentatively) defends a position he calls sensitive moderate 
invariantism (and is often referred to as subject-sensitive invariantism) about 
knowledge on the back of consideration of a series of lottery puzzles. These puzzles 
“derive their force from the idea that […] some sort of closure principle holds for 
knowledge” (Hawthorne 2004: 31).
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1. The Challenge to (Closure)
1.1 My strategy in outline: first, I want to set out Dretske’s classic 
challenge to (Closure) — a challenge which began in 1970–1971. Then I 
want to consider a specific counter-challenge to Dretske’s challenge to 
(Closure) mounted by John Hawthorne (2005), and to defend Dretske’s 
challenge from Hawthorne’s counter-challenge. Doing this is not to 
invalidate (Closure). In this regard my conclusions are modest: Dretske’s 
challenge to (Closure) is — or, better: can be made — sophisticated and, 
so far, unmet.
1.2 Dretske (1970: 1007) draws our attention to “sentential operators”; 
that is, terms or phrases which operate on a sentence or statement to 
give another sentence or statement. A focus on ‘S regrets’ and ‘S knows’ 
(where ‘S’ is a placeholder for a subject) will be useful. First, consider 
the following argument:
(R) S regrets P
S knows P implies Q
Therefore, S regrets Q
Is (R) valid? No. Consider a subject, Sam, who regrets that he drank 
ten beers last night, and who also knows that drinking ten beers entails 
drinking some alcohol. It does not thereby follow that Sam regrets 
drinking some alcohol last night.
Consider, more germanely to our present discussion, the following 
argument:
(K) S knows P
S knows P implies Q
Therefore, S knows Q
Is (K) valid? (K) is Dretske’s original (1970–1971) target, and he there 
concludes (K) is not valid.6 (K), while similar to (Closure), is distinct 
6  Nozick (1981: 240–42) also denies (K)’s (and (Closure)’s) validity. In the next chapter 
we come to engage directly with Nozick.
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from (Closure) in a number of respects. Most notably (Closure), but not 
(K), requires the performance of a competent deduction. (Equally, (K), 
but not (Closure), explicitly requires that S knows that P implies Q.) In 
his (2005) debate with Hawthorne, Dretske shifts his focus squarely to 
attacking (Closure).
1.3 To understand Dretske’s attack on (Closure) (and (K)) we need 
to introduce three interrelated pieces of (Dretskean) terminology: 
conclusive reasons, relevant alternatives, and heavyweight implications.
Let’s introduce these concepts in one go by means of consideration 
of two closely related arguments (assume a subject marshalling these 
arguments claims knowledge of premises and conclusion):
(HANDS1) I have hands
(HANDS2) If I have hands then I have a hand
Therefore:
(HANDS3) I have a hand
(BIV1) I have hands
(BIV2) If I have hands then I’m not a handless BIV7
Therefore:
(BIV3) I’m not a handless BIV
Suppose, in line with Dretske, that one’s evidence for the first premise 
of both (HANDS) and (BIV) is an experience as of having hands: an 
experience neutral between veridical and non-veridical cases.8
7  BIV = as before, Brain-in-a-Vat being fed pseudo-perceptual experiences by an evil 
scientist.
8  Klein (1995) gives an analysis of closure principles sensitive to different conceptions 
of evidential warrant. Note also — as a dialectical matter — Hawthorne (2005) does 
not contest this Dretskean conception of evidential warrant (notwithstanding it 
would not be his independently favoured way of viewing the matter).
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1.4 Here is Dretske’s (2005a: 19) definition of a conclusive reason 
(where ‘P’, again, is a placeholder for a proposition):
R is a conclusive reason for P = dfR would not be true unless P were true
Dretske’s original (extensionally equivalent — cf. n. 9) formulation of 
a conclusive reason (1971: 1) better brings out the modal character of 
conclusive reasons:
R is a conclusive reason for P if and only if, given R, ~◊~P (or, alternatively, 
~◊ (R.~P))9
Dretske makes clear later that the appropriate modality is empirical 
“possibility as it exists in relation to one’s evidence or grounds for 
believing P” (1971: 14). However, as the debate between Dretske and 
Hawthorne, which we will be entering here, centres on the former 
(2005a)-definition, it is that former definition on which we will focus. 
This (2005a)-definition (a close relative of the sensitivity condition to be 
encountered in the ensuing chapter) essentially asks whether, in (all) 
nearby possible worlds where P is false, is R also false? Iff this is so, R is 
a conclusive reason for P.
How does this piece of terminology map onto analysis of (HANDS) 
and (BIV)? Well the subject’s perceptual experience as of having 
hands is a conclusive reason for (HANDS1). The relevant alternative10 
9  The ‘~’ sign, here and elsewhere in this chapter, refers to negation. Although these 
formulations are both Dretske’s, one might, at first blush, think that they seem 
importantly different. One might think: the first formulation is naturally interpreted 
as saying that, in (all) nearby possible worlds where R is true, P is also true; but the 
second formulation (particularly the part in brackets) is more naturally interpreted 
as saying that, in all possible worlds where R is true, P is also true. Now it was not 
Dretske’s intention that these two formulations should be interpreted differently. 
Thus, one might ask: which formulation or interpretation would he have wanted? 
And — more on this later in this chapter — Dretske’s idea was that in (all) nearby 
possible worlds in which the proposition P is not true, the evidence proposition, R, 
is also not true.
10  What counts as a relevant alternative (strictly: a set of relevant alternatives), in this 
or that context, is an intuitive datum. There is no set of severally necessary and 
jointly sufficient criteria for relevance. We can say, though, if an alternative is a 
genuine objective possibility (a vague notion), it counts as relevant. (Heller (1999) 
defends Dretske’s notion and use of ‘relevant alternatives’ from attacks from Stine 
(1976), Cohen (1988), DeRose (1995) and Lewis (1996).) Finally, it is because only 
relevant (and not far-fetched) alternatives, for Dretske, need be ‘ruled out’ in order 
for a subject to have knowledge, that Dretske can be classed an infallibilist about 
knowledge.
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to having hands in the context of (HANDS1), is the subject having a 
stump in place of one hand, or a hand amputated, etc., and it is clear 
that the subject would not11 have an experience as of having hands were 
he to have a stump in place of one hand or be a hand-amputee. The 
subject’s evidence is, then, a conclusive reason for (HANDS1). The idea, 
then, is that a conclusive reason just is one that rules out all relevant 
alternatives. And a piece of evidence (described by a proposition, R) 
rules out all relevant alternatives to a proposition, P, iff in (all) nearby 
possible worlds where P is false, R would also be false.
And, moving on to (HANDS3) — (HANDS2) is knowable a 
priori — the relevant alternative to having a hand in the context of 
(HANDS3) is the subject being handless, perhaps through having both 
his hands cut off. It is clear that our subject’s experience as of having 
hands would not persist were he to become handless. The subject’s 
evidence is, then, also a conclusive reason for (HANDS3). We thus have, 
with (HANDS), an instance of closure of knowledge under known 
entailment.
1.5 But that there are instances of closure here and there is not good 
enough for closure supporters: closure must hold across the board 
if (Closure) is to be valid. This is where we must consider (BIV) and 
Dretske’s concept of heavyweight implications. As with (HANDS1), the 
subject’s perceptual experience as of having hands provides him with 
a conclusive reason for (BIV1). Likewise, the second premise of (BIV) 
is knowable a priori. The difference in the two arguments is brought 
out in the conclusion: in (BIV) — unlike with (HANDS) — the subject’s 
experiential evidence is not a conclusive reason for (BIV 3). The relevant 
alternative is different. Were our subject not not a handless BIV he would 
straightforwardly be a handless BIV. And, by hypothesis, our subject 
would still have an experience as of having hands were he a handless 
BIV. So, by Dretske’s lights, (BIV) is an instance of a counterexample to 
(Closure). (Closure) is thereby, for Dretske, invalidated.12
1.6 The final piece of the jigsaw is the concept of a heavyweight 
implication. Dretske wants to say something about when we will 
11  In the relevant sense of empirical possibility. (Read this modal claim in, where 
appropriate, in subsequent counterfactuals.)
12  Note, for the (standard) contextualist, (Closure) is valid in all fixed contexts.
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have instances of (Closure), and when we will have counterexamples. 
Dretske’s answer is that we will have counterexamples to (Closure) if 
there is a heavyweight implication as our conclusion. Clearly (BIV3) 
must count as a ‘heavyweight implication’. But can Dretske give an 
account of this concept without merely pointing to paradigms thereof 
when it suits his purposes?
Dretske is content simply to point to paradigms of heavyweight 
implications — for example, that there is a material world; that humans 
are not mindless zombies; that there was a yesterday — and to assert 
that “[t]here are some known implications of what we know […] that 
we do not have to know to be true in order to know to be true what 
implies them” (2005a: 23). It would be somewhat unsatisfactory to leave 
things there, so let’s invoke Hawthorne’s (2005: 33) take on what he calls 
a “heavyweight proposition”:13
Let P be a “heavyweight proposition” just in case we all have some 
strong inclination to think that P is not the sort of thing that one can 
know by the exercise of reason alone and also that P is not the sort of 
thing that one can know by the use of one’s perceptual faculties (even 
aided by reason).
In sum, Dretske views the denial of (Closure) as the only way to preserve 
ordinary knowledge — we do not have to know the heavyweight 
implications of (quotidian proposition) P to know P.
2. Hawthorne’s ‘Heavyweight Conjunct’ 
Counter-Challenge
2.1 First, an overview of Hawthorne’s (2005) strategy. His counter-
challenge to Dreske’s challenge has two strands. First, he aims to show 
how we can have conclusive reasons for heavyweight propositions — but 
in such cases, as we have seen from our analysis of Dretske in section 
13  A heavyweight implication just is, I take it, a heavyweight proposition which is entailed 
by a quotidian proposition. To link this back to Chapter Two, it is not clear whether 
the notion of ‘heavyweight implication’ will distinguish between the conclusions of 
(EK)- and (EK*)-reasoning. One view would be that in both cases, the conclusion 
is not the sort of thing that one can know by perception and reasoning alone; but 
the difference is that in one case, and not in the other case, there is the possibility of 
gathering evidence that would favour the conclusion over its negation.
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1, Dretske’s machinery gives us no account of how knowledge of such 
propositions is blocked. (Although on the face of it Dretske is simply 
offering conclusive reasons as a necessary condition on knowledge, the 
first strand challenge makes sense when we see that Dretske accepts the 
challenge of explaining why we don’t know heavyweight propositions.) 
Secondly, he aims to show how we can “all too often lack conclusive 
reasons for a priori consequences of known propositions, even though 
those consequences are not [heavyweight implications]” (Hawthorne 
2005: 35). That is, he aims to show that there are propositions for which 
we lack conclusive reasons (according to Dretske’s account of conclusive 
reasons) — in consequence, propositions that Dretske is bound to say 
we do not know — but which are not heavyweight propositions. (More 
on the dialectical efficacy of the second strand later in this chapter.)14
2.2 Our principal focus will be on the first strand: putative cases in 
which conclusive reasons are present for heavyweight implications. 
Hawthorne has three imaginative cases putatively exemplifying this 
property. I want to focus (initially) on Case 1: what I will call the case of 
the ‘heavyweight conjunct’. Here is case 1 (Hawthorne, 2005: 35–36):
[W]hile I might lack conclusive reasons for the proposition ~I am a brain 
in a vat, I will (supposing I have a headache) have conclusive reasons 
for I have a headache and ~I am a brain in a vat. My reason for that 
conjunction include my headache. Were the conjunction false I would 
not, then, have had my reasons.
So let’s consider this step by step. First a contrast proposition is set out: a 
heavyweight proposition — ~I am a brain in a vat — is asserted to lack 
the backing of conclusive reasons. The proposition in question — ~I am 
a brain in a vat — is a proposition for which we do not have conclusive 
reasons: the relevant alternative is that I am a brain in a vat, and it 
difficult to produce evidence that excludes that alternative.
Next a closely related proposition — I have a headache and ~I am 
a brain in a vat — is considered for which one does have conclusive 
reasons, in part, here, one’s headache. Why is the headache a conclusive 
reason for this proposition? Well, to use possible worlds discourse, the 
14  Dretske’s (2005b: 43–44) irenic reply to Hawthorne is, essentially, ‘confession and 
avoidance’.
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closest worlds where the conjunction is false are worlds in which one 
does not have a headache.15 Crucially, such worlds are not as outré as 
BIV-worlds: they are standard non-BIV-worlds.16 So my reasons for the 
conjunction are conclusive, but Hawthorne (2005: 36) contends that:
[T]he [conjunction] is every bit as apt to raise inner alarm bells as the 
proposition that ~I am a [BIV] and will thus come out as […] heavyweight.
2.3 What are we to make of case 1? An appealing response to 
Hawthorne is to deny one has conclusive reasons for the conjunction. 
This response will involve patching up Dretske’s definition (see 1.4) 
of a conclusive reason. (In this sense, Hawthorne is not criticisable for 
offering case 1 as a counterexample to Dretske’s challenge.)
2.4 To answer Hawthorne on behalf of Dretske, we need, I’ll contend, 
to supplement Dretske’s definition of a conclusive reason with a further 
(necessary) thesis for being a conclusive reason:
(SUPP) If P is a conjunctive proposition, R would not be true 
unless each of the conjuncts of P, taken separately, were true.
That is, R must be a conclusive reason for each of the conjuncts, taken 
separately, of a conjunctive proposition. What is the force of the italicised 
‘taken separately’? In essence, the point is that (SUPP) comes into play 
when we are faced with a conjunctive proposition, and requires the 
relevant modal relation to hold between R and each of P’s conjuncts (and 
not just instead, as in the original formulation of conclusive reasons, 
between R and P itself).17 More specifically, suppose that proposition, P, 
is a conjunction: (P1 & P2). Alternatives to P are possibilities in which P is 
false. Conclusive reasons do not need to exclude all possible alternatives 
15  So there is a crucial difference between this case and the (BIV) case. (BIV3) is ‘I am 
not a handless BIV’, which is equivalent to a disjunction: ‘Either I have hands or ~I 
am a brain in a vat’. Hawthorne’s example is a conjunction: ‘I have a headache and 
~I am a brain in a vat’.
16  As we are not debating with the sceptic, we can join Dretske and Hawthorne in 
making the assumption that we are not presently in a BIV-world.
17  This is why (SUPP) is a genuine supplementation of the original conclusive reasons 
account. On the original account, and where P is a conjunctive proposition, the 
relevant modal relation must hold between R and P, and when P is true, each of P’s 
conjuncts is true; however it doesn’t follow that the relevant modal relation must 
hold between R and each of P’s conjuncts (and this is because it isn’t the case that 
whenever P is false, each of P’s conjuncts is false).
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to P. However, by (SUPP), when P is conjunctive, conclusive reasons 
need to do more than exclude the most nearby alternatives to P. The 
nearby alternatives might be possibilities in which P1 is false. But, by 
(SUPP), conclusive reasons need to exclude nearby possibilities in 
which P1 is false and also the nearest possibilities in which P2 is false. That 
is, by (SUPP), both ~P1 and also ~P2 are relevant alternatives to P. What 
needs to be shown is (1) that in the nearest ~P1 worlds, R is false and also 
(2) that in the nearest ~P2 worlds, R is false.
With all this said: first I need to explain how this supplementation 
will solve case 1 for Dretske; then I need to defend the supplementation 
from a charge of being ad-hoc.
2.5 The first, explanatory part is straightforward. While having a 
headache is a conclusive reason for having a headache (first conjunct), 
I might well still have a headache were I a BIV (second conjunct), and 
this counterfactual precludes one’s having a headache from being a 
conclusive reason for one’s not being a BIV.18
2.6 More trickily, how do I justify appeal to (SUPP)? (I take it 
Hawthorne is committed – even if only: arguendo — to the denial of this 
supplementation as a necessary condition for a conclusive reason. So 
much is clear from Hawthorne’s treatment of case 1: with (SUPP) in place 
the headache is no longer, as Hawthorne requires, a conclusive reason 
for the conjunction.) I want to generate a reductio for this undeveloped 
Dretskean view of conclusive reasons, leading to justification of a 
Dretskean appeal to (SUPP).19 Consider the following case: suppose I 
have a headache. It seems, absent supplementation by (SUPP), that that 
experience can be a conclusive reason for the following proposition, (P): 
I have a headache and I have all my limbs. Without supplementation 
by (SUPP) this experience will count as a conclusive reason for this 
conjunction. After all, worlds in which I fail to have a headache are 
palpably closer than worlds in which I lose a limb. (Multiple like 
18  As the headache is internal to the BIV, I take it Putnam’s (1981: ch.1) objections to the 
capacity of a BIV to refer to external things are not germane.
19  In the next chapter I develop a like case against Nozick’s sensitivity condition. There 
I consider in detail a possible response to the case extractable from Peacocke (1986). 
Though Peacocke’s response is relevant here, I reserve treatment of the response 
until Chapter Seven.
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examples can be constructed. The form of such examples is developed 
in more detail in the next chapter. It is the case’s generalisability which 
makes it so pressing.)
Intuitively, however, the idea that this experience counts as a 
conclusive reason for this conjunction is nonsense (insofar as conclusive 
reasons in some sense justify belief in propositions for subjects).20 (SUPP) 
tells us why. (SUPP) rules out this result, as I might very well still have 
a headache were (P)’s second conjunct false. (Note that the second 
conjunct of (P) does not count as heavyweight by our definition of 1.6. This 
distinguishes my reductio from case-1-type examples: it is much more 
dialectically effective, in motivating a modification to Dretske’s account, 
to appeal to quotidian propositions, on account of their generalisability. 
The fact that the second conjunct of (P) is not heavyweight is developed 
in 3.1—3.3.)
My supplementary account of a conclusive reason hence provides a 
non-ad-hoc solution to case 1. I have not, as Hawthorne (2005: 34) scoffs: 
“scurr[ied] back to the epistemological laboratory to contrive an account 
which delivers the welcome result while avoiding the embarrassing 
one”. Rather my supplementation is necessary to avoid the absurdity 
into which an undeveloped Dretskean account leads us.
2.7 Hawthorne has two more imaginative cases involving 
propositions supposedly exemplifying the property of being 
heavyweight propositions for which we have conclusive reasons. I 
believe a (supplemented) Dretskean notion of conclusive reasons has 
the resources to accommodate them. Let’s quickly deal with them here.
Case 2: Suppose at the zoo I have experiences as of a bird flying around 
in a cage; and suppose that experience is my reason for thinking I am 
not looking at a cleverly disguised inanimate object in the cage. Suppose 
finally that it is much easier to make an inanimate object look like an 
animate object by making it turtle-like than by making it bird-like. Now 
Hawthorne posits that, while the proposition that I am not looking at 
an inanimate object cleverly disguised to look like an animate object 
20  This parenthetical claim is not explicit in Dretske’s account of conclusive reasons. 
However, insofar as Dretske affirms “knowledge is belief based on […] conclusive 
reasons” (2005a: 19), we might take the parenthetical claim to be in keeping with a 
Dretskean account of knowledge.
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is manifestly heavyweight, I have conclusive reasons for it: the ‘closest 
worlds’ where there is an inanimate object in the cage are worlds in 
which I fail to have a bird-like experience. In sum, there are two points 
that Hawthorne needs to make (here, and in the coming case 3). One is 
that, intuitively, reason plus perception cannot tell me that P is true; that 
is, that I am not looking at an inanimate object cleverly disguised to look 
like an animate object. Thus, by Hawthorne’s account of heavyweight 
propositions, the proposition (P) that I am not looking at an inanimate 
object cleverly disguised to look like an animate object, is heavyweight. 
The other point Hawthorne needs to make is that, when I have an 
experience as of a bird, this (R) counts as a conclusive reason for the 
proposition P. As noted, this second claim seems correct on Dretske’s 
account of conclusive reasons. In the nearest worlds in which P is false, I 
am looking at an inanimate object cleverly disguised to look like a turtle. 
So I do not have an experience as of a bird.21
Answer: Taken at face value, Hawthorne’s case 2 fails to set out a 
genuinely manifestly heavyweight proposition (and so is not ripe to 
be a counterexample to Dretske). Why not? If, as a matter of fact, the 
possibility of bird-like inanimate objects is as remote as Hawthorne 
stipulates, then I can (and do) know the proposition in question on the 
basis of my perceptual experience. (Whether I know that I know the 
proposition in question will depend on my knowledge of the germane 
objective facts about the circumstance of evaluation.) The possibility of 
bird-like inanimate objects in the cage is, by stipulation, too remote to 
be relevant, and it is of no matter that my evidence cannot discount 
such a counter-possibility. It is only if we — counter to how the case is 
set up — countenance bird-like inanimate objects in the cage as relevant 
alternatives that we fail to know the proposition in question. But on this 
supposition the proposition in question is manifestly heavyweight, and 
21  Before coming to my answer, there is a possible extrapolation from case 1. Arguably, 
P can be taken as equivalent to (P1 & P2), where P1: I am not looking at an inanimate 
object cleverly disguised to look like an animate turtle, and P2: I am not looking 
at an inanimate object cleverly disguised to look like an animate bird. Now, by 
parity with my treatment of case 1, we allow that, if P1 were false then I should not 
have evidence R. But we also point out that if P2 were false then I should still have 
evidence R. Thus, as before, R does not exclude relevant alternatives to P2, although 
it does exclude relevant alternatives to P1. My reason for not pursuing this answer 
lies in my doubts over whether P is indeed equivalent to (P1 & P2).
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now Dretske’s conclusive reasons machinery gives the welcome result 
that we fail to know the proposition in question on the basis of our 
perceptual evidence. The basic point is that this supposition, contrary 
to Hawthorne’s dialectical aims, brings Hawthorne’s case 2 in line with 
standard Drestkean cases.
Case 3: I see a cookie. Suppose I have an experience as of a cookie 
five feet in front of me and, on this basis, form the belief that there 
is a mind-independent object roughly five feet in front of me. Again, 
Hawthorne opines, we have a (“highfalutin”) manifestly heavyweight 
proposition. On this first point, it must be conceded that there is some 
strong inclination to think that reason plus perception does not suffice 
for knowledge that there is a mind-independent object roughly five feet 
in front of me. Reason plus perception does not exclude the possibility 
that the causes of my perceptual experience are mind-dependent. And, 
moreover — the second point — Hawthorne shows it is a proposition 
for which we have conclusive reasons: the ‘closest worlds’ in which 
there isn’t a mind-independent object roughly five feet in front of me 
are worlds with laws like the actual world in which there is no physical 
object at all in front of me (and not worlds where “some bizarre 
metaphysics holds”). Therefore, on this analysis, in such close possible 
worlds I will fail to have an experience as of a cookie five feet in front 
of me. Put differently, in the nearest possible worlds in which there is 
not a mind-independent object roughly five feet in front of me, I do not 
have the same kind of perceptual experience as of a cookie roughly five 
feet in front of me.
Answer: My strategy, in a nutshell, is to side with Hawthorne on the 
second ‘conclusive reasons’ point, but to depart on the first ‘heavyweight 
proposition’ point. More specifically: as with case 2 I just do not see that 
we have a genuinely manifestly heavyweight proposition here.22 And 
22  To anticipate my reasoning, and speaking metaphorically: the ‘highfalutin’ stain 
Hawthorne detects in the proposition in question, brought about by reference to a 
“mind-independent object”, is removed by the down-to-earth reference to “roughly 
five feet in front of me”. Everything turns on my rejecting Hawthorne’s claim that 
the proposition P meets the definition of a heavyweight proposition. It is important 
here that, in order not to beg the question against Hawthorne and in favour of 
Dretske, we must not take the fact that we have a conclusive reason for P to show 
that P is not heavyweight (that is, is not heavyweight by Hawthorne’s criterion).
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on the intuitively plausible view of what counts as the closest possible 
world in this context of inquiry, we do indeed — as the Dretskean 
machinery predicts — have a conclusive reason for the proposition 
in question. The closest world in which there fails to be a mind-
independent object roughly five feet in front of me is surely the world in 
which there is a mind-independent object failing to count as roughly five 
feet in front of me (and not either the world Hawthorne posits or worlds 
in which some bizarre metaphysics holds). Let’s suppose the cookie has 
been moved from its position; it is still in front of me, but not roughly 
five feet in front of me. Now I will not have an experience as of a cookie 
five feet in front of me when there is a mind-independent object failing 
to count as roughly five feet in front of me. And so I have a conclusive 
reason for this non-heavyweight proposition.23 The genuinely manifestly 
heavyweight proposition in this neighbourhood — indeed an entailment 
of Hawthorne’s proposition — is: there is a mind-independent object. 
Now the relevant alternative is a world in which there is no mind-
independent object. (We are in the ‘bizarre metaphysics’ world, or 
some equally distant world.) And now I straightforwardly fail to have a 
conclusive reason for the heavyweight proposition in question.24
Assuming I am right on all this, the dialectical situation is as follows: 
Dretske’s conclusive reasons machinery, supplemented by (SUPP),25 
can explain failures of closure satisfactorily by establishing the lack of 
conclusive reasons for heavyweight propositions.
3. Hawthorne’s Second Strand
3.1 In section 2.1, I mentioned the second strand to Hawthorne’s 
counter-challenge to Dretske. Hawthorne maintains we “all too often 
lack conclusive reasons for a priori consequences of known propositions, 
23  There are delicate issues here about the fine-grainedness of perceptual experiences 
and judgments (see Schaffer 2003). But to reject my analysis here is to allow that one 
fails to have conclusive reasons for quotidian perceptual judgments, such as: there 
is a cookie roughly five feet in front of me.
24  It has been put to me that, in light of cases 2 and 3, Hawthorne perhaps ought to be 
operating with an account of heavyweight propositions (cf. 1.6 supra) relativised to 
perceptual reasons or to empirical investigations. In advance of any such account being 
developed further, however, I prescind from further comment thereon.
25  (SUPP) enters the picture only for Hawthorne’s case 1 (but cf. n. 21 supra).
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even though those consequences are not [heavyweight implications]” 
(2005: 35). He proceeds to construct two fun cases putatively establishing 
this point (36—7).26 Even if Hawthorne is granted this, insofar as he 
presents these cases as counterexamples to (better: problematic or 
challenging cases for) Dretske he commits an ignoratio elenchi.27 Of the 
following three theses, Dretske is — as pointed out at 1.6 — (and should 
be) committed to neither (I) nor (II), but only to (III):
(I)  One lacks conclusive reasons for a proposition, p, iff the 
proposition is heavyweight.
(II)  One lacks conclusive reasons for a proposition, p, only if the 
proposition is heavyweight.
(III)  One lacks conclusive reasons for a proposition, p, if the 
proposition is heavyweight.28
3.2 Now Hawthorne has already — in the first strand — offered 
putative counterexamples to (III), and I have attempted to parry 
those counterexamples. In the second strand he goes on to argue that 
heavyweight propositions are neither necessary nor sufficient for 
failure of closure on Dretske’s account. Unfortunately for Hawthorne, 
however, these second strand cases count only against theses (I) 
and (II) — theses to which Dretske is not committed. In fact, these 
second strand cases provide the basis for further counterexamples to 
(Closure): grist to Dretske’s mill, one might think. Indeed, my reductio 
26  For why Kripke’s (2011) ‘red barn’ case is not a candidate to be a ‘second-strand’ 
case, see Dretske (2005a: n. 4).
27  As I grant Hawthorne his point here — viz. Dretske allows for non-heavyweight 
implications not backed by conclusive reasons — I do not set out his intricate cases.
28  In fact, (Closure) would be denied with the weaker still:
(IV)  Some heavyweight propositions lack conclusive reasons.
Without more by way of explanation, however, any such denial might seem 
unprincipled. Equally unmotivated would be the following (Closure)-denying 
principle which Hawthorne (2005: 37) considers:
If one knows P and deduces Q from P then one knows Q, unless Q is a 
manifestly heavyweight proposition.
Without being told what feature of manifestly heavyweight propositions allows 
them to fulfil this role, any such principle must seem ad hoc.
158 Basic Knowledge and Conditions on Knowledge
of the undeveloped Dretskean account in 2.6 is a further example of the 
phenomenon exemplified by these second strand cases (provided, of 
course, Dretske’s definition of conclusive reasons is supplemented with 
(SUPP)).
3.3 It would be better still for the Dretskean ‘anti-(Closure)’ project if 
Dretske could give an account of when non-heavyweight implications 
will lack conclusive reasons, but the project is hardly vitiated by the 
absence of any such account.29
4. Conclusion
4.1 My project is complete: (Closure) has certainly not been invalidated, 
but a sophisticated (suitably supplemented) Dretskean challenge thereto 
remains unmet. Deduction — pace Hawthorne (and Williamson) — may 
not always be a way of extending one’s knowledge.
29  It must be conceded that Hawthorne seems to read Dretske as offering a kind of 
explanation of when, and only when, these failures of (Closure) arise, viz. they 
arise when, and only when, the implied proposition is heavyweight. An implied 
proposition’s being heavyweight is not, however, what failure of closure consists in. 
Rather, on Dretske’s account, what failure of closure consists in is that the implied 
proposition does not meet the conclusive reasons criterion for being known. It is 
hard to see the idea of a heavyweight proposition being at the heart of an explanation 
of failures of closure if there are plenty of examples of failures of closure that do 
not involve heavyweight propositions. Again, though, it must be conceded that 
Hawthorne will take himself to have argued already that there is something wrong 
with Dretske’s account because examples that seem to be relevantly similar (e.g. 
both seem to involve heavyweight propositions) can receive different verdicts from 
the conclusive reasons test.
7. Sensitivity
Continuing to engage with the issue of knowledge-closure, I turn to Nozick’s 
(1981) sensitivity condition on knowledge. I propose some modifications of 
the sensitivity condition, argue that a sensitivity account should reject the 
Equivalence Principle (‘If you know a priori that p and q are equivalent and 
you know p, then you are in a position to know q’), and assess the costs of this 
rejection.
0.1 John Hawthorne (2004: 39–41) has two forceful arguments in 
favour of:
Single-Premise Closure (SPC). Necessarily, if S knows p, competently 
deduces q from p, and thereby comes to believe q, while retaining 
knowledge of p throughout, then S knows q.
Each of Hawthorne’s arguments rests on an intuitively appealing 
principle which Hawthorne calls the Equivalence Principle. I show, 
however, that the opponents of SPC with whom he’s engaging — namely 
Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick — have independent reason to reject 
this principle, and resultantly I conclude that Hawthorne’s arguments 
in favour of SPC are not knock-down.
0.2 The plan: First, I introduce Hawthorne’s Equivalence Principle, and 
a Sensitivity condition (see 1.2 infra) — a condition which features in, 
and is, arguendo, presupposed by, Hawthorne’s pro-closure arguments. 
(Presupposed, in the sense that Hawthorne assumes Sensitivity, pro 
tem, and seeks to chart serious costs — in addition to abandoning 
SPC — involved with such an acceptance.) Second, I set out one of 
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Hawthorne’s pro-closure arguments in which the Equivalence Principle 
features. Third, I set out and motivate, by means of reductio, a modification 
to the Sensitivity condition. Fourth, I use this motivated modification to 
the Sensitivity condition to reject the Equivalence Principle, and thus to 
cast doubt on the decisiveness of both of Hawthorne’s arguments for 
SPC. In so doing, a further principled modification to the Sensitivity 
condition emerges. None of the foregoing is to clinch the truth of a 
view in the ballpark of Sensitivity, but is rather to show a principled 
way to resist Hawthorne’s arguments, by means of well-motivated 
modifications to Sensitivity (cf. 3.3 infra).
1. Hawthorne’s Equivalence Principle and 
Sensitivity
1.1 Hawthorne notes the following intuitively appealing principle:
Equivalence. If you know a priori that p and q are equivalent and you 
know p, then you are in a position to know q.
(Here, p and q are equivalent iff they have the same truth-value.)
1.2 Hawthorne, while explicitly addressing both Nozick and Dretske, 
glosses his arguments using just Nozick’s Sensitivity condition on 
knowledge:
Sensitivity. S knows p only if S Sensitively believes p, where S Sensitively 
believes p just in case, were p false, S would not believe p.1
1  I suppress mention of methods (see Nozick 1981: 179–85, 188–96); I’m confident 
nothing major is lost, in this chapter, by so doing. While mention of methods 
is suppressed, and so not foregrounded, see n. 21 infra, where I briefly address 
an effort of some philosophers to appeal to methods — in particular, principles 
governing the individuation of methods — to solve some problem cases for the 
Sensitivity theorist. In a nutshell, though I suggest where my sympathies lie in 
debates over the individuation of methods, I am not presently in a position to offer 
an argument defending my sympathies, and the nub of my current position is 
that I do not need to commit on this issue for present purposes. Although Nozick 
confronts issues over methods much more directly than I, I essentially, on these 
issues, follow Nozick (1981: 184): “I do not want to underestimate […] difficulties 
[about how to individuate methods] but neither do I want to pursue them here.” 
(Moreover, Nozick (185) observes that “[a]lthough sometimes it will be necessary 
to be explicit about the methods via which someone believes something, often it 
will cause no confusion to leave out all mention of method.”) For why this is a 
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Dretske (1971) does not endorse Sensitivity. Instead he requires that, in 
order to know p, one must have a conclusive reason to believe p. While 
the two requirements are similar, Dretske (2005: 24, n. 4) himself is at 
pains to point out situations in which the requirements come apart. 
Hawthorne’s (2004) criticisms of Sensitivity, however, carry over to 
Dretske’s conclusive reasons account (see Hawthorne 2004, 2005), and 
their differences play no role in my arguments. I’ll follow Hawthorne 
(2004) by concentrating on Nozick’s Sensitivity account (though what 
I come to say about Nozick goes, mutatis mutandis, for Dretske also).2
2. Hawthorne’s ‘Equivalence and Distribution’ 
Pro-Closure Argument
2.1 Hawthorne (2004: 41) notes:
The following principle […] seems extremely intuitive:
Distribution. If one knows that p and q, then one is in a position to 
know p and to know q.3
Suppose I know
(9)  That is a zebra.
By Equivalence, I can know
permissible strategy on my part, again see n. 21 infra. Finally, for a recent overview 
of, and substantive position on, methods, see Becker (2012). Becker’s aim is to 
“sketch a particular conception of methods that [he] think[s] Nozick would have 
accepted, explaining how finely methods are to be individuated and how methods 
can be conceived internalistically within a broadly externalist epistemology” (82). 
(Cf. Nozick’s (184–85) “clarifying remarks” on — though not precise formulations 
of — individuation conditions for methods.)
2  It should be noted that SPC was not Nozick’s (or Dretske’s) conception of closure. 
This can be safely bracketed in what follows.
3  I use Hawthorne’s (2004: 41, n. 100) weaker formulation of Distribution which, he 
notes, “serve[s] [his] current purposes just as well [as the formulation in the main 
text]”. Is even this weaker principle true? Suppose one knows that one has hands 
and that one never performs conjunction elimination; one is not, then, in a position 
to know that one never performs conjunction elimination, by performing conjunction 
elimination. However, one may know the conjunction by conjunction introduction, 
or else one’s knowing the conjunction might constitute one’s knowing its conjuncts 
(cf. Williamson 2000: 283). In either case, knowledge of this conjunction does not 
undermine Distribution.
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(12)  That is a zebra and that is not a cleverly disguised mule.
By Distribution, I can know
(11)  That is not a cleverly disguised mule.
But Dretske and Nozick deny this.
In relinquishing SPC, we are thus forced to relinquish certain other 
principles—[…] Distribution (or instead, Equivalence)—that are very 
compelling. A denial of SPC thus ramifies into costs that are extremely 
high.
Nozick denies we can know (11) — one’s belief in (11) isn’t Sensitive. 
Therefore Nozick must either deny that we can know (9) (which 
would involve abandoning his account of knowledge) or else deny the 
(intuitive) conjunction of Distribution and Equivalence.
2.2 The argument generalises. Take any ordinary proposition p and 
some proposition, q, known to be entailed by p, such that one’s belief in 
q isn’t Sensitive. We thus know a priori that p is equivalent to (p & q). By 
Equivalence, if one knows p then one is in a position to know (p & q). 
Then, by Distribution, one is in a position to know q. However, as one’s 
belief in q is not held Sensitively, Nozick denies that q is known; and so 
Nozick is forced to deny either Distribution or Equivalence.
2.3 Note, however, that Distribution is effectively a restricted form 
of SPC: SPC claims knowledge is closed under competent deduction, 
whereas Distribution suggests knowledge is closed under conjunction 
elimination — a form of competent deduction. So, given that Nozick 
rejects SPC, it would be no major surprise were he to reject Distribution.4 
Indeed, as it stands, Sensitivity doesn’t respect Distribution, and so 
Nozick rejects Distribution.
However, it is not satisfactory to respond to Hawthorne’s argument 
simply by rejecting Distribution. First, Distribution is extremely 
plausible: it’s hard to see how knowing a conjunction doesn’t put 
one in a position to know each conjunct. Nozick (1981: 228, 692, n. 63) 
himself admits the plausibility of Distribution, although he does reject 
4  I recognise that for any valid principle of inference, V, there is a less restricted 
principle that is invalid, I. Being ‘no major surprise’ is, thus, a weak claim. Mutatis 
mutandis for ensuing uses of the phrase.
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it. (Going further, Dretske (1970: 1009) says “it seems to me fairly 
obvious that if someone knows that P and Q, […] he thereby knows 
that Q”.) Therefore if Nozick’s account of knowledge were Hawthorne’s 
chief target, an argument depending solely on Distribution — and not, 
additionally, Equivalence — might suffice to undermine it. Second, 
rejecting Distribution does nothing to undermine Hawthorne’s claim 
that a subject who knows (9), also knows (12). But (12) is in all relevant 
respects similar to the kind of proposition that motivates the rejection of 
SPC (i.e. (11)), as there is some intuitive pull to the idea that we cannot 
come to know (12) via our senses and deduction. Rejecting Distribution 
is therefore both implausible and fails to address a problem that 
Hawthorne poses for the intuitive motivation for rejecting SPC.5
2.4 It might seem, then, that Nozick ought to reject Equivalence 
(though Equivalence, like Distribution, is extremely plausible, and 
so any rejection thereof will have associated costs). Like Distribution, 
Equivalence is effectively a restricted form of SPC. SPC, recall, claims 
knowledge is closed under competent deduction, whereas Equivalence 
suggests knowledge is closed under a priori known biconditional 
elimination — a form of competent deduction. So, again, given that 
Nozick rejects SPC, it would be no major surprise were he to reject 
Equivalence. But Hawthorne notes that Nozick’s reasons for rejecting 
SPC don’t carry over to rejecting Equivalence (although they do carry 
over to Distribution); and Nozick (1981: 229, 690, n. 60) agrees. For 
example, Nozick’s rejection of SPC is based on the fact that a subject 
may Sensitively believe p without Sensitively believing some q, which 
that subject knows to be entailed by p. And since, for Nozick, Sensitivity 
is a necessary condition for knowledge, it can easily be shown that 
SPC fails for Nozick.6 However, Hawthorne notes, this situation cannot 
5  Nozick (1981: 228–30, 692, n. 64) himself in fact accepts that we can know 
conjunctions such as (12). (12) is Sensitive: when it’s false, there’s, say, a horse 
before you (rather than a zebra), and you don’t believe the whole conjunction.
6  This last ‘for Nozick’ qualification is important. There is no strict entailment from 
the fact that a (putative) necessary condition on knowledge, such as Sensitivity, is 
not closed under competent deduction, to the proposition that knowledge itself is 
not closed under competent deduction: it might be that the Sensitively believed p in 
question doesn’t satisfy some other condition which the account in question posits as 
necessary for knowledge. Nonetheless, for Nozick SPC does fail. For more on this, see 
Vogel (1987), Warfield (2004), Brueckner (2004), Murphy (2006), and Holliday (2014).
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readily arise when p and q are a priori equivalent. That is, we cannot get 
(~p → ~BSp)7 & ~(~q → ~BSq) when p and q are a priori equivalent, except, 
perhaps, in some recherché cases.
I’ll show, however, that, Sensitivity is (likely) unacceptable as it 
stands and should be modified for reasons independent of Hawthorne’s 
argument. Moreover, my modification conflicts with Equivalence, 
thereby allowing Nozick to reject Equivalence in a principled way. So 
a plausible Sensitivity condition on knowledge does provide reason 
to reject Equivalence, just as Nozick’s account of knowledge provides 
reason to reject Distribution. Therefore a plausible condition on 
knowledge does rule out Equivalence, even if, as Hawthorne notes, 
Nozick’s original condition does not. Moreover, once Equivalence is 
rejected, Nozick is able, I’ll show, to retain the attractive Distribution.
3. Modifying Sensitivity: A Reductio of Nozick’s 
Account of Knowledge
3.1 Consider the following case for reductio.8 Suppose you have a 
headache. Now consider the following (ex hypothesi true) proposition:
(P) I have a headache and I have all my limbs.
Suppose you form the belief, (P), based solely on your evidence of 
having a headache. (To form the belief, (P), on this basis, is to display 
an epistemic failing: this is not an apposite method for forming beliefs 
of this general nature. But it is not incoherent to make the foregoing 
7  ‘BSp’ designates: A subject, S, believes p.
8  Why a reductio (and not a (mere) counterexample)? The reductio operates as follows: 
assume (for reductio) Nozick’s account of knowledge; such an assumption leads to 
absurdity (given the generalisability of the case); therefore, not-Nozick’s account 
of knowledge. (It is the generalisability of the case which generates the absurdity, 
and thus elevates the case from a (mere) counterexample to a reductio.) As I note 
later (in 3.3), the dialectic of this chapter assumes that something like Sensitivity 
is necessary for knowledge. Given this assumption, and again as I note later (in 
3.3), the obvious, and natural, first response to this reductio is to modify Sensitivity. 
The inspiration for this reductio comes, somewhat ironically, from a distinct 
case presented by Hawthorne (2004: 44); Hawthorne doesn’t notice his case’s 
ramifications. I elsewhere (chapter 6) use an argument similar to the reductio here 
to stake out a principled modification to Dretske’s conclusive reasons condition on 
knowledge.
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supposition. Next time you have a headache, try forming the belief, (P), 
solely on that basis. You will see for yourself that it can be done.) This 
is not to stipulate that having a headache is the only evidence you have; 
just that it is the only evidence on the basis of which you form the belief, 
(P). Thus, this leaves open that you have whatever evidence is necessary 
to have the conceptual or cognitive resources to form the belief, (P), 
provided such evidence is not playing a basing role. (For more on 
the basing relation, which is left undeveloped here, see Korcz 2006.) 
Given your basing evidence, you will hold that belief Sensitively: in the 
closest world in which (P) is false (a world in which you fail to have 
a headache but retain all your limbs) you won’t believe (P). (Assume, 
uncontroversially, Nozick’s adherence condition on knowledge — were 
p true, S would believe p9 — is met in this case.) However, your belief in 
(P) does not constitute knowledge.10
9  See Nozick’s (1981: 680–81, n. 8) account of the semantics of subjunctive conditionals 
for how to interpret the adherence condition. Discussion of Nozick’s adherence 
condition has not been vast (but cf. Roush (2005), (2010), and her discussion of 
multi(ple)-premise closure), and many have thought that it is forgoable (by Nozick) 
as a necessary condition on knowledge (cf. Roush). Given this, and given a chief 
aim of this chapter is to make Sensitivity — and not adherence — as plausible 
as it can be, I ask the reader to assume the following. Either (1) in all cases of 
(intuitive) knowledge, the adherence condition is met (in advance of compelling 
counterexamples coming in, in which case see disjunct (2)). Or (2) the adherence 
condition is not a necessary condition on knowledge. This assumption enables me, 
in what follows (4.5–4.6), to talk of Nozick’s adoption of CON and DIS allowing him 
to endorse Distribution and AC, respectively.
10  Isn’t this case essentially the same as Kripke’s (2011: 186) ‘red barn’ variation on 
the ‘fake barns’ case? No. First, note that one can — indeed, most epistemologists 
do — take the ‘red barn’ proposition in Kripke’s case as involving a (complex) 
conjunctive predicate, rather than a conjunction. Insofar as this is the case, and 
insofar as my account treats these closely related parsings differently (cf. 4.8 infra), 
we have a difference between my reductio and Kripke’s case. Second, and more 
importantly, insofar as one takes Kripke’s case to involve a conjunction, my reductio 
and Kripke’s case do, for Nozick, share the form: S knows that (p & q), but doesn’t 
know that q. However, even on this alternative, permissible parsing, we have an 
important difference between the two cases: in my reductio, the subject has no basing 
evidence for q (cf. n. 11), whereas in Kripke’s case the subject does (albeit, as in my 
case, the belief in q isn’t held Sensitively). It’s a corollary of this that it’s highly 
counterintuitive in my case that the subject knows (p & q), whereas that’s not so 
highly counterintuitive in Kripke’s case. That’s why my case, but not Kripke’s, 
serves as a reductio of Nozick’s account of knowledge with respect to the belief in (p & 
q) considered alone. That’s not the moral of Kripke’s case. Third, and relatedly, in my 
case q comes out false only in worlds more remote than worlds in which p comes 
out false, whereas this isn’t so in Kripke’s case.
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The case is generalisable: stipulate that a subject’s sole basing 
evidence is a headache, and construct a conjunctive proposition, which 
the subject believes on the basis of that evidence, in which the first 
conjunct is the statement that the subject has a headache and the second 
conjunct is a (ex hypothesi true) quotidian proposition for which the 
subject has no basing evidence,11 which comes out false only in worlds 
more remote than worlds in which the subject fails to have a headache.12
3.2 A natural first response to my case, on behalf of Nozick, might be 
to draw on a suggestion from Christopher Peacocke (1986), namely to 
require for knowledge of a proposition that is inferred from lemmas that 
the lemmas should be, not only true (no false lemmas), but also known 
(no unknown lemmas). On the face of it, here is a way of applying this 
proposal to my case: (P) is inferred from two lemmas. Lemma 1: I have a 
headache (believed on the basis of the experience of having a headache). 
Lemma 2: I have all my limbs (believed on no basis). Proposition (P) is 
believed Sensitively. But in order for (P) to count as known according 
to the proposal, Lemma 1 should be known and Lemma 2 should be 
known. Lemma 1 is Sensitively believed, and so counts as known. But 
Lemma 2 is not Sensitively believed, and so does not count as known. 
Thus, the proposal, applied to the case where (P) is inferred from these 
two lemmas, does impose a more demanding condition than Nozick’s 
original account, with the result that (P) does not count as known.
 However, despite the attractive simplicity of this response, the 
proposal does not apply to my case as I presented it: my case does 
11  Put somewhat metaphorically, the subject’s belief outstrips his evidence. Indeed, this 
is a general problem for Sensitivity accounts of knowledge (modulo the adherence 
condition being met): a Sensitively held belief can outstrip one’s evidence — cf. 
Martin’s (1983) case in which a subject believes p Sensitively when his evidence, 
intuitively, only entitles him to believe (p or q). At a general level, any modification 
to Sensitivity must somehow link belief and evidence. My ensuing modifications to 
Sensitivity — modifications which do not accommodate Martin’s case — are means 
of linking belief and evidence for conjunctions and disjunctions, respectively.
12  There is nothing special about headaches. Further reductios can be constructed, 
using other sources of evidence, that exhibit the same structure. Indeed, the 
reader unsatisfied with the outré nature of my reductio can substitute a preferred 
reductio (with an alternative source of evidence, but exhibiting the same structure) 
in its stead. A word of caution, however: my suspicion is that the less outré one’s 
reductio, the more contestable will be the ‘closeness result’ constituting the required 
structure. In essence, my suspicion is that there is a trade-off in play between the 
benefit of being ‘less outré’ and the benefit of securing the ‘closeness result’.
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not involve a conjunction which is inferred from its conjuncts. (Or, the 
proposal does not apply unless it is stipulated that all conjunctions 
are to be treated by the proposal as if they were inferred from their 
conjuncts).13
3.3 So something has gone badly wrong with Nozick’s account of 
knowledge (on which truth, belief, Sensitivity, and adherence are 
severally necessary and jointly sufficient) in relation to conjunctive 
propositions.14 And we might think that the Sensitivity condition is to 
blame. But we needn’t abandon Sensitivity tout court. (Note the dialectic 
between Hawthorne and Nozick: it’s not that Hawthorne is, in his 
arguments under consideration in this chapter, denying that something 
like Sensitivity is necessary for knowledge. Thus to offer — as I come 
to do — principled modifications to the Sensitivity condition is not, to 
repeat, perforce to be a card-carrying Sensitivity theorist; it’s simply 
to make Sensitivity as plausible as it can be.) Here’s the obvious, and 
natural, fix. Supplement Sensitivity with an alternative (strengthened) 
necessary condition:
CON: If p is a conjunctive proposition, S knows p only if S believes 
each of the conjuncts of p Sensitively.15
13  Suppose, though, we adopt this proposal, with this stipulation. It imposes the same 
conditions for knowledge of a conjunction as my coming account (except that, 
as I come to note, my account does not require that the conjunction be believed 
Sensitively). And my account, I’ve noted, conflicts with Equivalence. That’s a cost. 
So it needs to be considered whether this proposal (with this stipulation) generates 
counterexamples to Equivalence (as my account does, for example, in certain cases 
involving a conjunction and an a priori equivalent non-conjunctive proposition). 
On the face of it, this proposal might not seem to do so. Nevertheless, however that 
question turns out, I take the cost associated with this proposal’s stipulation to be 
severe.
14  Take, as a default rule, the logical form of propositions to be determined by the 
logical form of the sentences semantically expressing them in this or that case (cf. 
n. 10 supra and 4.8 infra).
15  Note that Becker (2012: 95) raises, but does not develop or pursue, something in 
the region of CON. Finally, note that if Sensitivity is a necessary condition for 
knowledge, then the effect of this condition CON could also be achieved by a 
condition stating that:
DIST: If S knows a conjunction, then S knows each conjunct.
For if Sensitivity is necessary for knowledge, then DIST requires that each conjunct 
is believed Sensitively.
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This supplementation straightforwardly enables us to avoid the reductio: 
in a world in which you’re an amputee sitting alone basing your beliefs 
on your headache, you would still believe that you had all your limbs. 
Given you don’t believe the second conjunct of (P) Sensitively, you 
cannot, on the modified account, know (P).
A word about applying CON (which also goes, mutatis mutandis, 
for DIS, my coming proposal with respect to disjunctions): we suppose 
Sensitivity is a necessary condition on knowledge. We then test 
propositions for Sensitivity as we check for knowledge. If a conjunctive 
proposition comes to be checked thus, we filter it off from unmodified 
Sensitivity to CON. Iff that conjunctive proposition meets CON’s 
necessary condition on knowledge, (modified) Sensitivity is met.
This observation enables me to be a little more precise about what 
I mean when I talk of ‘modifying Sensitivity’ (where Sensitivity states 
a putative necessary condition on knowledge). I do not mean that I am 
modifying what it is to believe a proposition Sensitively. That is just what 
it has always been: it is a matter of meeting the condition that if the 
proposition were not true, one would not believe it. What I am instead 
doing is modifying the connection between Sensitivity and knowledge. For a 
conjunction, it is not required for knowledge of the conjunction that the 
conjunction should be believed Sensitively. Rather, it is required that 
each conjunct should be believed Sensitively. (Again, the same goes, 
mutatis mutandis, for DIS.)
3.4 Can I do better than simply contending that CON is the ‘obvious, 
and natural, fix’? Clearly, it would be better if I can. Here is one possible 
bolstering of CON: CON is true because belief in a conjunction just 
is belief in the conjuncts, and so knowledge of a conjunction just is 
knowledge of the conjuncts. Therefore, whatever account is plausible 
for knowledge of ‘atomic’ propositions, we can use that account to give 
an account of conjunctive propositions. Since a Sensitivity account is 
plausible for ‘atomics’, CON should be endorsed.
However, even assuming, pro tem, its validity, pretty quickly, two 
problems arise with the soundness of any such line of argument — a 
line of argument reliant, in its opening premise, on the following 
biconditional:
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BEL CON*: S believes a conjunctive proposition, p iff S believes 
each of p’s conjuncts.
First, and more sketchily, it might be objected that belief in a conjunction 
somehow involves (in addition to believing its conjuncts) the concept 
of CONJUNCTION, whereas belief in the conjuncts does not. Second, 
and less sketchily, ‘lottery’ issues become salient. Take some p1, …, pn, 
where one’s rational credence for each pi is very very high and the pis 
are independent. If we make n large enough, the conjunction can have a 
very low probability — presumably one incompatible with belief.
These two objections share the goal of breaking down BEL CON* 
in the right-left direction. That is, each is designed to falsify the thesis 
that belief in each conjunct is sufficient for belief in the conjunction in 
question. Insofar as they work — and I think they do — they belie any 
efforts to bolster CON by reliance on BEL CON*.
However, even prior to consideration of these objections, one might 
well have had instinctive doubts about a proposal seeking to bolster 
CON — a principle only stating necessary conditions on knowing a 
conjunction — by so ambitiously trying to reach the interim conclusion 
that knowledge of a conjunction just is knowledge of the conjuncts (cf. 
n. 24 infra). Indeed, one might wonder whether one needs an interim 
conclusion as strong as this to provide some bolstering of CON. Thus, 
one might — new proposal — less ambitiously seek to bolster CON by 
exploring weakening BEL CON* so as to be read in just the left-right 
direction:
BEL CON: S believes a conjunctive proposition, p only if S believes 
each of p’s conjuncts.
I don’t seek here to conclusively defend BEL CON (other than to note 
it is not counterexampled by the above objections to BEL CON*). It has 
some initial plausibility, however. Insofar as it is true, it could offer some 
extra support for CON beyond a bare appeal to its intuitiveness as a fix. 
Appeal could be made, that is, to BEL CON — a grounding principle 
concerning belief.
What, though, can be validly inferred from BEL CON? Specifically, 
can one infer that S knows a conjunctive proposition, p only if S knows 
each of p’s conjuncts? It would seem not. (Likewise, even though I initially 
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granted the validity of the original, more ambitious, proposal, I do not 
think one can infer that knowledge of a conjunction just is knowledge of 
the conjuncts, from the proposition that belief in a conjunction just is belief 
in the conjuncts.) All that can be validly inferred from BEL CON would 
appear to be that S knows a conjunctive proposition, p only if S believes 
each of p’s conjuncts. (Likewise, all that can be validly inferred from BEL 
CON* would appear to be the immediately foregoing conditional and S 
knows each of p’s conjuncts only if S believes the conjunctive proposition, 
p.) Thus, this new, less ambitious, proposal, with BEL CON as a first 
premise, does not promise to vindicate CON in the dramatic manner 
promised by the original, more ambitious, proposal.
Now, all of the foregoing is, concededly, fairly inchoate. Nonetheless, 
it seems we can conclude the following: insofar as BEL CON (and, 
indeed, BEL CON*) offers some (additional) reason to accept CON 
(beyond a bare appeal to its intuitiveness as a fix), further exploration of 
it, its truth, what it supports, and what can be validly inferred therefrom, 
by the Sensitivity theorist will be worthwhile (cf. Williamson 2000: 283).
4. Rejecting Equivalence
4.1 Recall Equivalence:
Equivalence. If you know a priori that p and q are equivalent and you 
know p, then you are in a position to know q.
As I’ve just argued, CON is an independently motivated modification 
of Sensitivity. But if Sensitivity is modified with CON, we can see why 
Equivalence fails for Nozick. When you know a priori that p and q are 
equivalent and you know p, and where q is a conjunctive proposition the 
second conjunct of which you do not believe Sensitively (on the basis of your 
evidence for p), then you are not (confining yourself to your evidence for p) in 
a position to know q.16
16  Of course, this response assumes that there can be distinct a priori equivalent 
propositions. Moreover, CON requires, pace Lewis and Stalnaker, that propositions 
are more finely individuated than necessary equivalence. Rejection of the Lewis-
Stalnaker picture is independently motivated by consideration of necessary truths, 
such as those of mathematics and a posteriori symmetric supervenience. The non-
identification of a priori equivalent propositions is also motivated by consideration 
of mathematical truths and cases of the contingent a priori. In any case, what 
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Moreover, supplementing Sensitivity with CON enables Nozick to 
maintain the attractive Distribution, since one can know a conjunction 
only if one Sensitively believes each conjunct. Nozick can thus accept 
Distribution but deny knowledge of (12) (since one doesn’t Sensitively 
believe its second conjunct) which blocks the route to knowledge of (11).
4.2 Therefore, returning to Hawthorne’s ‘Equivalence and Distribution’ 
pro-closure argument, the step from (9) to (12) is no longer legitimated. 
You can know (presumably on the basis of an experience as of a zebra): 
(9) that is a zebra. However, with Equivalence falsified, it doesn’t follow 
that you can know: (12) that is a zebra and that is not a cleverly disguised 
mule. On the basis of your experience as of a zebra you won’t believe the 
second conjunct of (12) Sensitively. With the route to (12) blocked there 
is now no route to Hawthorne’s conclusion that you can know — pace 
Nozick — that is not a cleverly disguised mule.
With CON, we can follow Nozick in relinquishing SPC, not by 
relinquishing Distribution, but instead by relinquishing Equivalence, 
which fails when CON is added, as an alternative necessary condition, 
to a Sensitivity account as it needs to be. Given that this failure of 
Equivalence is independently motivated, the costs of denying SPC by 
rejecting Equivalence aren’t as high as Hawthorne suggests (more on 
this later, in 5.1).17
Hawthorne’s discussion brings out is that this fine-grained individuation is a 
commitment of those who wish to accept that we can know (9) without knowing 
(12).
17  The failure of Equivalence will be a general phenomenon; that is, it will occur 
outside the limited circumstance detailed in 4.1, if my Sensitivity account is 
adopted. More on this later (see 4.7–4.8 infra). For now, consider the following case 
(similar to Kripke’s ‘red barn’ variation on the ‘fake barns’ case): suppose a red ball 
is before one, and if it failed to be red it would appear blue. One thus believes that is 
a red ball Sensitively. Suppose, though, that if the ball failed to be coloured it would 
appear grey (rather than colourless). One thus fails to believe that it is a coloured 
ball Sensitively. One thus knows a priori that, that the ball is red, and that the ball is 
red and coloured, are equivalent, and one knows that the ball is red. However,, by 
CON, one fails to (be in a position to) know that the ball is red and coloured: one 
fails to believe the second conjunct of the conjunction Sensitively. Note, however, 
that, independently of CON, one fails to know that the ball is coloured. That one 
fails to know the conjunction that the ball is red and coloured, then, is not obviously 
an extra cost of my Sensitivity account.
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4.3 Next, note Hawthorne has a second, ‘Equivalence and Addition’, 
pro-closure argument (2004: 39–41) resting on Equivalence and a second 
principle:
Addition Closure (AC). Necessarily, if S knows p and competently 
deduces (p or q) from p, thereby coming to believe (p or q), while retaining 
knowledge of p throughout, then S knows (p or q).
[…] Nozick grant[s] that I know:
(6)  I have a hand.
With AC I can then deduce:
(7)  Either I have a hand or I am not a brain in a vat.
This is a priori equivalent to:
(8)  It is not the case that: I lack hands and am a brain in a vat.
So from (6), by applications of AC and Equivalence, we can come to 
know (8). But according to Nozick we cannot know that we’re not 
handless brains in vats.
4.4 As with Distribution and Equivalence, note that AC is also a 
form of SPC, claiming that knowledge is closed under disjunction 
introduction — a form of competent deduction. Given that Nozick 
rejects SPC it would be no major surprise if he were also to reject AC. 
However, as with Distribution, AC is extremely compelling. As Nozick 
(1981: 230, 692, n. 64) admits, rejection of AC “surely carries [things] too 
far. […] Surely our knowledge that p does not stand in such splendid 
isolation from knowledge of other things so closely connected to p”.18 It 
would be a cost to Nozick if he were forced to reject it.
As it stands, however, Nozick does reject AC, since we can believe p 
Sensitively and yet fail to believe (p v q) Sensitively. For example, let p be 
(6) and let (p v q) be (7). Although, if I had no hands, I wouldn’t believe 
18  Dretske (1970: 1009) accepts that if one knows p one knows (p v q) — a principle 
which entails AC. Williamson (2000: 283), however, notes that knowing a proposition 
entails grasping that proposition, and grasping a complex proposition involves 
grasping its components. So given that knowing p is not sufficient for grasping q, 
Dretske’s claim is subject to counterexample. AC, however, is not subject to such 
worries.
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I had hands, it’s not the case that if I were a handless BIV, I wouldn’t 
believe I had hands or wasn’t a BIV. Rather, if I lacked hands and were 
a BIV I would, ex hypothesi, believe I had hands and wasn’t a BIV. Put 
differently: I know, hence Sensitively believe, that I have hands. Now 
suppose that I deduce and come to believe that either I have hands or I 
am not a BIV. If that disjunction were false — i.e., if I had no hands and 
was a BIV — I would still believe that it was true. The disjunctive belief 
is therefore not Sensitive; so Nozick rejects AC.
4.5 However, my introduction of CON to account for Sensitivity with 
respect to conjunctions makes salient, and suggests an answer to, the 
question: What is the appropriate account of Sensitivity for disjunctive 
propositions? We might think that, if Sensitivity with respect to a 
conjunction requires that we Sensitively believe each conjunct, then 
Sensitivity with respect to a disjunction requires only that we Sensitively 
believe some disjunct. We’d then need to add the following further 
modification to Sensitivity:
DIS*: If p is a disjunctive proposition, S knows p only if S believes 
one of p’s disjuncts Sensitively.
DIS* allows Nozick to say that a subject can know Hawthorne’s 
disjunctions (e.g. (7)) and to endorse AC, just as CON allows Nozick to 
endorse Distribution.
4.6 DIS*, however, is not plausible in general. We can know a 
disjunction without knowing or believing either disjunct. For example, 
we can narrow down the epistemic possibilities: we can know that 
Danny is in the kitchen or he’s in the lounge by knowing Danny isn’t 
in the bedroom. Similarly, suppose one knows a city is in France; one 
can then know that city is in either the north of France or the south of 
France. DIS*, then, is too strong.
What these cases show is that we can come to know a disjunction 
without knowing either disjunct. But when we infer a disjunction from 
one of its disjuncts, we know a disjunction in virtue of knowing one of its 
disjuncts. In such a case, our evidence for the disjunction is our evidence 
for the disjunct from which it’s inferred. So, in this event, in order to 
know the disjunction we need only believe the disjunct from which it’s 
inferred Sensitively rather than the disjunction itself. This suggests:
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DIS: If S infers (p v q) from p, S knows (p v q) on that basis only if 
S believes p Sensitively.
With DIS, Nozick can endorse AC. That is, we are countenancing a 
version of the principle Sensitivity that imposes a less demanding 
necessary condition on a disjunctive proposition when it is inferred 
from one of its disjuncts (see 3.3 supra for how to apply DIS). This will 
guarantee that modified Sensitivity does not present any obstacle to 
closure of knowledge under AC. Of course, this does not yet suffice to 
avoid Hawthorne’s argument. Indeed, the validity of AC is a premise 
of Hawthorne’s argument. However, as we saw above, Nozick should 
reject Equivalence; and he should reject the instance of Equivalence in 
this case too. Although Sensitivity can be met with respect to (7) (i.e. 
(H v ~BIV)), since one can Sensitively believe (6) (i.e. H), it’s not the 
case that Sensitivity can be met with respect to (8) (i.e. ~(~H & BIV)) 
even though this is equivalent to (7). The reason for this is just as it is in 
Nozick’s original rejection of SPC: one can know that one has hands via 
one’s senses or via one’s senses and deduction, but one cannot, in any 
such manner, know that one isn’t a handless BIV.19
So by accepting DIS and endorsing AC, Nozick can once again 
reject Equivalence in a motivated way. The facts that lead to Nozick’s 
original rejection of SPC are exactly the facts that should lead to his 
rejection of the transition from (7) to (8). Therefore Hawthorne’s second 
19  Although (7) and (8) are a priori equivalent, the Sensitivity condition does not 
apply to them equivalently. Because (7) has the logical form of a disjunction, and is 
inferred from its first disjunct, all that is required is that its first disjunct be believed 
Sensitively. Similarly, one can know: that is a zebra or it is not a cleverly disguised 
mule, without knowing that it is not a cleverly disguised mule, even though the 
latter is equivalent to the former. One can Sensitively believe the first disjunct of 
this disjunction but one cannot Sensitively believe the second disjunct. However, 
on my revised version of Sensitivity, such a state of affairs is sufficient for the 
Sensitivity condition to be met with respect to this disjunction. Finally, note that 
Roush (2010), who employs a Sensitivity condition, and who uses probability rather 
than counterfactuals, contends that, if one knows H, one knows ~(~H & BIV) (and, 
more generally, ~(~H & Whatever)). Crucially, this is because, for Roush (2005, 
2010, 2012), Sensitivity does not operate as a necessary (or, indeed, a sufficient) 
condition on knowledge (and thus Roush does not need to forsake SPC; indeed she 
endorses it).
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pro-closure argument does nothing to increase the costs that Nozick 
must face — once, that is, he accepts DIS.20
4.7 Let me close by noting two (additional) costs of my proposal. 
Cost 1: What’s the appropriate account of Sensitivity for negations 
of propositions? Negations of atomic propositions are to be treated 
just like the propositions they negate. That is, Nozick’s unmodified 
Sensitivity condition suffices as a necessary condition for knowledge 
of the negation of an atomic proposition. But what about the negations 
of molecular propositions? In particular, what about the De Morgan 
equivalents of conjunctions and disjunctions? As we’ve just seen, on my 
proposed modification of Sensitivity, one can know (7) but not (8) — a 
negated conjunction. As a result, we cannot treat disjunctions and their 
De Morgan equivalents alike. However, unmodified Sensitivity explains 
our failure to know (8), since if I lacked hands and were a BIV, I would 
still believe that it is not the case that I lack hands and am a BIV.
This might suggest that negations are subject to unmodified 
Sensitivity. But the reductio of Nozick’s account of knowledge, which 
motivated CON, shows that we cannot apply unmodified Sensitivity to 
negations of disjunctions. If someone believes:
(P) I have a headache and I have all my limbs,
solely on the basis of their headache, we concluded that they wouldn’t 
know (P) despite satisfying unmodified Sensitivity. Similarly, the same 
considerations show that we do not know the De Morgan equivalent 
of (P) — viz. It’s not the case that I neither have a headache nor all my 
limbs — even though we satisfy unmodified Sensitivity.
This all suggests the following, then. First, we should treat negations 
of disjunctions as conjunctions: one can know them only if one believes 
the negation of each disjunct Sensitively. Second, we should treat 
negations of conjunctions as subject to unmodified Sensitivity. Finally, 
note there will be no problematic interactions between CON and DIS, as 
we can never move directly from a disjunction to a conjunction or vice 
20  As with CON (3.5 supra), one might explore bolstering a defense of DIS by appeal 
to a grounding principle concerning belief. This time, however, the relevant 
biconditional seems plausible:
BEL DIS: If S infers (p v q) from p, S believes (p v q) on that basis iff S believes p.
176 Basic Knowledge and Conditions on Knowledge
versa. Overall, however, it must be conceded that these manoeuvres 
may appear somewhat ad hoc.
4.8 Cost 2: Consider the following case which brings out an upshot 
of my proposal. Jones gets to know Peter, a paediatrician, by observing 
him medically treating children, and forms the Sensitive belief that 
Peter is a paediatrician on the basis of such observation. Nevertheless, 
Jones, who is in other relevant respects normal, holds the strange 
misconception that everyone is some kind of physician. Jones therefore 
believes the following conjunction: Peter is a paediatrician and Peter is a 
physician. By CON Jones does not know this conjunction, since his belief 
in the second conjunct is not Sensitive. But what about if Jones holds 
a belief concerning Peter involving, not a conjunction, but a complex 
(conjunctive) predicate? Specifically, what about if Jones believes: 
λx[x is a paediatrician and x is a physician](Peter)? Jones believes this 
proposition Sensitively since if Peter did not satisfy the predicate: λx[x 
is a paediatrician and x is a physician], Jones would not believe that he 
did.
In sum, we here have a case where Jones does not know:
(A) Peter is a paediatrician and Peter is a physician.
But Jones does know:
(B) λx[x is a paediatrician and x is a physician](Peter).
Now it is clear that on some fine-grained and plausible way of 
individuating propositions (A) and (B) express distinct propositions, 
but how plausible is it to say Peter knows (B) but not (A)? Of course, the 
approach I have explored denies the general validity of Equivalence, but 
the link between (A) and (B) is, concededly, tight. Indeed, we usually do 
not distinguish between the two propositions.
(Perhaps, though, the cost of this case is not so bad. I have already 
allowed that Equivalence is not generally valid. I have also allowed that 
the very same proposition (a disjunction) needs to meet only a weaker 
Sensitivity condition, rather than the standard Sensitivity condition for 
knowledge, depending on whether the disjunction was arrived at by 
inference from one of its disjuncts. The relevant point here is that (B) is 
not in the form that allows immediate inference to ‘Peter is a physician’. It 
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is only when there is an inference from (p & q) to q, for a proposition that 
is not believed Sensitively and so not known, that it is important that 
CON should be applied to give the result that the conjunction (p & q) is 
not known either.)
Relatedly, consider the following case. Suppose that we have three 
birds: a male blackbird, a female bird that looks like a female blackbird 
but is of a different species, and a female sparrow. (Male blackbirds are 
black and easily recognizable, but females are brown and superficially 
similar to birds of other species.) Suppose S never makes mistakes 
identifying male blackbirds; but S would mistake the bird that looks like 
a female blackbird for a female blackbird; and S always mistakes female 
sparrows for male sparrows. Suppose that we pick a bird at random 
and show it to S; suppose we pick the male blackbird. And suppose, to 
simplify, that the picked-the-female-blackbird-lookalike world and the 
picked-the-female-sparrow world are equally close to the actual picked-
the-male-blackbird world.
It seems that S knows, and Sensitively believes, that the bird is a male 
blackbird. If the bird had not been a male blackbird then it might have 
been the female blackbird lookalike or it might have been the female 
sparrow. So S might have believed that the bird is a female blackbird 
and might have believed that the bird is a male sparrow but, either way, 
S would not have believed that the bird is a male blackbird. However, 
it seems that S does not Sensitively believe that the bird is male. If the 
bird had not been male, it might have been the female sparrow, and so 
S might still have believed that the bird is male. Equally, it seems that S 
does not Sensitively believe that the bird is a blackbird. If the bird had 
not been a blackbird, it might have been the female blackbird lookalike, 
and so S might still have believed that the bird is a blackbird.
Nonetheless, as noted, when S sees a male blackbird, it seems that S 
comes to know, and Sensitively believe, that the bird is a male blackbird. 
Here is a preliminary way of summarising the point of the case: if 
the subject were to infer, from the seemingly known premise ‘That is 
a male blackbird’ either ‘That is a male bird’ or ‘That is a blackbird’, 
then the inferred conclusion(s) would not be known.21 What do I say 
21  This case bears obvious similarities to Kripke’s ‘red barn’ case (cf. nn. 10 and 
17 supra). Note that Adams and Clarke (2005: 214–16) attempt to rescue Nozick 
from Kripke’s case by appeal to methods: the subject in Kripke’s case, for Adams 
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about this case? The proposition believed by S — that the bird is a male 
blackbird — could involve a conjunction:
(A*) The bird is male and the bird is a blackbird,
which, by CON, S does not know. Or it could instead (more naturally) 
involve a complex predicate:
(B*) λx[x is male and x is a blackbird](the bird),
which S knows. In sum, the paediatrician/physician case told us that 
Equivalence is to be given up in these cases where we have alternative, 
though closely related, parsings of a single sentence;22 and now the 
male blackbird case tells us, moreover, that we can know a proposition 
involving a (complex) conjunctive predicate without knowing any of 
the corresponding propositions involving the simple predicates — and 
without knowing the equivalent conjunctive proposition. Overall, 
and Clarke, comes to know that a red barn is before her by the ‘red barn (look) 
method’ — a method the subject also employs, for Adams and Clarke, to come 
to know that a barn is before her. A similar thin slicing of methods approach could 
be used, mutatis mutandis, to dissolve the force of the male blackbird case against 
Nozick (cf. Becker 2012: 94). Adams and Clarke are aware of the objection that they 
have “slic[ed] methods too thinly or without principle merely to rescue Nozick”, 
and make a somewhat terse effort to address this objection. Myself, I am sympathetic 
to this objection (hence my presentation of the male blackbird case in the main 
text), though I do not presently have an argument defending my sympathies (cf. 
Goldman’s (1983: 84) ‘Dack the dachshund’ case). (While Nozick’s (1981: 179) 
treatment of his ‘grandmother’ case would suggest visual perception being the 
operative, and intuitive, method in cases such as these, it would be mistaken to 
take this to be Nozick’s final, considered view. Nozick (1981: 179–85, 188–96) 
goes on to consider, with some sympathy, (much) more narrow individuations of 
methods.) For present purposes, I do not need to commit on this debate. All I need 
to commit on is the following. Either (1) Adams and Clarke’s (and others’) thin 
slicing of methods is apposite, and consequently the cost of Cost 2 for my proposal 
is diminished (though not eliminated). Or (2) It is not apposite, and the cost of Cost 
2 remains undiminished. As my project is not to provide a bullet-proof defense of 
Sensitivity, I can remain neutral between (1) and (2). (Nozick (193), meanwhile, 
explicitly states that “[s]ince [he has] not […] specified precisely how to identify a 
method and tell when it is held fixed, there is some leeway in [his] account”, and 
does not take this to be problematic “provided […] discussion of [problem] cases 
[does] not exploit the leeway […] inconsistently.”)
22  The sentence, in that case, could either be ‘Peter is a paediatrician and Peter is 
a physician’ (with the conjunction parsing being more natural), or ‘Peter is a 
paediatrician and a physician’ (with the complex predicate parsing being more 
natural).
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however, it must (again) be conceded that these upshots are a cost of 
my proposal.23
5. Conclusion
5.1 Where, then, does this leave us? Let me summarise the dialectic thus: 
(1) Hawthorne raises an objection to Sensitivity, namely that it cannot 
satisfy Equivalence and Distribution or Equivalence and AC. (2) Nozick 
explicitly rejects both Distribution and AC; and that’s a cost of his account. 
(3) Hawthorne’s argument shows that a Sensitivity account which 
respects Distribution and AC cannot respect Equivalence. So a dilemma 
arises: either reject both Distribution and AC or reject Equivalence. 
(4) I note that a Sensitivity account ought to reject Equivalence in any 
case (the reductio of section 3), and so Nozick picked the wrong horn 
of the dilemma: Sensitivity is free to respect Distribution and AC. Of 
course, rejecting Equivalence is itself a cost. (5) However, the best way 
for the Sensitivity theorist to go is problematic. As well as giving up 
on Equivalence, Sensitivity has to engage in manoeuvring which might 
appear ad hoc in the special cases of De Morgan’s equivalents, and also 
has to give up on providing similar treatments of different parsings of 
‘conjunctive claims’ (but cf. n. 23 supra).
No grand conclusion is warranted, to the effect that, once the 
Sensitivity theorist picks the right horn of Hawthorne’s dilemma, there 
are no associated costs. We can, though, conclude that the costs to the 
Sensitivity theorist are somewhat more bearable once it is recognised 
that those costs are being incurred for principled reasons (the reductio 
23  Here is an approach which promises to avoid cost 2 by effectively giving the same 
treatment for conjunctive propositions and propositions involving conjunctive 
predicates. Supplement CON with:
CON*: If p is a proposition of the form λx[Fx and Gx](a), S knows p only if S 
believes the proposition λx[Fx](a) Sensitively and S believes the proposition 
λx[Gx](a) Sensitively.
Beyond the obvious cost of further complicating one’s account of knowledge (by 
further modifying Sensitivity), I do not at present know if there are further (perhaps 
severe) costs of endorsing CON*. (Insofar as CON requires bolstering beyond an 
appeal to its intuitiveness as a fix (cf. 3.4 supra), so too does CON*.) Finally, note 
that Becker’s (2012: 95, n. 13) ‘large shrimp’ case is relevantly similar to the cases I 
discuss here in 4.8.
180 Basic Knowledge and Conditions on Knowledge
of section 3). To that extent, then, we can conclude that Hawthorne’s 
pro-closure arguments are not knock-down.24
24  Note in closing that Nozick (1981: 227–28, 230) also rejects the plausible claim that 
knowledge is closed under universal instantiation and existential generalization. 
What I say about conjunctions and disjunctions may apply, mutatis mutandis, to 
quantified statements too. If we take universal statements to be conjunctions and 
existential statements to be disjunctions, the natural application is that to know the 
universal statement ‘for all x, F(x)’ one must believe all its instances Sensitively, 
and to know the existential statement ‘for some x, F(x)’ one must believe (at 
least) one of its instances Sensitively (subject to DIS’s proviso). The application to 
universal statements threatens to be the more problematic application. (Though 
note one pseudo-problem: as we are only here considering necessary conditions 
for knowledge, it is no problem that knowing universal statements requires more 
than believing all its instances Sensitively. In particular, it is no problem that it also 
requires a that’s all belief to be held Sensitively.) Consider: the subject might not 
be able to express all the instances. Indeed, it might be that no natural language 
has names for all the objects quantified over (e.g. if the domain is very large). This 
worry can be defused by keeping clear that belief is a dispositional mental state, not 
an action. Therefore, actual limitations on the part of the subject or natural language 
need not preclude Sensitive belief provided the subject has an appropriate set of 
dispositions.
8. Safety
Beginning from Sosa’s (1999) safety condition on knowledge, I engage with 
Comesaña’s (2005) example of unsafe knowledge. I propose a modified safety 
condition, test it against examples, and respond to a series of objections. I argue 
that, while further modifications may be required, it is plausible that (some 
version of) safety is a necessary condition on knowledge.
0.1 My purpose in this chapter is to (begin to) defend safety as a 
necessary condition on knowledge. First, I introduce Ernest Sosa’s (1999) 
safety condition.1 Second, I set up and grapple with Juan Comesaña’s 
(2005) putative counterexample to safety as a necessary condition on 
knowledge; Comesaña’s case forces us to consider Sosa’s updated 
(2002) safety condition. From such grappling a principled modification 
to Sosa’s (2002) safety condition emerges. Safety is safe from this, and 
like, attacks.
1. Safety Introduced
1.1 Sosa (1999: 378) offered the following first pass at a safety condition 
on knowledge (time designations are suppressed throughout):
1  Timothy Williamson (2000: ch.5) also operates with a (distinct) safety condition on 
knowledge.
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Call a belief by S that p “safe” iff: S would not believe that p without it 
being so that p. (Alternatively a belief by S that p is safe iff: as a matter 
of fact, though perhaps not as a matter of strict necessity, S would not 
believe that p without it being so that p.)2
By such a condition’s lights, on its supporters’ views, we’re not prevented 
from having quotidian knowledge, and nor are we prevented from 
having knowledge of the falsity of an array of sceptical hypotheses. So 
far, so good, one might think, for safety.
1.2 Note that safety — a reliability notion — is a squarely externalist 
condition on knowledge. It does not inquire one jot, for example, into 
a putative knower’s recognition of certain epistemically salient facts 
about the basis, or bases, on which he adopts a particular belief. Rather, 
for a belief to be safe is simply for a particular modal relation to hold 
between a subject’s belief that p and the fact that p.
1.3 Before coming to Comesaña’s putative counterexample to safety, 
note one (familiar) modification to safety:
A belief that p by S is safe iff S would not believe that p on the same basis 
without it being so that p. (Comesaña 2005: 397 (My emphasis))
(Or: S B(p) on basis e → p.)
This modification — as Comesaña points out (2005: 403, n. 4) — is 
incorporated by Sosa’s (2002) updated condition on knowledge, a 
condition which we’ll be focusing on, and modifying, in the remainder 
of this chapter.3
2  Or: S B(p) → p (and not the stronger: □ [S B(p) → p]). Read ‘S B(p)’ as: ‘A subject, S, 
believes that p’. Following Sosa, we can read ‘→’ as “subjunctively implies”: if p → q, 
“its being so that p offers some guarantee, even if not an absolute guarantee, that 
it is also the case that q” (Sosa 2002: 284, n. 4). If one formulates safety in terms 
of a subjunctive conditional one will operate with an account of the semantics of 
subjunctive conditionals not rendering true-true subjunctives trivially true — cf. 
Nozick (1981: 680–81, n. 8). Assuming the truth of the relevant subjunctive 
conditional, any plausible semantics therefor will have the relevant material 
conditional not coming out false at the actual world.
3  I assume that all cases considered herein involve beliefs formed on the same basis 
in the actual and relevant counterfactual circumstances (cf. Williamson 2009: 307).
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2. Comesaña’s Putative Counterexample: 
HALLOWEEN PARTY
2.1 Comesaña (2005: 397) asks us to consider the following case:
There is a Halloween party at Andy’s house, and I am invited. Andy’s 
house is very difficult to find, so he hires Judy to stand at a crossroads and 
direct people towards the house (Judy’s job is to tell people that the party 
is at the house down the left road). Unbeknownst to me Andy doesn’t 
want Michael to go to the party, so he also tells Judy that if she sees 
Michael she should tell him the same thing she tells everybody else (that 
the party is at the house down the left road), but she should immediately 
phone Andy so that the party can be moved to Adam’s house, which is 
down the right road. I seriously consider disguising myself as Michael, 
but at the last moment I don’t. When I get to the crossroads, I ask Judy 
where the party is, and she tells me that it is down the left road.
And Comesaña’s gloss thereon:
In this case, after I talk to Judy I know that the party is at the house down 
the left road, and yet it could very easily have happened that I had the 
same belief on the same basis (Judy’s testimony) without it being so that 
the belief is true. That is, in this case I know that p but my belief that p is 
not safe — I have unsafe knowledge.
2.2 Ahead of grappling with HALLOWEEN PARTY let’s note 
Sosa’s updated (2002: 275–76) safety(-related)4 principle — a principle 
motivated in response to cases demonstrating that outright tracking5 isn’t 
necessary for knowledge. Let’s introduce it first — laden with heretofore 
unexplained Sosa-terminology — and explain the terminology by way 
4  I say ‘safety(-related)’ as it does not, unlike the first pass set out at 1.1 supra, take 
the explicit form of a definition of safety. It rather takes the explicit form of a 
(disjunctive) necessary condition on knowledge, though it should also be taken as 
stating a (disjunctive) necessary and sufficient condition for safe acceptance — cf. 
n. 13 infra. (The same goes, mutatis mutandis, for my modification of this principle to 
come.) Note, moreover, that it employs the more general notion of acceptance rather 
than belief. (This will not matter, however, for present purposes, as throughout we 
assume the form of acceptance in question is belief.)
5  “One tracks the truth, outright, in believing that p IFF one would believe that p iff 
it were so that p: i.e., would believe that p if it were so that p, and only if it were 
so” (Sosa 2002: 267). Thus outright tracking combines a safety requirement and an 
adherence requirement.
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of applying it to HALLOWEEN PARTY, the case in hand. Here’s the 
updated principle:
S knows that p on the basis of an indication I(p) only if either (a) I(p) 
indicates the truth outright and S accepts that indication as such outright, 
or (b) for some condition C, I(p) indicates the truth dependently on C, 
and S accepts that indication as such not outright but guided by C (so that 
S accepts the indication as such on the basis of C).6
The indication, I(p), in HALLOWEEN PARTY, is Judy’s testimony 
to me that the party is down the left road.7 Disjunct (a) doesn’t hold: 
Judy’s testimony doesn’t indicate the truth outright as Judy’s testimony 
indicates the truth dependently on the fact that-I-do-not-appear-to-
Judy-Michael’ly (C).8 What is it for an indication to “[indicate] the truth 
outright”? This happens iff I(p) → p. That leads us to disjunct (b). The 
first conjunct of the conjunctive condition contained in disjunct (b) is 
true. What is it for an indication to “[indicate] the truth dependently on 
C”? This happens iff C obtains and [C&I(p)] → p, but ~[I(p) → p]. The 
second conjunct of the conjunctive condition contained in disjunct (b), 
however, is false: ex hypothesi I don’t accept Judy’s testimony as true, 
conditional on the fact that-I-do-not-appear-to-Judy-Michael’ly. As the 
case is set up, I’ll believe Judy’s testimony whether or not I appear to her 
Michael’ly. I therefore don’t accept the indication “guided by”, or “on the 
basis of”, C. (If I do accept Judy’s testimony as true conditional on the 
6  Sosa (2007: 105) adds the following disjunct to (b) in his most recent condition on 
(animal) knowledge based on an indication: “[…] or else […] C is constitutive of the 
appropriate normalcy of the conditions for the competence exercised by S in accepting I(p)” 
(footnote omitted). The candidate C in HALLOWEEN PARTY (to come) does not 
satisfy this disjunct. Sosa defends this (2007) condition on (animal) knowledge 
yet now disavows (2007: 92–93) that safety is a necessary condition on (animal) 
knowledge: the addition of this disjunct must disqualify the principle in question 
from counting as a safety principle. Finally, for more on the basing relation — which 
features in both the antecedent and consequent of Sosa’s (2002) principle — see 
Korcz (2006).
7  Sosa (2002) wavers on this. Transposing things to HALLOWEEN PARTY: at times 
Sosa takes the indication (or: safe deliverance) to be what Judy’s testimony causes in 
me, but at other times he takes it to be Judy’s testimony to me itself. Comesaña — and 
I will follow suit — goes with the latter interpretation (though I do not think this is 
crucial). Also, note it is, crucially, ‘Judy’s testimony to me’. For ease of prose I omit 
the ‘to me’ hereinafter, but please read it in.
8  Because we are interested in Judy’s testimony to a particular subject, and that 
subject is me, the C on which I focus is as stated, and not the more general: 
that-Judy-is-not-appeared-to-Michael’ly.
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fact that-I-do-not-appear-to-Judy-Michael’ly, HALLOWEEN PARTY 
becomes a straightforward case of safe knowledge.)
Therefore Sosa’s updated (2002) safety principle — as Comesaña notes 
(2005: 399) — cuts no ice against HALLOWEEN PARTY. By its lights we 
still have unsafe knowledge.
2.3 Let’s now grapple with HALLOWEEN PARTY. We need to 
modify Sosa’s (2002) safety principle.9 My modified principle aims to 
capture a pre-theoretic notion of beliefs which are safe from the danger 
of being false, just as other objects can be safe from myriad dangers. 
Moreover, the modification is motivated by scrupulous attention to 
the externalism which underpinned safety’s first formulation. Earlier, 
we noted the squarely externalist nature of safety’s initial formulation: 
it’s merely the positing of a modal relation between a subject’s belief 
and a fact. So we might be suspicious of the internalist flavour to 2.2’s 
updated safety principle: 2.2’s principle requires — modulo no outright 
indication of truth — that the putative knower accept the indication in 
question “guided by” and “on the basis of C”. I take it that, in order to 
do this, the putative knower in HALLOWEEN PARTY (viz. me) must, at 
the very least, recognise (or: be aware of) the condition under which the 
indication in question indicates the truth (Sosa 2002: 271). (As a result 
the internalism in question here is access internalism about grounds (Pryor 
2001: 106–08): one must have access to the conditions for a ground 
(or indication) counting as justified (or safe).) Otherwise there is no 
principled reason for the putative knower in HALLOWEEN PARTY 
(viz. me) to accept Judy’s testimony guided by, or on the basis of, the 
fact that-I-do-not-appear-to-Judy-Michael’ly.10
9  As a closely related alternative to my proposal (to come) one might develop an 
explicitly time-sensitive notion of safety (cf. Sainsbury (1997: 907–19), Peacocke 
(1999: 310–28), and Williamson (2000: 124)). Relatedly, Bogardus (2014) thinks 
HALLOWEEN PARTY (and like cases) err as counterexamples by positing epistemic 
risk prior to the formation of the belief in question (cf. n. 27 infra).
10  I restrict my claim here to HALLOWEEN PARTY (and like cases). (Compare: if 
disjunct (a) were to hold, even though S would know p on the basis of an indication 
I(p), I would not take any internalism to be implicated thereby. This is because I 
take there to be a fundamental difference (in this regard) between accepting an 
indication outright (disjunct (a)) and not outright (disjunct (b)) — cf. disjunct (b)
(ii) to come.) The form of acceptance required by 2.2’s safety principle — modulo no 
outright indication of truth — could, in some cases, be cashed out simply in terms 
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But why — modulo no outright indication of truth — require this for 
knowledge? It seems that this further requirement, as to the putative 
knower’s recognition-based acceptance in HALLOWEEN PARTY, is 
more aptly viewed as a requirement — modulo no outright indication of 
truth — not on knowledge simpliciter, but on knowing that one knows.
2.4 So the challenge is to set out a modified — more externalist — version 
of Sosa’s updated (2002) safety principle. We need two novel pieces of 
terminology. First, a schema introducing the notion of a safe condition:
(CSAFE) A condition, C, is safe iff C obtains,11 and if C were the 
case in the way described in the thought experiment under 
consideration, then C would hold in all12 close possible worlds.
We’ll refer to a safe condition as (a) CSAFE. Just as we can talk of the safety 
of a subject’s belief that p — where that is cashed out as a modal relation 
between a subject’s belief that p and the fact that p — so we can talk of 
the safety of a condition, C — where that is cashed out in terms of how 
far into modal space C holds, conditional on C being the case in the way 
described in the thought experiment under consideration. That is, in the 
thought experiments to come, we suppose the candidate C is the case 
of a modal relation between a subject’s acceptance that p and the fact that p (Sosa 
2002: 272). But, insofar as my restricted claim is right, we’ve departed from a purely 
externalist safety condition. Cf. Sosa’s later comments on ‘guidance’ (2002: 282).
11  This functions, in part, to prevent necessarily false conditions from being trivially 
safe conditions. According to standard semantics for subjunctive conditionals, 
necessarily false antecedents make (vacuously) true subjunctive conditionals. 
Sosa’s account of dependent indication (see 2.2 infra) itself requires that C obtains, 
but I prefer an independent obtention requirement on CSAFEs themselves. Finally, 
by ‘obtain’ I take it that Sosa means ‘obtain in the actual world’. That is, in engaging 
with these thought experiments (which may, though need not of course, be actual 
cases), we suppose C obtains in the actual world, and not in some (remote) possible 
world which may have bizarre metaphysics. This is one reason why the following, 
admittedly cleaner, safe condition schema will not do: A condition C is safe at a 
world w iff C holds in all close possible worlds to w.
12  One might explore alternative formulations, for example replacing ‘all’ with ‘all 
or nearly all’ — cf. Pritchard’s (2005b) safety account. It has, though, been noted 
by Greco (2007) that Pritchard’s account may have especial difficulties with the 
lottery problem (cf. n. 22 infra). It should be noted that Pritchard (2009) has since 
attempted to amend his account of safety in an effort to respond to Greco’s (and 
others’) objections. I don’t attempt to adjudicate on this debate here. Finally, to be 
explicit, we are here measuring closeness to the world represented in the thought 
experiment.
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in the way described in the thought experiment under consideration, 
and then, given an intuitive ordering of worlds, check whether that 
condition, C, holds in all close possible worlds. In what follows, I want 
to suggest that it’s intuitive to add a disjunct to Sosa’s safety principle 
(thereby weakening it) making reference to the safety of candidate 
conditions.
Now here’s our modified safety principle:
S knows that p on the basis of an indication I(p) only if EITHER 
(a) I(p) indicates the truth outright and S accepts that indication as 
such outright, OR (b) either (i) for some condition C, I(p) indicates 
the truth dependently on C, and S accepts that indication as such 
not outright but guided by C (so that S accepts the indication as 
such on the basis of C),13 or (ii) for some non-trivial condition CSAFE, 
I(p) indicates the truth dependently on CSAFE, and S accepts that 
indication not-as-such outright.14
Now our second piece of terminology. Call a CSAFE meeting the 
requirements of disjunct (b)(ii) (viz. it is non-trivial and I(p) indicates the 
truth dependently on it) relevantly-safe — (a) CR-SAFE.15 And a condition is 
trivial iff it is, or entails, the putatively known proposition; non-trivial 
otherwise (cf. Comesaña 2005: 403, n. 7). In HALLOWEEN PARTY 
this non-triviality requirement thus rules out conditions such as: that-
the-party-is-down-the-(bumpy)left-road. Note that the (putatively 
relevantly-safe) condition that-I-do-not-appear-to-Judy-Michael’ly does 
13  What is now called ‘disjunct (b)(i)’ must be retained. Though — modulo no outright 
indication of truth — such ‘guidance’ is no longer necessary for safety, it is still (stand-
alone) sufficient therefor (cf. n. 4 supra): if I do accept Judy’s testimony as true guided 
by the condition that-I-do-not-appear-to-Judy-Michael’ly, HALLOWEEN PARTY, 
we’ve seen, becomes a straightforward case of safe knowledge (and, arguably, 
second-order knowledge), even if that condition does not, suppose, obtain safely.
14  That is, S does accept the indication outright, but not-as-such outright, as the 
indication in question, if disjunct (b)(ii) is to be satisfied, is not, ex hypothesi, an 
outright indication of truth. Finally, it is worth noting that disjunct (b)(i) can 
(though of course need not) be satisfied by a CSAFE. Mutual exclusivity would still 
be maintained between (b)(i) and (b)(ii) due to the different forms of acceptance 
involved in satisfaction of the two disjuncts. (For the mutual exclusivity of disjuncts 
(a) and (b) ((b)(ii) in particular), see 2.5 infra.)
15  This second novel piece of terminology is necessary. For example, that-2+2=4 is, 
and that-my-washing-machine-is-functioning can be, a CSAFE. Without more, these 
conditions aren’t relevant to our inquiry. We need to isolate a proper subset of 
CSAFEs — CR-SAFEs — in which we’re particularly interested.
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not entail that Judy’s testimony that the party is down the left road is 
true: Judy’s testimony could still have been false for any number of 
reasons (albeit such reasons obtain, ex hypothesi, only in distant possible 
worlds).
However, consider the condition: [p v ~I(p)]. The disjunction as a 
whole neither is, nor entails, p; and I(p) indicates the truth dependently 
on the disjunction (by disjunctive syllogism). Objection:16 to allow this as 
a CR-SAFE would be to trivialise the notion of CR-SAFEs: for any p one could 
construct a CR-SAFE consisting of the disjunction of p and the negation of 
an indication that p. One should combat this by making it sufficient for 
triviality that a disjunct of the condition is, or entails, p. Reply: while this 
objection draws attention to an interesting class of condition, it ignores 
the fact that being CSAFE is a prerequisite for being CR-SAFE. However, it 
will follow that on any occasion in which [p v ~I(p)] is CSAFE it will also 
be CR-SAFE. To the extent that this is a problematic result — something on 
which I do not here commit — we will need to modify our definition of 
triviality in line with this objection.
2.5 This modified safety principle is a move towards the externalism 
which motivated Sosa’s initial (1999) formulations of safety, and 
dispenses with the internalist flavour of Sosa’s subsequent (2002) 
formulations. (Recall: 2.2’s principle requires — modulo no outright 
indication of truth — that the putative knower accept the indication 
in question “guided by” and “on the basis of C”. My modified safety 
principle rejects this requirement.) My claim here is only this: insofar 
as one is interested in defending safety as a necessary condition on 
knowledge, why not see how far one can get with a more externalist 
account thereof? After all, as noted, initial formulations of safety were 
(purely) externalist.
Does this modified safety principle, however, handle HALLOWEEN 
PARTY? Do we get the result that I gain knowledge of the whereabouts of 
the party from Judy’s testimony — chiming with our intuitions — with 
the belief on which such knowledge is based rendered safe by dint 
of fulfilment of disjunct (b)(ii)? To answer these questions we first, 
16  I close the chapter, in 2.7–2.10 infra, with four numbered objections to my fully 
interpreted safety principle. This objection, as with the subsequent objection in 2.5, 
bears on the antecedent matter of correctly interpreting my safety principle.
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obviously, assess this (more externalist) safety condition’s success in 
handling HALLOWEEN PARTY. But our enquiry should not rest there. 
We’ll then move on to consider its plausibility (in general) by considering 
some objections thereto.
And so to HALLOWEEN PARTY itself and the candidate condition 
that-I-do-not-appear-to-Judy-Michael’ly. It’s plausible that if this C were 
the case in the way described in HALLOWEEN PARTY — at which point 
in time, ex hypothesi, crucially my decision has been made not to disguise 
myself as Michael — Judy won’t be appeared-to-Micheal’ly by me in 
any close possible worlds. I take it we should read such a decision into 
HALLOWEEN PARTY; otherwise how do we explain my move from 
“seriously considering disguising myself as Michael” to — “at the last 
moment” — not doing so? (cf. Raz 1999: 65)17 To be sure, there are remote 
worlds in which, even after the decision has been made not to disguise 
myself as Michael, I end up disguising myself as Michael.18 However, 
provided we stick to the case as set up, these “disguising myself as 
Michael”-worlds will not be close enough to threaten the safety of my 
true belief that the party is down the left road.
It is the element of prior decision — reached, I take it, as a result 
of deliberation on the reasons for or against the action in question, 
with decisions themselves terminating that deliberation and being 
reasons19 — which distinguishes HALLOWEEN PARTY from the 
ensuing cases we’ll consider. At a more general level, a condition will be 
CSAFE if20 there is some (non-luck-infected)21 factor — whether a mental act, 
as in HALLOWEEN PARTY, or not — which pre-dates the putatively 
17  Comesaña (2005: 399) reads such a decision in. This suggests a candidate 
(complementary) CR-SAFE: that-I-decide-not-to-appear-to-Judy-Michael’ly (see 2.9 
infra).
18  There are also worlds — I take it they are remote, if it were the case that-I-do-
not-appear-to-Judy-Michael’ly in the way described in HALLOWEEN PARTY — in 
which I don’t decide not to dress as Michael. I am not, by diktat, holding that decision 
fixed across all worlds.
19  These remarks are taken from Raz (1978: 135, 1999: 65–72). For Raz (1999: 66), “a 
decision is always, for the agent, a reason for performing the act he has decided to 
perform and for disregarding further reasons and arguments. It is always both a 
first-order and an exclusionary reason”. Consistently with this, “in most cases the 
refusal to reopen the case is not absolute”. (67) Cf. also Raz (2002: ch.1).
20  I am not committed to the ‘only if’ claim.
21  I leave this notion intuitive, but for an extended analysis of epistemic luck, see 
Pritchard (2005). It is omitted in what follows, as only non-luck-infected factors can 
secure the holding of conditions in all close possible worlds.
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safe condition, and serves to secure that condition’s holding in all close 
possible worlds. This candidate condition is therefore CSAFE. Moreover, 
we saw in 2.2 that Judy’s testimony indicates the truth dependently 
on this (non-trivial) CSAFE. It’s therefore a relevantly-safe condition: it’s 
CR-SAFE. We thus have disjunct (b)(ii) of 2.4’s modified safety principle 
being met. We, untroublingly, have safe knowledge in HALLOWEEN 
PARTY.
 There is, however, a complication here relating to how an indication 
can indicate the truth dependently on a CSAFE. Or, put differently: how 
a CSAFE can be a CR-SAFE. Objection: for Sosa, we’ve seen, an indication 
indicates the truth dependently on a condition iff C obtains and 
[C&I(p)] → p, but ~[I(p) → p]. However if C is a CSAFE, (a fortiori) obtains, 
and [C&I(p)] → p, that seems to entail that: [I(p) → p]. Reply: however 
this is not so. Though there is, at root, one question to be determined 
in HALLOWEEN PARTY — viz. do I possess knowledge? — two 
“contexts of thought or discussion” are “relevant” (Sosa 2002: 271) 
at different stages of enquiry into that question. At the first stage 
of enquiry — determining whether the condition in question is 
CSAFE — schema (CSAFE) makes salient the way in which the condition came 
about in the thought experiment under consideration. At the second 
stage of enquiry — determining whether the condition in question 
satisfies disjunct (b)(ii) — the foregoing feature of the condition is not 
rendered salient: Sosa’s formulation of when an indication indicates 
the truth dependently on a condition, of course, makes no reference to 
CSAFEs. It is only by recognising these two different contexts within a 
single project of enquiry that we can pay due deference to the initial 
intuitive pull towards thinking of HALLOWEEN PARTY as a case of 
unsafety — recognising, that is, that I could very easily (in some context 
of thought or discussion) have disguised myself as Michael. This will be 
a general feature of applying my safety principle.22
Thus, in HALLOWEEN PARTY we assess whether the condition that-
I-do-not-appear-to-Judy-Michael’ly satisfies disjunct (b)(ii) not building 
in information about precisely how that condition came about in the 
thought experiment (i.e. via a prior decision). Given this, the foregoing 
entailment does not hold and, plausibly: ~[I(p) → p]. To fail to adopt this 
22  To recognise the foregoing is not, I take it, to perforce become an epistemic 
contextualist — see Rysiew (2007).
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approach, Judy’s testimony would end up indicating the truth outright 
(modulo my reading of HALLOWEEN PARTY). (More generally, to fail 
to adopt this approach, condition (b)(ii) of my safety principle would 
be unsatisfiable, with my proposal boiling down to Sosa’s updated 
principle.) While the result would still be safe knowledge, by my 
reckoning something important would be lost in describing the case 
this way. Overall, this complication demonstrates the fine line between 
outright and dependent indications of truth (cf. Sosa 2002: 270–71).
2.6 Now, as a preamble to considering objections, let’s distinguish 
between two epistemological projects one might undertake. First, one 
might attempt to defend safety as a necessary condition on knowledge. 
This is my project in this chapter. Second, and more ambitiously, one 
might attempt to give a reductive analysis of knowledge, with safety 
as a component part — perhaps: all and only safe true beliefs count 
as knowledge. For familiar reasons, any such reductive analysis fails 
to have the resources to account for knowledge of necessary truths: 
such an account cannot allow for failure to know (some) necessary 
truths, because all necessary truths count as safe. (And for less familiar 
problems with such a reductive analysis, see Manley (2007: 408).) More 
prosaically, insofar as Becker’s (2006) case, in which a person (safely) 
believes that the earth revolves around the sun solely on the basis of 
his adherence to a religion in which the sun is worshipped, is non-
knowledge such a reductive analysis would fail on this score too. Note, 
however, that such an analysis is not vulnerable to Roush’s (2005: 122–23) 
FAIRY GODMOTHER case of putative safe non-knowledge, in which a 
fairy godmother — let’s say, of nomological necessity — renders true, 
for any p, S’s belief that p, however faulty S’s mode of reasoning in 
coming to believe that p. Recall (from n. 2), our formulation of safety 
using a subjunctive conditional was: S B(p) → p. It wasn’t the stronger: 
□ [S B(p) → p]. As such, we can, without complication, rely on the non-
obtaining of fairy godmothers in close possible worlds (cf. n. 11 supra’s 
remarks on thought experiments).
The more ambitious project of reductive analysis, however, is not 
my project here. Insofar, then, as other safety accounts can successfully 
undertake this more ambitious project, my project might seem unduly 
unambitious. But my project would only be mistaken should my safety 
condition not feature as a necessary component of the reductive analysis.
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(For other accounts which might be thought to provide the basis for a 
reductive analysis — accounts which are not in competition with, and 
indeed may need to be supplemented by, my account — cf. method 
safety/process reliabilism and virtue reliabilism. Each of these alternative 
accounts is, however, vulnerable to objections — most notably, perhaps, 
the generality problem: the problem of identifying precisely which 
process it is whose reliability determines how justified your belief is.) 
Still, insofar as we follow Sosa (1999) in considering safety an advance 
on sensitivity,23 and insofar as the sensitivity condition allowed for 
progress on the Gettier problem (1963), it would be troubling for my 
proposed safety condition if one could readily invent Gettier-style cases 
of safe (true beliefs which are) non-knowledge. Any putative Gettier-
style cases — see objections 1 and 2 (to come) — of safe non-knowledge 
should be accommodated by my project.24
2.7 Objection 1 and Reply 1: Suppose Judy flips a coin in a situation 
like HALLOWEEN PARTY but absent the ‘that-I-do-not-appear-to-
Judy-Michael’ly’ condition. Instead, if the coin comes up tails, she’ll 
direct me down the left road to the party at Andy’s; if it comes up heads, 
she’ll direct me down the left road to Andy’s, but will immediately 
phone Andy so the party can be moved to Adam’s. Call this JUDY 
COIN-FLIP. Suppose the coin lands tails. Do I know that the party is 
at the house down the left road?25 It seems that I don’t know this. Is my 
safety condition met? Suppose the candidate CR-SAFE here is: that-Judy-
is-not-appeared-to-heads’ly. Is this C indeed safe? If this C were the case 
in the way described in JUDY COIN-FLIP, would C hold in all close 
possible worlds? No. That the flipped coin lands tails in our case has no 
(strong) bearing on what way the coin lands in close possible worlds; in 
23  Viz.: If p weren’t true, S wouldn’t believe that p via M. (Or: ~p → ~[S B(p) via M].) 
This is a (Nozick-inspired) refinement on Nozick’s (1981: 172) “condition (3)”.
24  I am content to classify the classic lottery case — in which one truly believes one’s 
single ticket in, say, a million-ticket lottery loses — as unsafe non-knowledge: 
although the odds of winning the lottery are minuscule, there are close possible 
worlds in which one wins. Space prevents detailed defense of this classification.
25  This case is found in Comesaña (2005: 402). (I do not think things turn out 
materially different if the coin-flip takes place after I get Judy’s testimony.) One 
could construct a similar case in which Judy tells the truth conditional on it being 
the case that-Judy’s-one-ticket-wins-a-million-ticket-lottery, and her ticket in fact 
wins said lottery.
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particular, that the flipped coin lands tails in our case does not make it 
the case that the coin lands tails in all close possible worlds. Therefore 
we don’t have a case of safe non-knowledge. Rather, it’s, untroublingly, 
unsafe non-knowledge.26
HALLOWEEN PARTY — as with nearly all thought experiments — is, 
of course, under-described. Clearly I am making mileage out of a prior 
decision in HALLOWEEN PARTY securing C’s (viz. that-I-do-not-
appear-to-Judy-Michael’ly) holding in all close possible worlds. But 
suppose — as Comesaña (2005: 402) does — that the decision not to 
disguise myself as Michael was formed — as is, concededly, left open 
by HALLOWEEN PARTY — on the basis of a coin-flip landing tails (or 
conditional on my one ticket winning a million-ticket lottery). Call this 
PARTYGOER COIN-FLIP. Suppose the coin lands tails (or I win said 
lottery). Now, it’s not so that if C were the case in the way described in 
PARTYGOER COIN-FLIP, C would hold in all close possible worlds. 
Result (pace Comesaña 2005: 402): more of an intuitive pull to withhold 
knowledge. We have unsafe non-knowledge (as in JUDY COIN-FLIP).
Summary diagnosis: in all the cases we’ve considered so far 
there’s some (however weak) initial intuitive appeal to ascribe 
knowledge — after all, all the cases have a source of knowledge 
(whether testimony or perception) operating successfully. As we fill 
in the cases it becomes clear that the relevant source only operates 
successfully dependently on some or other (non-trivial) condition 
being the case. And the relevant condition, in each thought experiment, 
might — it seems — very well not have been the case. Now we have an 
intuitive pull to withhold knowledge. As we fill in the cases further we 
discover — my contention — that our willingness to ascribe knowledge 
in this or that case is a function of whether or not the relevant condition, 
if it were the case in the way described in the thought experiment under 
consideration, holds in all close possible worlds. In other words, it’s a 
function of whether the relevant condition, C, is safe.
26  I give a like diagnosis, mutatis mutandis, of Goldman’s (1976) FAKE BARNS, Neta 
and Rohrbaugh’s (2004) two cases, and Bogardus’s (2012) case. (To the extent that 
denying Neta and Rohrbaugh’s cases involve knowledge is a bullet, I am prepared 
to bite it — cf. n. 27 infra.) Though note the following putative difference between 
FAKE BARNS and Neta and Rohrbaugh’s cases: the threat to knowledge in FAKE 
BARNS is actual — there really are fake barns around — whereas the threat in Neta 
and Rohrbaugh’s (as in HALLOWEEN PARTY) is purely counterfactual.
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Indeed, on the back of this summary diagnosis, I’m open to 
persuasion — contra my initial diagnosis of HALLOWEEN PARTY at 
2.5 supra — that, in HALLOWEEN PARTY, the condition that-I-do-not-
appear-to-Judy-Micheal’ly is not safe. More descriptive information 
about the case pointing in this direction could come to light. Moreover, 
orderings of modal space are contentious. If this condition is not, 
after all, safe, discovery that it is not safe will, I suggest, be matched 
by — will generate — an intuitive pull to withhold knowledge.27 We 
would, untroublingly, have unsafe non-knowledge.
Throughout, I — following most leading proponents of safety — rely 
on an intuitive ordering of possible worlds and do not commit on any 
substantive account of orderings of possible worlds (such as Lewis’s 
(1979)). Clearly, this leaves room for disagreement over whether a 
condition is safe (e.g. on account of context dependence and/or vagueness 
infecting the relevant subjunctive conditional which is being given a 
possible worlds analysis). But perhaps this is exactly what we should 
expect in hard cases (cf. Gendler and Hawthorne (2005) on the putative 
instability of knowledge-intuitions in hard cases). It must be conceded, 
however, that it is the very fact that modal orderings are contentious 
which leads some philosophers to give accounts of knowledge which do 
not use modal conditions at all.
2.8 Objection 2: My proposal trivialises the safety condition, for almost 
every true belief will, on this objection, turn out to be safe. Consider, 
for instance, PARTYGOER COIN-FLIP, and grant that the condition 
that-I-do-not-appear-to-Judy-Michael’ly is not CR-SAFE. That doesn’t by 
itself show that the belief in question isn’t safe, for there may be other 
CR-SAFEs relative to which the belief is safe. In this case, let the candidate 
condition be: that-the-party-is-at-Andy’s-house. This condition is, on 
this objection, CR-SAFE. That-the-party-is-at-Andy’s-house doesn’t entail 
that the party is at the house down the left road, and thereby counts as 
non-trivial. And Judy’s testimony does indicate the truth dependently 
27  For a contrasting strategy to that adopted in this chapter, see Williamson (2009: 
305): “One may have to decide whether safety obtains by first deciding whether 
knowledge obtains, rather than vice-versa.” Sloganistically, Williamson’s is a 
‘knowledge first’ strategy; mine (at least in hard cases) is a ‘safety first’ strategy.
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on this condition. But we’ve classed PARTYGOER COIN-FLIP as a case 
of intuitive non-knowledge.28 
Reply 2: But the condition that-the-party-is-at-Andy’s-house is not 
(relevantly-)CSAFE. It’s not the case that, if this C were the case in the 
way described in PARTYGOER COIN-FLIP, the party would be at Andy’s 
house in all close possible worlds. The party is only at Andy’s house 
in PARTYGOER COIN-FLIP thanks to a coin-flip landing tails (or my 
winning said lottery). If, by contrast, this C is stipulated to be (relevantly-)
CSAFE, the case is changed beyond all recognition and I don’t see that 
the resultant case would be a genuine Gettier-case. That is, suppose, for 
contrast, the party is at Andy’s house in all close possible worlds. Now is 
my belief that the party is at the house down the left road a clear case of 
non-knowledge? I don’t think so.29, 30
2.9 Objection 3: My proposal does not tell us how to find CR-SAFEs. 
Perhaps we’re better off with Sosa’s original proposal that — modulo 
no outright indication of truth — the putative knower must accept the 
indication “guided by”, or “on the basis of”, C. (Sosa’s original proposal, 
though, is, of course, vulnerable to Comesaña’s HALLOWEEN PARTY 
counterexample.)
Reply 3: I agree that no algorithm for finding CR-SAFEs is on offer. 
However: so what? I take it 2.4’s safety principle states a (disjunctive) 
necessary condition on knowledge. It doesn’t have epistemic pretensions 
to furthermore help us identify CR-SAFEs. Identifying such conditions is for 
(common-sense, philosophical) judgment to do (though this is not to say 
28  This objection would putatively generalise to Gettier-cases like Lehrer’s (1965: 
168–75) NOGOT AND HAVIT, in which the subject’s belief that someone in his office 
owns a Ford is safe dependently on the putative CR-SAFE: that-Havit-owns-a-Ford. 
Again: that-Havit-owns-a-Ford doesn’t entail that someone in the subject’s office 
owns a Ford; only that-Havit-who-is-in-the-subject’s-office-owns-a-Ford entails that.
29  And in NOGOT AND HAVIT, the condition that-Havit-owns-a-Ford is, for all we’re 
told in that case, not (relevantly-)CSAFE. If it’s stipulated to be a CSAFE, it’s less clear we 
have a genuine Gettier-case of non-knowledge — cf., inter alia, Klein (2008: 25–61) 
for the possibility of knowledge inferred from falsehoods. As noted in 2.6, though, 
I don’t claim to have set out a ‘Gettier-proof’ safety condition.
30  Is the condition that-the-party-is-at-Andy’s-house a candidate (complementary) 
CR-SAFE in HALLOWEEN PARTY? To answer this, we need more information about 
the likelihood of Michael himself (and any other potential ‘Michael-disguiser’, such 
that there be) talking to Judy at the crossroads.
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such identification will always be easy). 2.4’s safety principle is none the 
worse for leaving this epistemic task to judgment. Try plugging some 
non-trivial conditions into the relevant subjunctive conditional and then 
evaluate it. We might be pleasantly surprised — I conjecture — by the 
paucity of conditions — none? one? just more than one? — which turn 
out to be CR-SAFEs in this or that case.31
2.10 Objection 4: Whether a condition counts as (relevantly-)safe 
depends on how the condition and the facts that pre-date the condition 
are described. In JUDY COIN-FLIP, for example, the condition that-
Judy-is-not-appeared-to-heads’ly does not seem to be safe, and (as 
a result) it is a case of unsafe non-knowledge. But what prevents us 
from describing the relevant condition as the condition that-Judy-
is-not-appeared-to-heads’ly-given-the-fact-that-the-coin-lands-tails? 
This fact pre-dates the condition and, on this objection, guarantees 
that the condition holds in all close possible worlds. Using such a 
description, JUDY COIN-FLIP would come out as a case of either safe 
non-knowledge (which is troubling for my project) or safe knowledge 
(which is counterintuitive).
Reply 4: Objection 4 describes, not two different descriptions of one 
condition, but rather two different conditions — two ways of picking 
out different features of the world. Given a way close worlds are, we 
can fully expect two different conditions — two ways of picking out 
different features of the world — to differ in whether or not they’re 
(relevantly-)safe.32 As it happens, here, on a correct construal of the 
new condition, it shares the property of the condition in JUDY COIN-
FLIP of failing to be safe (and so failing to be relevantly-safe), and thus 
the difficulties that would have arisen had we had a case of safety do 
31  Some CR-SAFEs — in the event of there being more than one in a particular case — will, 
however, be explanatorily superior to others.
32  Beyond the claim that if one has two ways of picking out different features of 
the world one has two different conditions, I don’t commit on more substantive 
individuation criteria for conditions — that is, criteria for telling one numerically 
distinct condition from another. More specifically, I don’t commit on whether 
Leibniz’s law — the principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals — holds for the 
modal property of (relevant-)safety (or the logico-linguistic property of logical form 
considered in the next paragraph). (Even more plainly, I don’t need to commit on 
the status of the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles.)
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not arise. (On a mistaken construal, we’ll see, the new condition has 
different properties.)
Let me explain. The logical form of the new condition is, abbreviating, 
the following conditional: T ⊃ ~APP H.33 According to our safe condition 
schema (of 2.4 supra), to be safe a condition must ‘obtain’, and ‘hold’ in all 
close possible worlds. To do this, a conditional must be non-vacuously 
true throughout these worlds. And, while this conditional will not be 
false in any close possible worlds, it will go vacuously true — the coin 
will land heads — in some. We cannot, by diktat, stipulate that the 
coin lands tails in all close possible worlds: we are beholden to modal 
space. This condition, thus, is not safe. (If, mistakenly, one took non-
falsity in all close possible worlds to be sufficient for a conditional to 
be a safe condition, this conditional, while safe, will not be relevantly-
safe — consider the close worlds in which it goes vacuously true.)
Having said all this, let me concede that it may be that whether a 
condition counts as (relevantly-)safe can depend on how the condition 
is described. Return, for example, to HALLOWEEN PARTY. Suppose, 
with me, that the condition that-I-do-not-appear-to-Judy-Micheal’ly is 
relevantly-safe. But now also suppose that Judy happens to be the tallest 
person invited to Andy’s party. On one plausible way of individuating 
conditions, the condition that-I-do-not-appear-to-the-tallest-person-
invited-to-Andy’s-party-Micheal’ly is the same condition as the one 
we’ve classed as relevantly-safe — it picks out the same features of 
the world — just newly described. Equally plausibly, though, the newly 
described condition may fail to be (relevantly-)safe (cf. n. 31 supra). 
However, even if all this is so: so what? A given belief will count as safe 
if there is some description of a condition under which the condition in 
question counts as relevantly-safe.34
33  T = the-coin-lands-tails; ~APP H = Judy-is-not-appeared-to-heads’ly.
34  I do not lay myself open to trivialisation by this ‘some description’ test; the 
‘relevantly’ qualifier will pose a demanding test for such descriptions.
198 Basic Knowledge and Conditions on Knowledge
3. Conclusion
3.1 I haven’t conclusively demonstrated that (2.4’s) safety is a 
necessary condition on knowledge. I have, though, dismissed some 
cogent objections thereto.
9. Safety: An Application
In this final chapter, I bring epistemology to the practical domain of law. As 
Comesaña (2005) presented a putative counterexample to the necessity of 
Sosa’s (1999, 2002) safety condition, so I present a putative counterexample to 
the necessity of the safety condition that Pardo (2010) employs in his work on 
knowledge and jury verdicts. My aim is not, of course, to falsify the thesis that 
safety is necessary for knowledge, but rather to advance discussion of the safety 
condition in philosophy of law (see Pardo, 2011). Towards the end, connections 
are drawn with my proposal in Chapter Eight.
0.1 Michael Pardo (2010: 38) recently intriguingly argues that “the 
goal or aim of legal proof is knowledge (or something approximating 
knowledge) rather than less epistemically demanding goals.”1 Pardo 
(52) continues, “[L]egal verdicts require more than truth and justification 
[…] [T]ruth and justification also need to be connected in an appropriate 
way.” I do not want to contest (directly) this central claim of Pardo’s. 
My aim here is principally to show some difficulties for the account of 
(legal) knowledge with which Pardo (nn. 61 and 81) evidently operates, 
on which safety is a necessary condition. Highlighting these difficulties, 
however, puts pressure on Pardo’s central claim.
1  As Pardo (57) notes, this claim of his takes place against the backdrop of a vast 
epistemological literature devoted to analyzing whether, and in what respect, 
knowledge is more valuable than less epistemically demanding achievements. For 
a comprehensive overview, see Pritchard and Turri (2007/2012). For an illuminating 
recent proposal, see Goldman and Olsson (2009). Finally, while Pardo (46) notes 
interesting issues about the relationship between systemic and case-specific epistemic 
considerations, Pardo’s principal focus—and I follow suit—is on specific cases.
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The plan: first, I set out and probe Pardo’s Fake Cabs case — a case that 
demonstrates Pardo’s commitment to safety as a necessary condition on 
(legal) knowledge. Second, I present a putative legal counterexample 
to safety as a necessary condition on (legal) knowledge. I close by 
presenting Pardo with a trilemma.
1. Pardo’s Fake Cabs Case
1.1 Pardo (52) presents the following case:
Fake Cabs: The plaintiff files a lawsuit against the defendant, who owns and 
drives the only taxicab in town, claiming she was hit by the defendant’s 
cab while crossing the street. She saw the cab drive away but did not see 
the driver. A video camera at the intersection filmed the accident, and it 
shows what appears to be a cab (but not the driver) hitting the plaintiff, 
exactly as she claimed. Now, suppose the car in the video really is the 
defendant’s, but also that — unknown to the jury — along with his real 
cab there are hundreds of other cars in the town that look identical to his 
cab. The jury finds for the plaintiff based on the video.
And Pardo’s (52) gloss thereon:
The verdict is true and justified (that is, there is sufficient evidence 
before the jury and no evidence regarding the fake cabs), and […] there 
is a straight-forward causal connection between the true conclusion 
and the evidence. But there is still something problematic about the 
verdict — the jury would have formed the same conclusion if it had been 
one of the hundreds of other identical-looking cars on the video. The 
fortuitous circumstances — that it just happened to be the defendant’s 
cab — render the relationship between the conclusion’s truth and 
justification accidental in a way that undermines knowledge. It also […] 
makes the verdict problematic.
So far, so good. But what feature does Pardo take to explain the verdict’s 
problematicalness?:
The verdict is problematic primarily because it is unsafe — that is, in a 
number of similar possible worlds the jury would have reached the same 
result and been in error.2 (n. 61)
2  Plausibly, the verdict is also (what might be called) insensitive.
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Pardo thus evidently operates with an account of (legal) knowledge on 
which safety is a necessary condition.3
1.2 Let us put Pardo’s notion of unsafety on display alongside a cognate 
notion of safety. First, we can extract a general notion (pertaining to a 
subject S’s actual belief in a proposition p):
UNSAFETY*: In a number of similar possible worlds, S would 
have believed p, and been in error.
SAFETY*: It is not the case that in a number of similar possible 
worlds, S would have believed p, and been in error.4
For familiar reasons,5 these theses need to be refined as follows:
3  Now that Fake Cabs has been introduced and preliminarily grappled with, 
note that the case from which Fake Cabs is derived — Fake Barns — originates in 
Goldman (1976) (with Goldman crediting Carl Ginet with the case). Fake Cabs is 
the first of several thought experiments in this chapter. The success of the thought 
experiments does not depend on their being empirically likely. (But consider the 
more prosaic presentation in Duff, Farmer, Marshall and Tadros (2007: 91), of 
a case of a defendant convicted accurately on the basis of evidence that though 
apparently sufficient at trial, turned out to be tainted or unreliable. Such cases that 
bear similarities to Fake Cabs are by no means far-fetched.) Rather, by abstracting 
from the untidiness of real-life cases, they serve interestingly to put pressure on 
concepts germane to the project of inquiry and to elicit intuitive judgments thereon. 
The sharpened conceptual awareness arising from consideration of these thought 
experiments can then serve to hone normative claims about the goal or aim of legal 
proof in verdicts in concrete legal systems.
In Fake Cabs the relationship between truth and justification is accidental in a 
knowledge-undermining way. Following the seminal paper by Gettier (1963), we 
can refer to such verdicts as being Gettierised. (Importantly, my thought experiment 
in section 2, Insecure Mafia, is not a Gettierised verdict; it is central to Insecure Mafia 
that knowledge is not undermined.) Objection: Pardo’s claim that legal verdicts 
ought to be non-Gettierised is utopian: with sufficient ingenuity we can ‘tweak’ 
the facts of any otherwise unproblematic verdict to Gettierise it. Reply: Pardo is 
claiming that legal verdicts ought to be non-Gettierised; not (contra the objection) 
non-Gettierisable — where non-Gettierisable verdicts are verdicts with a guarantee 
that the facts cannot be tweaked to Gettierise them.
4  Safety has received many different formulations — and defenses as a necessary 
condition on knowledge — in the epistemological literature; cf., notably, Williamson 
(2000: ch.5); and Sosa (2002). Pardo’s ‘in a number of similar possible worlds’ 
locution is regrettably imprecise. We might read ‘a number of’ as ‘some’. If we do 
so, Pardo’s SAFETY* would be equivalent to: In no similar possible worlds is it the 
case that S would have believed p, and been in error. The formulations extracted 
from Pardo are not ideal, but aim to stay close to Pardo’s n. 61.
5  See the famous ‘granny’ case in Nozick (1981).
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UNSAFETY: In a number of similar possible worlds, S would 
have believed p on the same basis, and been in error.
SAFETY: It is not the case that in a number of similar possible 
worlds, S would have believed p on the same basis, and been in 
error.
Second, to focus the discussion, let us put Pardo’s restricted notion of 
jury unsafety on display alongside a cognate notion of jury safety:
JURY UNSAFETY: In a number of similar possible worlds the 
jury would have reached the same result on the same basis, and 
been in error.
JURY SAFETY: It is not the case that in a number of similar 
possible worlds the jury would have reached the same result on 
the same basis, and been in error.6
Given certain plausible assumptions — notably, a jury forming a 
belief in the relevant legal proposition semantically expressed by its 
verdict7 — a counterexample to jury safety as a necessary condition on 
(legal) knowledge serves as a counterexample to safety as a necessary 
condition on knowledge.
1.3 We can see the intuitive appeal of Pardo’s analysis by ‘tweaking’ 
the facts of Fake Cabs. Consider:
Fake Cabs*: As Fake Cabs, but the video camera filming the 
accident is operated by Sam Spade, a private investigator, hired to 
investigate the defendant’s conduct, with perfect discriminative 
abilities in picking out the defendant’s cab.8
This tweak now makes the jury’s verdict safe: now it is not the case 
that in a number of similar possible worlds — say, worlds in which 
the defendant’s cab hits the plaintiff at a slightly different angle and/
6  One could construct like restricted notions for other legal fact finders.
7  I prescind from the difficult question of what is it for a jury (a group of minded 
individuals) to form a belief (whether it is, for example, just a matter of all — or a 
majority of — the individuals forming beliefs with the same content).
8  Similar tweaks are given to Fake Barns in the epistemological literature — e.g., cloud 
occlusion of the fake barns, binoculars trained rigidly on the real barn, etc.
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or velocity — the jury’s finding for the plaintiff would be in error. And 
now (modulo no other knowledge-thwarting luck in the offing) the 
problematicalness of the verdict vanishes and it becomes a candidate for 
knowledge. We can play out this tweak — namely, rendering an unsafe 
verdict safe — in a number of similar cases to comparable effect. So I take 
the point to generalize. Pardo’s explanation of the problematicalness of 
the verdict in Fake Cabs seems on the right lines, and safety seems a good 
candidate to be a necessary condition on (legal) knowledge.
2. Legal Counterexample to Safety as a Necessary 
Condition on Knowledge
2.1 Consider:
Insecure Mafia: The chief prosecution witness, Amoruso, an honest 
and reliable citizen, is ready truthfully to provide damning 
evidence against the guilty defendant, Baggio, a member of the 
Mafia — such evidence guaranteeing a guilty verdict. However, 
Insecure Mafia, the Mafia’s rival, has reason to believe that 
Baggio’s brother, Carbone, may be a member of the jury and is 
certain that Carbone, if on the jury and presented with damning 
evidence against Baggio, will successfully obstruct a guilty 
verdict. So as not to lose face (by dint of a rival mafioso going scot-
free and being seen to do so), Insecure Mafia devises the following 
plan: should Carbone appear on the jury on the first day of trial, 
Insecure Mafia will overnight switch Baggio for Twin Baggio (an 
unrelated exact lookalike of Baggio) — Twin Baggio becomes the 
defendant — and will inform only Carbone of the switch (who 
is no longer motivated to obstruct the guilty verdict). Baggio 
has no incentive to reveal the switch, and Twin Baggio is paid 
handsomely by Insecure Mafia in return for his silence. Amoruso 
would then, unawares, untruthfully provide the same damning 
evidence against Twin Baggio, thereby guaranteeing an unjust 
guilty verdict against Twin Baggio and saving Insecure Mafia’s 
face — at least it would seem like a rival mafioso had been sent 
down. Carbone, however, is not on the jury. At the final hurdle in 
the tests for jury membership — Carbone having passed ninety-
nine of the one hundred tests — it emerges, quite by chance, that 
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Carbone is Baggio’s brother, and Carbone is dismissed. So the 
plan is not initiated, and the case proceeds normally. Amoruso 
provides true damning evidence against Baggio, and the jury 
convicts Baggio on the basis of Amoruso’s testimony.9
Plausibly, in this case, the jury knows that the defendant is 
guilty10 — therefore, modulo Pardo’s central claim, the goal or aim of 
legal proof has been realized. And yet, plausibly, in a number of similar 
possible worlds the jury would have reached the same result on the same 
basis (Amoruso’s testimony), and would have been in error. That is, in 
this case the jury knows that the defendant is guilty, but its verdict is not 
jury-safe. The jury has unsafe (legal) knowledge.
2.2 Objection (premise 1): the jury knows that Baggio is guilty (by 
Amoruso’s testimony). And this knowledge is safe — the jury would 
not easily have been in error. However, according to this objector 
(premise 2), the jury does not know that Baggio is the defendant; modulo 
the details of Insecure Mafia, the jury would easily have been in error, 
and if the man in the dock — the defendant — had not been Baggio, 
the jury would still have believed he was Baggio, and so on. Therefore, 
inductively (conclusion), the jury does not, after all, know that the 
defendant is guilty — no unsafe (legal) knowledge.11
9  Insecure Mafia is inspired by Comesaña’s (2005) Halloween Party case (though there 
are salient differences). Neta and Rohrbaugh (2004) also concoct two putative cases 
of unsafe knowledge, one of which involves a lottery. One may construct (more 
streamlined) variations on Insecure Mafia involving, for example, lotteries (e.g., 
where the switch is dependent on a lottery result); but my sense is that lottery cases 
lend an otherworldly nature to these cases. In any event, cases of this general form 
seem capable of being invented.
10  How does Insecure Mafia (knowledge) differ from Fake Cabs (non-knowledge)? 
One idea is that the threat to knowledge in Fake Cabs is actual — there really are 
fake cabs around the video camera — whereas the threat in Insecure Mafia is purely 
counterfactual — Carbone is not on the jury.
11  Consider: there is an opaque box into which I shall put either a frog, Kermit, or a 
donkey, Eeyore. I introduce you (an honest and reliable citizen) and a third party 
to Kermit but not to Eeyore. You think that I shall put Kermit in the box because 
I tell you, but only you, that I will. As it happens, I flip a coin to decide which 
animal to put in the box. The coin lands heads up, meaning, suppose, that I do in 
fact put Kermit in the box. Now you, pointing at the box, say to the third party, 
‘The animal in this box is smaller than a bread bin.’ Does the third party know this 
claim? Objection (premise 1’): the third party does safely know that Kermit is smaller 
than a bread bin (by perception and my testimony). However (premise 2’), the third 
party does not know that Kermit is the animal in the box. So, inductively (conclusion’), 
the third party does not know that the animal in the box is smaller than a bread bin. 
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Reply: the proponent of Insecure Mafia should deny premise 2 and affirm 
that the jury does (unsafely) know that Baggio is the defendant. How so? 
The proponent must, plausibly, say it is a perceptual-cum-testimonial 
analogue of the jury’s (unsafe) knowledge that the defendant is guilty 
in Insecure Mafia itself.12
3. Conclusion
3.1 This all suggests the following trilemma for Pardo (and how 
intuitively problematic he views the outcome in Insecure Mafia will have 
a bearing on which limb he takes and in what fashion): (1) retain his 
central claim that (safe) knowledge13 is the goal or aim of legal proof 
and deny that Insecure Mafia is a case of knowledge;14 (2) retain his central 
claim that (safe) knowledge is the goal or aim of legal proof and deny 
that Insecure Mafia is a case of unsafety;15 or (3) withdraw his central claim 
that (safe) knowledge is the goal or aim of legal proof. Each option has 
its drawbacks.16
No unsafe knowledge. And, the objector would press, Insecure Mafia is relevantly 
similar (though obviously disanalogous in some ways): ‘I/my’ is Insecure Mafia; 
Kermit is Baggio; Eeyore is Twin Baggio; ‘you’ is Amoruso; the third party is the 
jury; the coin flip is the jury tests; the animal in the box is the defendant; and ‘is 
smaller than a bread bin’ is ‘is guilty’.
12  Reply to n. 11’s objection: the proponent of Insecure Mafia should deny that 
n. 11’s case is relevantly similar to Insecure Mafia. Premise 2’ is true, but only 
because — unlike, mutatis mutandis, Insecure Mafia — the third party receives no 
knowledge-conferring evidence that Kermit is the animal in the box. If the third 
party does receive such knowledge-conferring evidence (e.g., testimony from you 
after my coin flip), the cases become relevantly similar, but premise 2’ becomes 
false.
13  By ‘(safe) knowledge’ I mean knowledge on which safety is a necessary condition.
14  In Chapter Eight, I proposed a different safety condition which could be used 
to argue that Insecure Mafia is a case of unsafe non-knowledge (see section 2.7 of 
Chapter Eight especially). (Perhaps, though, plausibly, for a world to be relevantly 
similar, Carbone needs to be dismissed — as in the actual world, according to 
Insecure Mafia. One might analogise the facts leading to Carbone’s dismissal with 
the element of prior decision in Halloween Party (see section 2.5 of Chapter Eight), 
such that that-Carbone-is-dismissed is a relevantly-safe condition. I reject the analogy: 
the facts leading to Carbone’s dismissal are designed to be ‘luck-infected’ in a way 
that the prior decision in Halloween Party is not.)
15  This option involves constructing a (plausible and motivated) modified safety 
condition on which the jury’s verdict in Insecure Mafia comes out safe. For an 
explicitly time-sensitive safety condition that could be put to such use, cf. Sainsbury 
(1997); Peacocke (1999: 310–28); and Williamson (2000: 124).
16  Pardo (2011) has replied to me.

Conclusion
We have explored the viability of allowing immediate justification 
and basic knowledge. While the existence of such a category of 
knowledge/justification strikes many as plausible, we observed (in 
Part One of the book) that to allow it is to face several problems. Good 
responses can be offered to most of these problems, but the objection 
discussed in Chapter Five was strong. In the Interim Review, I suggested 
several genuinely promising ways to respond to the objection. While 
I attempted to develop them, I concluded that, at this stage, I cannot 
take myself to have fully vindicated them. This led me to the following 
conditional verdict: If it really is the case that the justification to believe 
the quotidian proposition depends epistemically (constitutively) on the 
antecedent justification to believe that the source K is reliable, then (as I 
said in the Introduction) it is at best unclear whether this is even Cohenian 
basic knowledge. On the other hand, if there is not the constitutive 
epistemic dependence then we should say that it is Pryorian (and thus 
Cohenian) basic knowledge, and that the challenge to dogmatism is not 
compelling. While it would be optimal to enter a categorical — and not 
provisional — verdict, I still hope to have made some progress by my 
elaboration and scrutiny of several possible responses to Chapter Five’s 
objection (in addition to the proposals I made in Chapters One to Four).
We then considered (in Part Two of the book) certain conditions which 
some philosophers have claimed are necessary for knowledge — viz. 
conclusive reasons, sensitivity and safety. While not decisively defending 
the (conclusive reasons or) sensitivity condition as a necessary condition 
on knowledge, several principled modifications thereto emerged as we 
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concluded that two recent forceful arguments in favour of a plausible 
knowledge-closure principle were not knock-down successes. This 
conclusion with respect to knowledge-closure, we noted, was of 
relevance to the prospects for basic knowledge: rejection of knowledge-
closure, and perhaps also of justification-closure, may provide a means 
of defending such a category of knowledge from the argument(s) in 
Chapter Five. Finally, we noted that a modified safety condition may 
well be a necessary condition on knowledge (and proceeded to attempt 
to advance discussion of the safety condition in philosophy of law).
Many avenues for further research open up. (Clearly, the most 
pressing challenge is to attempt to convert the provisional verdict 
entered on the viability of basic knowledge into something more 
categorical.) Let me mention just two from each part of the book, and 
then one more tying together Parts One and Two (though there are, of 
course, many more such avenues in practice).
Focusing on dogmatism about justification, according to which 
one can have immediate justification, Pryor (2000: 539) limits his 
dogmatism to “propositions we seem to perceive to be so, but not in 
virtue of seeming to perceive that other propositions are so, [which 
he calls] perceptually basic propositions, or propositions that our 
experiences basically represent.” In this book I did not consider the 
scope of perceptually basic propositions (such that there be); and Pryor 
himself has yet to fully commit on this subject. This large and important 
issue — the issue of the possible contents of perceptual representation 
(see Siegel 2005/2010) — is one which I’d like to consider further.
For our second avenue for further research from Part One, recall 
that in the Interim Review we considered the possibility of some kind 
of putative default justification against sceptical hypotheses. It would 
seem that different philosophers will want to say very different things 
about such default justification. It would be a useful project to gain a 
deeper understanding of the different substantive things philosophers 
have said about such default justification — in particular, determining 
to what extent the different substantive notions of default justification 
are compatible with one another (see, for example Burge 1993, 2003, 
Wright 2004, and Davies 2004).
Next, taking Part Two, in Chapter Seven we made several principled 
modifications to a sensitivity condition (and, in Chapter Six, to a 
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conclusive reasons condition). It would be an interesting project — our 
first avenue from this part — to consider whether further work could 
result in a sensitivity condition bulletproof to counterexample as a 
necessary condition on knowledge across the board. A corollary of any 
such project would involve an extension of the scope of application 
of any such condition beyond the principal scope of application of 
our project in Chapter Six, viz. atomic propositions, conjunctions, 
disjunctions, and (some) negations. Indeed — and relevantly to 
a defense of dogmatism — such a project might be extended to 
investigate whether justification to believe might itself be characterised 
by a sensitivity condition
Also — our second avenue from this part — Chapters Eight and 
Nine looked at the safety condition, with Chapter Nine in particular 
considering an application of epistemological work to a practical 
domain — law. An increasing number of theorists are considering 
possible applications of some of the conditions considered in Part 
Two for law (see, for an example involving sensitivity, Enoch, Spectre 
and Fisher (2012)). Such projects deserve serious consideration — in 
particular, questions must be asked whether domains such as law raise 
especial problems for engaging in applied epistemology.
To close, let me detail a research challenge firmly tying Part Two 
(specifically Chapter Eight — and Nine) back to Part One. It is a pretty 
stern challenge, particularly as the two bodies of literature on Parts One 
and Two of the book typically operate independently from one another. 
The rewards of successfully completing such a challenge, however, 
have the potential to be great: to provide a unified account of basic 
knowledge would be no small philosophical achievement.
Martin Smith (2009) has (in effect) intriguingly attempted to 
connect issues from Part One of the book — in particular, transmission 
failure — with issues from Part Two of the book — in particular, safety. 
(It will be seen that the notion of antecedence — whether temporal or 
epistemic — does not feature in Smith’s account of transmission failure.) 
Insofar as Smith’s arguments go through (cf. Tucker (2013b) for criticism 
of Smith) — and I do not commit on this here — my tentative defense of 
safety as a necessary condition on knowledge could be put to work in 
providing an analysis of transmission failure.
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Smith (2009) applies several novel distinctions in developing his 
account of transmission failure in terms of safety. It is best to put the 
nub of Smith’s contention on display up front — laden with heretofore 
unexplained Smith-terminology — and then to explain Smith’s 
contention by explaining Smith’s terminology. Smith’s terminology is 
best explained with the aid of an example — the ‘zebra’ case (considered, 
en passant, previously in this book). Here is the heart of Smith’s claim:
Suppose one safely believes that P is true, notices that Q is a deductive 
consequence of P and proceeds to infer that Q is true too. If one’s belief 
that Q is safe purely in virtue of its content, then presumably it cannot 
be said to be safe in virtue of the inference from P. One’s belief that Q 
would have been safe irrespective of whether one inferred Q from P—it 
would have been safe even if it were held as an article of faith. Safety, 
we might say, is not always transmitted by deductive inference. When 
knowledge is not transmitted, this may be due to the safety condition 
[…] All that I am claiming here is that a failure to transmit safety is a 
sufficient condition for a failure to transmit knowledge. Even if an 
inference transmits safety, it may yet fail to transmit knowledge because 
of a failure to transmit some other necessary precondition. (Internal 
footnote omitted) (Smith 2009: 171–72)
(Smith appears to assume, without argument, that safety is a necessary 
condition on knowledge.) Let ‘P’ be ‘the animals are zebras’ and let ‘Q’ be 
‘the animals are not disguised mules’. (Moreover, suppose one believes 
P on the basis, B, ‘the animals are black and white, striped and equine’.) 
Suppose one infers Q from P in this case. In such a case Smith contends 
that one’s belief that Q is safe purely in virtue of its content. What does 
this come to? In essence, it comes to one’s belief that Q being safe purely 
in virtue of the modal profile of Q. In essence, here, the point is that one’s 
belief that the animals are not disguised mules is true purely in virtue 
of the fact that worlds in which the animals are disguised mules are very 
remote. It follows that if this belief is safe purely in virtue of its content, 
then it is not safe in virtue of the inference. (Plausibly if P is safe, that 
which is deductively inferred from P — Q — is also safe. Smith endorses 
this, and he would put this as safety always being preserved — if not 
always being transmitted — by deductive inference. His point is that in 
the ‘zebra’ case the inference, as contrasted with content, is playing no 
explanatory role — the in virtue of relation — in the safety of that which 
is inferred. As Smith puts it, the belief that Q in this case “would have 
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been safe even if it were held as an article of faith”.) In this last respect, 
Smith would contrast his diagnosis of the ‘zebra’ case — transmission 
failure — from many quotidian inferences — no transmission failure. 
And Smith notes that:
A belief may be safe purely in virtue of its content even though it was 
deductively inferred from a belief that is safe in virtue of its basis. The 
zebra inference, of course, provides one example of this phenomenon. 
(My emphasis) (2009: 171)
(A belief safe in virtue of its basis is one safe in virtue of the modal 
relationship between the basis and the believed proposition.) In sum, for 
Smith, failure of an inference to transmit safety — failure of an inferred 
belief to be safe in virtue of the inference — is a sufficient condition for 
an inference to fail to transmit knowledge; a sufficient condition, that is, 
for transmission failure. (Since safety is preserved by deductive inference, 
this promises an account of transmission failure that is consistent with 
the preservation of knowledge by deductive inference.)
Now Smith’s account of transmission failure in terms of safety has 
been boiled down here to its bare essentials. Nonetheless, I hope its 
broad outline is now apparent, and, moreover, that it is at least initially 
plausible. To repeat, insofar as it can be fully vindicated (something 
on which I don’t presently commit), we would have an explanation 
of a phenomenon considered in Part One of the book — transmission 
failure — in terms of a phenomenon considered in Part Two of the 
book — safety.
Indeed, we can draw an analogy between Smith’s position and 
Wright’s position. When we have transmission failure on Wright’s 
account, it is because of epistemic circularity. The inferred proposition 
is in good order epistemically, but not in virtue of the inference. 
Rather, the inferred proposition is in good order epistemically because 
of justification by default. So there will always be preservation (of 
justification) despite the failure of transmission of justification. Safety 
purely in virtue of content is the analogue of justification by default.
(The analogy will be tighter, and Smith’s account of transmission 
failure of knowledge can carry over to transmission failure of justification, 
insofar as safety is accorded a justificatory role. Smith rejects according 
safety such a role on the basis that safe beliefs must be true, while 
justified beliefs need not be; and he accordingly prefers to explain 
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transmission failure of justification in terms of his own non-factive 
notion of reliability. Even insofar as safe beliefs must be true (cf. Chapter 
Seven, n. 2), something on which I believe I can remain neutral, I think 
that this is compatible with safety being accorded a justificatory role. 
To carve out space for such a role we can appeal to our previously 
introduced distinction between prima- and ultima-facie justification. The 
view would be that prima facie justified (dogmatist) beliefs need not be 
safe, and so need not be true; but ultima facie justified (dogmatist) beliefs 
must be safe, and therefore true.)
As a result of the analogy with Wright, we can predict that the 
problem of easy knowledge would be solved by appeal to transmission 
failure. It seems that looking at a red table and doing some simple 
inference is too easy to be a way of coming to know that there is no 
tricky red lighting. But ‘there is no tricky red lighting’ is safe purely in 
virtue of content: it would be safe if it were believed as an article of faith.
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